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Abstract  
Economic diplomacy is a political approach regarding how a country seeks to deal 
with other countries to maximise their national gains in various areas through obtaining 
a comparative advantage against others that do not use such political practices. This 
study examines the potential role of economic diplomacy in the foreign policy of the 
UAE and its impact on the trade and investment flows for 18 years (1999-2016). The 
study objective is to assess the effectiveness of diplomatic entities, such as embassies 
and consulates and signed legal agreements on delivering the desired trade and 
investment outcomes. The research method is a quantitative econometric gravity 
model of the UAE-X countries based on the Generalized Gravity Theory (GGT), 
which is suitable for assessing trade and investment determinants. Thus, two 
augmented gravity models for trade and investments were built to determine the impact 
of the independent variables on trade and investments. Panel data format was used to 
run a random effect generalised least square regression with robust standard errors and 
the dependent variable being the total trade and total investments. The generated 
results provided support information for making the right decisions to sign the bilateral 
or multilateral agreements by the diplomatic entities and even perform due diligence 
to assess doing trade or investments in various regions in the world. The UAEs’ global 
trade potential reveals that the effects of economic diplomacy are seen in East Asia, 
the GCC, Europe, and African counties, while the investment potential was focused 
on East Asia. The findings offer indirect support for the emerging literature on new 
and intangible barriers or enablers to trade and investments. Towards this end, higher 
income countries tend to have more flow of trade and investment with the UAE 
through the positive impact of having embassies and trade offices, along with signed 
agreements. Moreover, the low impact of economic diplomacy means with the 
Caribbean and Pacific islands is due to limited infrastructure and trade facilitation and 
no availability of data. Besides the findings mentioned above, this study opened up 
several questions for future research. Among these questions, why some economic, 
diplomatic tools are insignificant, ineffective, and sometimes unfavourable from one 
region to another?  
Keywords: Foreign policy, diplomatic entities, commercial attaché, economic 
diplomacy, international cooperation, foreign aid, foreign direct investment, UAE. 
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 )cibarA ni( tcartsbA dna eltiT
العربية المتحدة  الإماراتدور الدبلوماسية الاقتصادية في السياسية الخارجية لدولة 
 وانعكاساتها على التدفقات التجارية والاستثمارية
 الملخص
لطريقة التي تسعى بها البلدان للتعامل يشار إلى الدبلوماسية الاقتصادية على أنها العملية وا
خرى لتحقيق أقصى قدر ممكن من مكاسبها الوطنية في مجموعة متنوعة من مع البلدان الأ
م بذلك تسعى تلك الدول للحصول على ميزة مقارنة تجاه الدول التي لا تستخدم المجالات. عبر القيا
لوماسية الاقتصادية في السياسة ور الدببحثت د هذه،في رسالتي  .مثل هذه الأدوات أو الممارسات
سنة  81لدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة وتأثيرها على تدفقات التجارة والاستثمار لمدة الخارجية 
. حيث أن الأهداف الرئيسية هي تقييم كفاءة وفعالية أدوات 6102حتى عام  9991من عام 
بالإضافة إلى إبرام اتفاقيات  القائمة،عثات دبلوماسية اقتصادية مثل فتح بعثات أو زيادة عدد الب
وكذلك على المستوى  والاستثمار،ادية ثنائية، في تحقيق النتائج المرجوة على التجارة اقتص
قمت بدراسة  ذلك،السياسي الثنائي ومتعدد الأطراف لدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة. وعلاوة على 
أو اتفاقات  ي التجارة والاستثمار والاتفاقيات سواء الثنائيةالعلاقة المتبادلة بين النتائج المرغوبة ف
التجارة الحرة الموقعة على المستوى المتعدد الأطراف من خلال دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي 
استخدمت في رسالتي  وتأثيرها على تدفق التجارة والاستثمارات مع جميع القارات حول العالم.
حيث  ية تؤدي إلى اختبار كل فرضية والوصول إلى نتيجة.منهجية بحث تشتمل على مقاربة كم
طورت نموذًجا سببيًا للتجارة والاستثمار لدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة لتحليل السياسات وفقا 
قياسا على الدراسات والنظريات والمقالات الأكاديمية السابقة  )TGG( لنظرية الجاذبية المعممة
الأكاديمية  اتالنظريلمنهجيات والمتغيرات المستخدمة، حيث تشير التي تمت مناقشتها في فصل ا
إلى أن تلك المنهجية تم استخدامها أيًضا واختبارها من قبل مؤلفي مقالات أكاديمية مختلفة في 
مجال تقييم محددات التجارة والاستثمار وكذلك مقالات أدوات الدبلوماسية الاقتصادية. ونتيجة 
بار كفاءة وفعالية كل كل من التجارة والاستثمار لاخت جين جديين لزيادةقمت بتطوير نموذ لذلك،
متغير وهما أدوات الدبلوماسية الاقتصادية وسمات البلدان لتحديد تأثيرها على تدفق التجارة 
والاستثمار. تم استخدام كلا النموذجين لدراسة تأثير الثوابت الاقتصادية على متغير إجمالي 
توفر لصانعي القرار الأطروحة بطريقة  وتوصياتتتم مناقشة نتائج  .راتالتجارة والاستثما
واتخاذ  الأطراف،المعلومات المطلوبة عند اتخاذ القرارات للتوقيع على اتفاقية ثنائية أو متعددة 
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لتقييم  بتحليل المخاطر من قبل التجار والمستثمرينوحتى القيام  قنصلية،قرار بشأن فتح سفارة أو 
النتائج ومن خلال  في الختامالعالم. ستثمارات في مناطق مختلفة من ام بالتجارة أو الاجدوى القي
تميل البلدان ذات الدخل المرتفع إلى زيادة تدفق التجارة  هذه،في رسالتي التي توصلت إليها 
 والقنصلياتالإمارات، وقد أظهر معظمها تأثيراً إيجابيا ً لوجود السفارات  دولة والاستثمار مع
في تعزيز التدفقات  الدبلوماسية الاقتصاديةوهذا تأكيد آخر لدور  معها،توقيع على اتفاقات الو
ألا وهو الحاجة إلى  المناقشة،يضيف تحليلي عنصرا جديدا في تلك كما ، التجارية والاستثمارية
.  اتدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة عبر إقامة علاق إنشاء سفارات أجنبية من هذه المناطق في
 .والاستثمار للتجارة كعامل محفز مهمسياسية تولد الثقة 
 الدبلوماسية الملحقية التجارية، ،الدبلوماسية بعثاتال، السياسة الخارجية مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية:
 الخارجية، الاستثمار الخارجي المباشر، دولة الإمارات.  التعاون الدولي، المساعدات الاقتصادية،
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
Economic Diplomacy is a political approach regarding how a country seeks to deal 
with other countries to maximise their national gains in a variety of areas. In doing so, 
the country seeks to obtain a comparative advantage against nations that do not use 
such tools or practices.  Ruffini (2016) defined Economic Diplomacy as “the method 
or processes by which a country takes advantage of cross-border economic activities 
to achieve its ultimate national interests”. In contrast, Naray (2008) used the term 
Commercial Diplomacy as “ the activities that are conducted by state’s representatives 
with diplomatic status for the reason that the business promotion between a home and 
a host country aiming at encouraging bilateral trade and investment flows”.  
Economic Diplomacy is not a new approach in foreign policy; it had been used many 
years ago for removing barriers that might withstand the flow of investment and trade, 
as well as support negotiations on exceptional deals. Despite the relatively long history 
of Economic Diplomacy, there remains a debate as regards its efficiency and 
effectiveness. It is, therefore, a relatively complicated process for a young developing 
country with large positive surpluses that are invested through national sovereign 
wealth funds. The criticism that has been made is that these sovereign funds are 
invested in obtaining the highest risk-adjusted returns. Saner and Yiu (2003) stressed 
on the urgent need to redefine diplomacy in a sense that governments provide national 
development assistance to foreign countries through their home enterprises, while also 
entering into assistance programs that lead to receiving back diplomatic or 
multinational status support in return.  
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At the same time, the UAE Vision 2021 (2010) seeks to carry out a significant 
transformation of the country in a short space to become a significant economic and 
trading nation. The transformation of the country is taking place at a time when there 
are increasing threats both political and economic. In the case of the latter, the primary 
earner of the economy namely hydrocarbons is challenged by new producers leading 
to a drastic fall in oil prices. In the case of the former, the UAE is in a highly volatile 
region and thus needs to ensure its national security. This includes not only its national 
borders but essential aspects, such as food and water which are extremely important in 
an arid region.  
Therefore, bilateral relationships are entering a period where new tools are required. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the uniqueness of this research shall provide 
positive contributions to the relevant literature that examines the role of Economic 
Diplomacy for the UAE and can support the country’s new international path in policy 
making, strategies and initiatives. As a consequence, the dissertation shall add to the 
body of knowledge the effectiveness of Economic Diplomacy tools for a country such 
as the UAE which this research seeks to fill.   
1.2 Problem Statement  
The United Arab Emirates Foreign policy constitutes of various elements and pillars 
of which this dissertation examines some elements of the economic diplomacy pillar. 
The decision-making process to strike agreements and expand diplomatic missions 
relies on various factors. However, what this dissertation looks at is a few of the 
economic diplomacy means that may affect the overall bilateral trade and investment. 
Such an empirical approach that provides a sound and scientific methodology to assess 
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each economic diplomacy means and their effectiveness on the bilateral trade and flow 
of foreign direct investments is useful for the decision-making process. 
1.3 Relevant Literature 
1.3.1 Economic Diplomacy as Part of the Foreign Policy 
Economic diplomacy is referred to as the method or processes by which states take 
advantage of cross-border economic activities to further their national interests 
(Ruffini, 2016). In doing so, nations seek to obtain a comparative advantage against 
nations that do not use such tools or practices. Ruffini (2016) states that Economic 
Diplomacy is also about making connections between the sphere of corporate players, 
who export or invest abroad, and the sphere of diplomats, who represent the state on 
the international scene and implement geopolitical decisions. 
Diplomacy has been evolving, and so has its definition and understanding as well as 
the professional identity of the diplomats. Diplomacy is an old practice that dates back 
to the ancient Greek empire and has evolved significantly over the past periods. 
Significant contributions have been made by several civilisations particularly during 
the Italian city-states, the French before the French revolution, and in England starting 
with industrialisation and the expansion of the British Empire. Regular and significant 
contributions have been made by the United States of America especially after the 
second world war with the modern large scale social science research aiming at 
analysing, understanding and synthesising to better understand the behaviour of the 
international negotiators (Saner & Yiu, 2003).  
Economic Diplomacy is not a new tool and has been used for many decades to 
eliminate investment and trade barriers and to negotiate special deals. Moons and van 
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Bergeijk (2016) argue that Economic Diplomacy is used primarily for the following 
reasons: 
i] To open foreign markets so that trade can increase. Interestingly, initially, the 
focus of countries was to export; however more recently nations have realised 
that their companies need to be part of global value chains and hence two-way 
trade is essential. In many respects, the focus is to remove trade impediment 
and to ensure that lengthy trade facilitation procedures do not negatively 
impact latest production systems. 
ii] To lobby on behalf of national firms to enter foreign markets or gain some 
competitive advantage. This may also include dealing with government-related 
outstanding or contractual obligations. 
iii] To bring about multi-country systems such as the recent Trade Facilitation 
Agreement which ensures that all countries follow a single system. In part, this 
also implies negotiating international agreements and ensuring their 
compliance. 
iv] Attracting inward investment. It may seem a little odd that countries such that 
are rich and highly developed seek inward investment. However, the reality is 
that inward investment brings with it many benefits such as new technology, 
linkages that support domestic small and medium-sized firms, and so on. 
Okano-Heijmans (2010) argues that Economic Diplomacy is about economics as an 
instrument of international foreign policy to give the below definition:  
i] Diplomacy concerned with economic policy questions. 
ii] Diplomacy that employs economic resources, either as rewards or sanctions, in 
pursuit of a particular foreign policy objective. 
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Since economic tools can be used not only for foreign policy objectives but also for 
domestic political goals, Economic Diplomacy cannot be understood without 
consideration of the domestic domain. Indeed, in Economic Diplomacy, governments 
try to reconcile three types of tensions: between politics and economics; between 
international and domestic pressures; and between government and other actors 
(Woolcock, 2008). Lee (2010) argues that international developments whether they 
are economic or political are driven by diplomacy. Historically, this area of 
international relations was viewed within a context of state-driven issues or security. 
However, more recent academic research has taken a broader approach and examined 
the economic interests of a country to how diplomacy is carried out.  
In part, the focus on economic matters has been forced on countries through the 
development of multinational institutions such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund in the post second world war. These multinational institutions in the 
last sixty years have become extremely important organisations wielding considerable 
power and influence over a country. These multinational institutions are concerned 
with issues relating to intellectual property rights, e-commerce agreements, 
transnational finance negotiations, trade facilitation, climate change and more recently 
sustainable development goals. Therefore, a new form of diplomacy is required that 
goes beyond simply security concerns of a country and takes a more holistic approach. 
In recent years, however, there have been many notable shifts in the study of 
diplomacy. As per Lee (2010), several scholars outlined the need to understand 
international relations outside the narrow state-centric security nexus. In light of this, 
the author focused on how contributors to this developing debate have moved the study 
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of diplomacy towards a better understanding of the processes and practices of 
Economic Diplomacy.  
Several researchers have used analytical tools from various social-science sectors, in 
particular, International Political Economy (IPE) and Business Studies, to shed lights 
on the importance, and impact, of economic factors and economic needs to diplomatic 
practice and processes. Also, they developed new concepts of diplomacy – catalytic 
diplomacy, network diplomacy, and multi-stakeholder diplomacy – which created new 
tools to recognise the greater variety of state and non-state factors in diplomatic 
practice as well as to shed lights on the different and changing character of diplomatic 
processes. Diplomacy, in this view, is not limited to inter-state relations in the global 
and international system but also caters for the social, economic, cultural and political 
relations among networks of political factors in formal and informal domestic and 
systemic environments (Lee, 2010).  
In broader terms, Lee (2010) argues that the study of diplomacy has shifted its focus 
from the diplomacy of economics in which the key theme was the economic tools of 
statecraft, to the study of Economic Diplomacy in which two themes are combined. 
The first theme is that of a diplomat as an agent in International Relations (IR) and 
IPE. The second is how to involve non-state and non-foreign ministry employees into 
diplomatic agents. 
According to Ruffini (2016), countries usually use trade as well as other foreign 
economic relations in a soft manner in order to enhance its influence upon other states 
while drawing political gains on the international and global scene. It is not a simple 
practice to unravel the purely political and economic motives in commercial relations 
bilaterally. Therefore, Ruffini (2016)’s view is that when trade flow increases between 
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two countries from the corporate voluntary initiatives and projects, the political and 
official relations between them becomes even closer.  
The bilateral trade relations usually lead to signing trade, intergovernmental and 
investment agreements that usually involve having political representation during the 
signing ceremony which could be at the level of heads of state. Therefore, the objective 
does not remain at the simple trade rationale but now becomes a political issue. This 
also brings upon further channels of cooperation that may involve technology transfer 
and cultural exchanges as well as boosting diplomatic relations to a whole new level. 
This at least causes one of the two countries to exercise some form of an influence on 
the other country.  
For instance, the economic relations, nowadays, between China and several African 
countries are a good depiction that illustrates the strong commercial position acquired 
by China in Africa which China considers at the forefront of their economic Agenda. 
Since the year 2000, a ministerial conference name “The Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation” has been held every three years, not to mention the historic visit of the 
Chinese President Xi Jinping to Tanzania, South Africa and The Republic of the Congo 
in his African tour in 2013 (Ruffini, 2016). 
When looking at the regional level, foreign trade relations are seen to play a vital role 
at the political level. The importance can be drawn from the tools used such as the free 
trade agreements, the monetary unions as well as the customs unions. Many countries 
tend to favour such an arrangement. However, the level of integration is always a key 
success factor to any grouping. For example, a weaker arrangement could be seen in 
the regional agreements such as the free trade areas. For instance, the North American 
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Free Trade Agreement where the political ties are quite loose, the same is noticed in 
the European Free Trade Association (Ruffini, 2016). 
However, stronger arrangements could be seen in the European Union which is the 
most advanced form of regional integration to date. The main driver for the European 
Union is the political will. In 2010, the Eurasian Customs Union (Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia) was another example of the use of economic drivers as a 
constituent of the stronger political block (Ruffini, 2016). As far as developmental aid 
and financial support is concerned, it has been evident that several countries have tied 
these activities to specific political goals. The negotiation that usually occurs prior to 
securing financial aid always involve political and economic goals.  
As per Ruffini (2016), an OECD study claimed that foreign-aid-connected exports 
from nine European countries donors and thirty two developing countries only 
represented 4% of total exports. This provides a stronger indication that much larger 
weight is given to the political weight and interests as well as historical ties, current 
trade and culture relations and geopolitics. These factors constitute larger importance 
when deciding to provide financial assistance or ODA’s. 
Recently, Globalization has made the greater necessity for the use of Economic 
Diplomacy within the foreign policy of nations. The range of its use has significantly 
increased, and new subjects became active leading to stronger public awareness. 
Therefore, many developing and ex-communist countries became integrated within the 
world system in which multinational organisations played a more significant role in 
organising the trade and economic cooperation such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
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Moreover, Economic Diplomacy penetrated deeper in these countries and its local 
policies through several actors within and outside the governments. As a consequence, 
it has been noticed that government power and resources are increasingly shrinking 
while trying to do more for less. Governments have been searching for ways to 
improve their negotiation tactics and leverage as well as its decision-making processes. 
The reasons behind this are their desire towards compensating the loss of power, 
addressing the international issues to serve their national interests, and managing a 
global system that is accessible to all nations (Bayne & Woolcock, 2011). From this, 
Economic Diplomacy arose by taking into consideration these enablers:  
i] Involving ministries. 
ii] Bringing non-state actors. 
iii] Greater Transparency. 
iv] Using international institutions.  
These enablers are mainly geared towards engaging into negotiations and discussions 
with large multinational organisations such as NGOs, the IMF, The World Bank and 
the WTO. Non-state actors are usually used to spread the pressure of the international 
organisations requirements by sharing the burden. Also, development and investment 
funds are also used as leverage towards achieving specific developmental goals that 
improve the competitiveness and ranking of the countries in the world competitiveness 
indices.  
Bayne and Woolcock (2011) argue that greater transparency has been a critical success 
factor in the Economic Diplomacy new order, especially that modern NGO’s and 
multinational organisations tend to require certain levels of transparency that enable 
more access to capital flows and investments. The OECD demands the highest levels 
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of transparency and monitors the implementation of transparency measures in the 
member countries as well as non-members who seek to participate in any of its sub-
committees. The main advantage is that countries gain more attractiveness for the flow 
of trade and investments through their association with the OECD.  
The use of international organizations and institutions became increasingly crucial to 
countries. As mentioned earlier, the shrinking power of nations is compensated 
through taking part or membership in international organisations where the power is 
regained collectively through the collective power of the member countries. The 
particular era in which international organisation started booming was throughout the 
1990s where new organisations were formed while transforming the old ones 
especially in the fields of trade, investment, finance, governance and business 
environment (Woolcock, 2008). 
For instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO) uses trade policy reviews regularly 
to revise and scrutinise the domestic policies of nations to ensure compliance with 
world trade facilitation standards as well as subsidisations policies and intellectual 
policies. The Group of 7 (G7) and the OECD are progressively demanding countries 
to include environmental measures into their domestic policies and procedures 
especially those related to climate change and biodiversity (Bayne & Woolcock, 
2011).  
However, nowadays multilateralism has been weakened by several crises. Mortimer 
(2018) argued that the failure of western politicians to protect the multilateral system 
might be because people take it for granted. The euphemistic “WTO option” of a no-
deal Brexit is an example of the assumption that the rules-based international trading 
regime is a constant bedrock, even though Trump often seems bent on dismantling it. 
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Also, the European Union (EU) was always dependent on NATO; in fact, the EU was 
also established as a security organisation, while both organisations also work 
together. As Mortimer (2018) described it, the EU’s objective was to install and 
maintain good political relations of the Jean Monnet’s theory was that you become 
friends by doing things together, rather than you do things together because you are 
friends. The more things you do together, the better friends you become.  
Member states are in a constant process of negotiation so that it becomes strategically 
important to quarrel as little as possible with your fellow members, because you never 
know when you will need their support. The disadvantage of multilateralism is that 
when you are not a member, it works against you. Furthermore, by leaving the EU the 
United Kingdom, which is comparatively liberal in trade matters, may trigger the EU 
towards protectionism. Consequently, the UK may find that the EU it has left is more 
difficult to negotiate with than it was while it still belonged. 
In light of the weakening of the multilateral institutions, Mortimer (2018) argues that 
China is fast emerging as a high power with an elaborate and strategic master plan. 
Accordingly, China seems inclined to use parts of the existing multilateral system – 
including parts that constrain it, such as WTO dispute settlement, and the peer review 
process in the Financial Action Task Force, which works against money laundering. 
Meanwhile, China is creating new institutions such as the New Asian Infrastructure 
and Development Bank as an alternative to the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. It has also established the One Belt and One Road Initiative as an 
initiative of its President Xi Jinping geared towards its international efforts to build 
economic cooperation. 
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Woolcock (2008) affirmed that a key constituent in Economic Diplomacy is the 
finance and financing for development. The new set of financial standards came to life 
under the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision as well as the Financial Stability 
Board. They produced a comprehensive set of rules and regulations not only for the 
banks and financial institutions internal governance but also on capital liquidity, 
leverage and cross-border operations.  
As far as the tools of Economic Diplomacy are concerned, bargaining, dispute 
settlement and attractive deals are vital concepts that nations use to execute their 
strategies in trade, investment and economic cooperation. Trade and investment 
agreements are sometimes put on hold due to dispute or bargaining to strike other 
deals. For instance, the initial agreement between Canada and NAFO failed to 
materialise until another deal between Canada and the EU was reached and triggered 
the resolution of the Canada NAFO agreement overcoming Spain’s reluctance (Bayne 
& Woolcock, 2011).  
In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of Economic Diplomacy, the tools 
that are deployed by nations to serve their foreign policy were examined. In most of 
the cases, the Economic Diplomacy is integrated into the broader foreign policy of the 
countries. Ministries of foreign affairs, trade, finance and economy are the critical 
executors of Economic Diplomacy blueprints (Seabrooke, 2011). In the political 
sphere, two terms are widely used to describe the process of diplomacy to enhance 
trade, investment and economic interests. Those two terms are Economic Diplomacy 
and Commercial Diplomacy.  
According to Saner and Yiu (2003), Economic Diplomacy is mainly attributed to 
economic policy issues, for example, the work conducted by the nations' delegations 
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at standard-setting organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). Economic diplomats are also mandated to 
monitor and report on the foreign countries economic policies in order to provide their 
capitals and home countries with recommendations on how to make use of them. Also, 
Economic Diplomacy uses resources with an economic nature such as rewards and 
sanctions in order to achieve a particular objective in their overall foreign policy.  
As a tool for Economic Diplomacy, some countries also seek to support other nation’s 
economic development by offering their enterprises and non-state entities services to 
foreign governments. These services take many forms such as expert advice, legal 
assistance, export incentives, and backstopping if required. This practice also entails 
helping their national enterprises to expand their markets and establish existence 
through subsidiaries and representative offices in other regional and international 
markets. Also, the provided services could also be extended to foreign non-state 
enterprises in the form of assisting them in investing and marketing activities to grow 
their businesses (Saner & Yiu, 2003).  
Alternatively, the term Commercial Diplomacy is also used. Saner and Yiu (2003) 
described the term as providing support through the diplomatic missions to the home 
country’s business and financial sectors in their pursuit of economic success and 
eventually achieving the national objectives of economic development. Commercial 
Diplomacy entails promoting inward and outward investments and trade. The crucial 
constituents of the commercial, diplomatic activities are the supply of timely and 
accurate information about the export opportunities for the home country’s enterprises 
as well as investment opportunities, in addition to taking specific measures to organise 
and assist trade missions from their home countries to the host countries. Another level 
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of commercial diplomacy is also being able as diplomats to provide accurate advice 
and support to the national enterprises in taking the investment decision throughout 
the due diligence process. 
Towards this end, Commercial Diplomats are usually placed abroad to undertake 
business facilitation activities in the fields of trade, investment, tourism, country 
image, and promotion of science and technology. A commercial diplomat may take 
various forms such as trade representative, trade commissioner, commercial attaché, 
and trade attaché (Naray, 2008). 
Naray (2008) identified various types of distinguishable arrangements that serve as a 
basis to identify different organisational arrangements. The different organisational 
configurations are outlines as follows:  
i] Arrangement 1: Trade promotion part of trade policy (Ministry of Trade) - 
China’s foreign affairs ministry is not directly involved in Economic 
Diplomacy. However, its embassies keep close coordination with the 
commercial service of the trade ministry. In the United States, the Department 
of Commerce is the exclusive entity to deal with Economic Diplomacy and 
business support. However, the commercial service provided in its embassies 
are under the direct authority of the ambassador and thus the Department of 
State. 
ii] Arrangement 2 & 3: This Arrangement is a combination of foreign affairs and 
trade with Australia, Canada and New Zealand tend to distinct trade policy 
from trade promotion activity. Except, Scandinavian countries, which include 
the promotions activity; however, all of these countries combine foreign affairs 
with trade in a single ministerial entity and maintain separation from its 
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diplomatic service, although the heads of their missions would be responsible 
for both activities.   
iii] Arrangement 4: Coordination mechanism- In this arrangement, is an example 
in the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) which reports to both the Foreign 
Office and the Department of Trade and Industry? The UKTI organisational 
structure is centralized, and career diplomats undertake the UK Economic 
Diplomacy. Most of the UK’s diplomatic resources are committed to trade and 
commercial activities, not to mention that 75% of the staff are recruited from 
within the target markets (Naray, 2008). Singapore also has a similar 
arrangement in which the Economic Diplomacy is carried by a trade promotion 
agency which has a joint oversight by the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministries. 
Also, Rana (2000) outlines the term “part unification” matrix between both 
ministries in which two specialised units are formed within the Foreign Office 
to oversee trade and investment activities, but through a unified diplomatic 
function. 
iv] Arrangement 5: Trade promotion in MFA: Large and medium-sized 
developing countries are mostly using this arrangement. The arrangement 
entails having the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carry out Economic Diplomacy 
from within the ministry and through its embassies. The separation of the 
foreign affairs and trade affairs creates this un-harmonised arrangement 
(Naray, 2008). Rana (2000) argues that such an arrangement increases the 
weights of the organisation and thus makes it difficult to undergo reforms. 
v] Arrangement 6: Independent trade promotion structures- This arrangement 
entails having an independent Trade Promotion Office that operates without 
any hierarchical subordination to the Embassy. The Embassy only deals with 
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political issues. Countries like Germany adopt this model as their Economic 
Diplomacy is delegated to the network of the bi-national chamber of 
commerce. Also, Japan has JETRO, South Korea has (KOTRA), and Italy has 
ICE, whom all practice Economic Diplomacy independently from the foreign 
affairs embassies.  
In Portugal, it is noticed that a similar arrangement in having ICEP as an entity tasked 
to conduct Economic Diplomacy activities. The trade attaché is usually nominated by 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry and has a dual mandate as a diplomatic member of the 
embassy as well as the director of the trade promotion office (ICEP branch) in the 
target market (de La Carrière, 1998). Okano-Heijmans (2010) examined the tools 
Japan used in its relations with North Korea especially from the perspective of 
Economic Diplomacy. The four policy areas/tools as outlined by the author are:  
Negotiations on normalisation and single-issue politics;  
i] Bilateral Trade and investment.  
ii] Sanctions and humanitarian aid. 
iii] Multilateral and regional diplomacy.  
These tools match the four long-term objectives stated in the Pyongyang Declaration. 
Taken together, the authors demonstrate that Tokyo’s in-action stretched from the 
‘business end’ to ‘power-play end’ (and in between) making for a sophisticated 
negative Economic Diplomacy (Okano-Heijmans, 2010). As per Okano-Heijmans 
(2010), Japan Economic Diplomacy is exercised through the indirect promise, 
provision, withholding and sanctioning of economic benefits, and is largely practised 
in the bilateral and multilateral context. National policies such as the tightening or 
easing of indirect help for Pyongyang by supporters of North Korea in Japan (mainly 
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financial flows) support Japan’s Economic Diplomacy. As trade relations between 
Japan and North Korea are virtually non-existent at present. 
1.3.2 The Global Perspectives of Economic Diplomacy 
Today’s Chinese Economic Diplomacy is seen as part of realising the “Chinese 
Dream” put forward by President Xi Jinping to realise the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation (Fuchs, 2016). China is currently assuming the second largest economy 
to be a key member in the Group of Twenty “G20”. The Chinese leadership continue 
to put forward plans of transformation in order to become an active trade and economic 
power in the world. For such a reason, I added China in this section due to its strategic 
importance as an economic power in the world, along with its extensive use of 
economic diplomacy tools that are seen in Africa, Far East and South America. 
Heath (2016) argue that the Chinese have directed reforms to deepen Asia’s integration 
as a regional economy, modify international trade rules and standards, and secure 
needed technology, resources, and markets to improve China’s competitiveness. 
China’s main goal is to intensify its ongoing competition with the United States and 
increase its market exposure to the global economy. Concerned about its vulnerability 
in the face of these realities, China has begun to view requirements for economic 
growth in terms of national security. The net effect of these changes has been a 
weakening of the role that trade, and investment ties have long played in restraining 
political and security tensions in U.S.-China relations. The bilateral relationship thus 
appears to be entering an era in which intense strategic competition coexists with deep 
economic interdependence. 
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President Xi Jinping strategy included several key strategic large-scale initiatives that 
increased the Chinese influence in Asia and the world. In 2013, President Xi Jinping 
announced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Development Bank 
(AIIB). Following that in 2014, China announced the One-Belt One-Road (OBOR) 
initiative to revive the silk road trading corridors from the east to the west and vice 
versa. During the same year, the BRICS announced the establishment of the new 
Development Bank, and the Chinese, promoted Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation-APEC (Heath, 2016). 
China has also taken several leaps towards the internationalisation of the Renminbi. 
The Asian Development bank concluded in 2014 that Beijing had progressed in 
promoting RMB settlements for a trade involving China and in issuing RMB-
denominated bonds in Hong Kong, but that the level of internationalization remains 
limited due to capital account controls. (Eichengreen, 2014). In August 2015, China 
sought larger market share through a sharp devaluation of the RMB. The US and other 
industrial countries rose suspicions over this action stating that China used this as an 
excuse to gain larger market share through lower price of exports. Several 
commentators described this action as the initiation of “trade war” between industrial 
countries over the global export market. (Eavis, 2015) 
Although China’s has been actively seeking to apply economic diplomacy tools in its 
foreign policy, it has been argued that it remains an active Chinese focus on its 
surroundings security. Erickson and Liff (2016) discussed the active assertion of its 
claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that led to increasingly crowded surrounding 
waters and airspace with the Chinese military and paramilitary forces, signalling the 
risk of a Sino-Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. They assessed the 
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extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US-China EP-3 crisis have 
enhanced longstanding weaknesses in China's crisis management capabilities and its 
ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. Therefore, the establishment of a 
Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms have been 
considered as achieving modest improvements in the Chinese reform efforts. 
Towards this end, Heilmann and Stepan (2016) described that China’s leadership 
styles are essential to achieve the goals and objective of China in the international 
economic agenda. They argue that rebalancing the economy while maintaining steady 
growth – is more important than strengthening the party in the short run, and also more 
difficult. Xi Jinping Xi could make decisions and force them through the bureaucratic 
and party apparatus, but he lacks any feel for a vast, complicated and globally- 
integrated economy. There are no easy victories in economic policy, nor guaranteed 
outcomes. Accordingly, the rebalancing of the Chinese economy is an ongoing effort 
but remains not guaranteed fully.  
Breaking China’s iron triangle, of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), state-owned 
companies and provincial, city and local governments is the most critical element in 
materialising the growth potential of its economy. The Chinese economy which still 
allows a substantial role for the state could enhance its credibility in the world as an 
alternative to the United States of America. The dynamics of Chinese politics have 
changed since the installation of the new party and state leadership under Xi Jinping 
in 2012 and 2013. Decision-making power has shifted to the newly formed central 
party organs (Heilmann & Stepan, 2016). 
Although China may seem demographically different than the UAE, the Economic 
Diplomacy tools and effects could be of a certain similarity to the case of the UAE. At 
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a macro scale and within its influential regional position, the UAE could look at some 
of the steps China has taken and applied them in a manner that is suitable to the 
magnitude and constituency of its economic status either internally, regionally or 
internationally. The literature on China demonstrates that there might be an 
opportunity for the UAE to exploit within the Chinese initiatives through embedding 
various economic ties with them and hence, excel towards the optimum outcome 
sought to enhance the UAE’s economic status globally.  
The political, trade and economic relations are very much tied on various facets. In 
1989, Brian Pollins developed a public choice model of bilateral trade flow. He argues 
that the decision to import goods or services is primarily determined by the place of 
origin of the providers and taking into consideration the political climate between the 
trading partners (Pollins, 1989b). He also argued that importers are very much 
concerned with the political risks and trade disruptions that arise from conflicts, thus 
rewarding political friends and punishing foes (Pollins, 1989a). 
Fuchs (2016) applied the political-trade nexus effects on bilateral economic relations. 
As China frequently applies pressure on governments not to receive the Dalai Lama, 
he empirically evaluated the effect of visits on the receiving countries through looking 
at the China-imposed sanctions using a probability model econometric test. He 
concluded that the likelihood of a Chinese leadership visiting a country is 13.6% lower 
if that country received the Dalai Lama in a given year; however, the odds of a Chinese 
leadership visiting the same country improve the following year as the political 
tensions begin to ease off. All in all, these findings are evidence in favour of Economic 
Diplomacy being a vital determinant of the bilateral political climate and economic 
exchange among nations.  
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Okano-Heijmans (2010) argues that although there are substantial gains from the 
multilateral forums such as the WTO for trade liberalisation, the speedy spikes in 
North-South bilateral and mini-lateral Free Trade Agreements since the late 90s brings 
a systematic explanation towards the prioritisation of various mediums of Economic 
Diplomacy over the others. While motivating developing countries to pursue 
preferential trading links with modern industrialised nations have been widely 
considered especially to consolidate market access, obtain exemptions from contingent 
protection, attract foreign direct investments, and enhance policy reforms, Okano-
Heijmans (2010) offered a new rationale through linking positive political economy 
approaches to rational institutional design in a way explaining why industrialized 
democratic states seek their trade and economic objectives in non-multilateral forums 
which the authors called “The Gain-Control Trade-off”.  
For instance, in a multilateral setting where almost universal membership exists, the 
maximisation of gains from trade and investment and the reduction in transactional 
costs are offered. However, a single country should not expect to have adequate control 
over its trading partners or having a liberalisation agenda the level of a multilateral 
organisation set.  In contrast, when having a bilateral free trade agreement, a country 
may yield negligible amounts of gains from trade and investment in addition to a 
substantial increase in transactional costs due to the existence if idiosyncratic sets of 
rules and regulations. At the same time, a vast country can acquire a higher level of 
control in terms of ability to choose its partners, deal with its issues, and determine its 
agenda, while having sound exclusion and inclusion criteria that is based on domestic 
political interests. Therefore, Okano-Heijmans (2010) contend that industrialised 
democratic countries face a trade-off between seeking maximisation of aggregate 
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economic gains in the interest of the national welfare or seeking control over the rules 
in line with political interests (Okano-Heijmans, 2010).  
Despite the widespread usage of Economic Diplomacy, it has not gone un-criticised. 
Sceptics argue that companies are profit motivated and do not need any form of 
government support. The counterargument is that widespread usage of Economic 
Diplomacy implies that it serves a beneficial role to support the corporate sector. This 
view is supported by the fact that cultural factors impact corporate activities and hence 
necessitate the intervention of the state either as a partner or lobbyist. Second, new 
financing of large-scale projects, such as public-private partnerships, implies that the 
state becomes a partner. This also implies that the state needs to support its corporate 
sector in securing and safeguarding the interests of the corporate sector. With greater 
corporate to stat, dealings imply that information flows and signals to the private sector 
are essential. From an inward investment attraction viewpoint, the state can offer 
incentives and guarantees that can induce foreign capital. 
Moreover, Cotula (2016) argues that governments rarely considered arbitration risks 
at the negotiation stage, and that awareness of these risks remained low after the 
treaties were signed. In most of the case studies considered, it is only after the 
government was taken to arbitration that awareness about investment treaties increased 
and that policies started to shift—whether incrementally (e.g., through recalibrating 
treaty texts), or radically (e.g., through terminating investment treaties). Ponsatí (2004) 
proposed a simple model to explore the effects of positive economic intervention by 
stakeholders in the resolution of bilateral conflicts. The author has proved that while 
unilateral promises offering transfers after the contenders agree may sometimes help, 
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they are not always advisable. In contrast, active participation in a multilateral 
negotiation may easily yield outcomes that benefit the stakeholder. 
The results fundamentally rely on the very crude nature of the bilateral conflict that 
has been postulated, a war of attrition, and on the constraints imposed by the game 
protocol. Manzini and Ponsati (2006) explore the role of stakeholders in bargaining 
games where a bilateral agreement can be any division of the surplus. Therefore, the 
willingness of stakeholders to make contributions to promote agreement may backfire: 
instead of accelerating agreement the stakeholder’s intervention might be the source 
of additional inefficiency. Relaxing the assumption that stakeholders gain only from 
the agreement, allowing stakeholders that suffer negative externalities upon agreement 
(think, for example, of weapon suppliers) is an extension for future research (Ponsatí, 
2004). 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is composed of 10 nations that 
have made significant steps towards having stronger economic ties and 
intergovernmental cooperation. One of the key enablers that the ASEAN created was 
the regional trade agreement (RTA) signed in 1992. Selmier and Oh (2013) analysed 
Economic Diplomacy outcomes before and after the RTA. The results indicated that 
ASEAN members were able to engage with more robust trading partners. Also, the 
pecking order between influential countries and ASEAN members have statistically 
been lower. Post-1992, the imports from powerful nations showed lesser amounts 
while more exports were noticed compared to the period before the RTA in 1992.  
Employing ASEAN's diplomatic relations and economic integration over the period 
1980–2001, Oh and Selmier Ii (2008) examined how diplomacy influences intra-
ASEAN trade and trade between ASEAN member and non-member countries. The 
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authors argue that ASEAN indeed follows GATT's Article 24: the purpose of a free 
trade area that should have to enable seamless trade between the constituent territories 
without raising barriers against other contracting parties. Instead, ASEAN proactively 
employs diplomatic relations to increase imports by 1.2 times from non-members, 
while ASEAN membership increases intra-RTA imports by 2.2 times. This supports 
the authors’ argument that RTAs like ASEAN not only increase regional economic 
interdependency through institutional agreements but also increase trade with non-
member countries through a process of Economic Diplomacy. Oh and Selmier Ii 
(2008) found that RTAs augment globalisation processes in ways not often considered: 
regionalisation is not a substitute for but rather a complement to globalisation. 
1.3.3 The Perspective of the UAE Foreign Policy and its Economic Statecraft  
In recent years, significant importance has been placed by researchers to the 
fundamental transformation in the foreign policy of the UAE. From being merely 
regionally focused, the UAE has become increasingly global in its outlook. A vital part 
of this significant change in its international engagement has been the growing use of 
foreign direct investment and trade to achieve key foreign policy and security goals 
(Bartlett, Ker-Lindsay, Alexander, & Prelec, 2017). 
For the UAE trade and inward investment are undoubtedly important, and to date, there 
have mostly been a ‘hands-off’ approach whereby the private sector has been allowed 
to deal with issues without government involvement. The rationale behind this is quite 
simple in that with a major part of the UAE Federal Government and local government 
especially Abu Dhabi’s revenue is being generated from the hydrocarbon sector, the 
focus has been to ensure its development as well as diversification away from the oil 
and gas sector. Since four decades ago, the UAE became highly diversified to relieve 
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from hydrocarbon dependence, which would be accounted for 30% of the GDP by 
2021 onwards (Vision 2021, 2010). The vision of the country foresees hydrocarbons 
playing a marginal role. In fact, in some emirates such as Dubai hydrocarbons account 
for only 4% of GDP.  
With a diversified corporate sector there becomes a greater need for Economic 
Diplomacy. In the case of the UAE with its surplus funds, Economic Diplomacy also 
includes its ability to invest overseas through sovereign wealth funds or state-owned 
enterprises. To date, these funds have been invested in obtaining the highest risk-
adjusted return rather than any political advantage. Similar to the case of the UAE, 
Cotula (2016) examined the hypothesis that low- and middle-income country 
governments concluded investment treaties in ‘boundedly rational’ ways—that is, 
based on incomplete information and analysis. The central argument is that 
governments overestimated the benefits of investment treaties, taking at face value 
claims that the treaties would promote foreign investment; and that they 
underestimated the costs by not fully considering the risk of investor-state arbitration 
until investor claims hit them directly.  
In general, small states have been considered reasonably limited in terms of influence 
and the ability to project power in the international arena (Cooper & Shaw, 2009). 
However, in the case of the UAE, it has demonstrated that small states have acquired 
an increasing soft power that allowed it to thrive and overcome the challenges in an 
interconnected world (Ulrichsen, 2012). Several factors have facilitated this. First, oil 
and gas have placed the UAE as the second largest economy in the Arab World. The 
primary rationale for this surge is the income generated by energy – from the largest 
and most resource-abundant Emirate, Abu Dhabi – has been of utmost importance.  
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Second, the UAE has also gained leverage from the decline of traditional regional 
powers, such as Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Syria, which has seen a resulting rise in both the 
affluence and influence of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bartlett et 
al., 2017). The vacuum created by the regional turmoil enabled the UAE to step in as 
a regional influencer and durable economic power. Third, the UAE has benefited from 
an advantageous geographic position in the Middle East bridging the West, East and 
South. In addition to its proximity to many of the world’s emerging markets, it has 
established a reputation as a politically-stable and investor-friendly state in an 
otherwise volatile and unstable region (Ulrichsen, 2012). 
The UAE’s Economy is at the service of its foreign policy and the economic resources 
expanded abroad in the forms of foreign aid or investments are meant to generate 
returns that serve the country and its vision (Young, 2017a). Besides, Young (2017a) 
projects the UAE’s sophistication in the statecraft is emboldened and strengthened by 
careful ties between companies, bilateral partners and the country itself. The 
diversification targets and objectives set in the Vision 2021 (2010) has indeed started 
a long time back since the year 2000. The primary industry that the UAE had focused 
more to achieve the diversification is the logistics and transport sector. (Almezaini, 
2012). 
Henderson (2017) examined the UAE’s state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) in the 
transport and logistics sector and their role in the state foreign policy. The transport 
and logistics sector in the UAE has seen signification evolution in the past years 
especially with the significance of the investments witnessed abroad in the same 
sector. To that end, Molavi (2014) described the UAE as being a nexus state for trade 
on the Southern Silk Road linking Asia with the Americas, Europe and Africa and 
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vise-versa.  The increase in sophistication has departed the UAE from the “city-state” 
described by Bassens, Derudder, and Witlox (2010) - in which Dubai is the 
commercial hub and Abu Dhabi is the oil-rich capital – to the nexus state initially 
described by Molavi (2014) and followed by Henderson (2017).  
The evolution of the UAE’s nexus state was first witnessed in Dubai, which invested 
heavily in infrastructure since the past 50 years onwards. Its state of the art seaports 
and airports resulted in the establishment of a services sector in its economy. Since 
then, other emirates began to invest in logistics and travel, and starting from the year 
2000, Abu Dhabi made its move to create the emirate’s national carrier Etihad 
Airways, as well as other facilities. Also, although Sharjah’s airport is the very first 
airport in the UAE, it relatively recently launched Air Arabia in 2003 (Henderson, 
2017).  
Towards this end, the fundamentally global nature of the nexus state is a result of the 
size of the UAE’s airline and logistics SOEs. Two state-owned Emirati carriers, 
Emirates and Etihad are considered to be “super-connectors”, this is primarily because 
of their international routes that connect in the UAE (Economist, 2015). In addition to 
Emirates and Etihad, Air Arabia and Fly Dubai which are considered low-cost airlines 
also operate routes across the region. While in the logistics sector,  Dubai Ports World 
also plays a role in routing cargo traffic through Dubai (Henderson, 2017). The 
company is the operator of Jebel Ali, and it is one of Dubai’s largest SOEs with a 
portfolio of more than 77 marine terminals across the six continents with its core 
business being in container handling operations which generates approximately 80% 
of revenues.  
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DP World generates more than 75% of its throughput in faster-growing markets and 
70% of its volumes in higher margin origin and destination cargo.  The DP World has 
an average concession life of approximately 40 years in its investments abroad 
(DPWorld, 2016). The above progressions were mainly driven by the need to maintain 
a nexus state and the external SOE’s that it depends on. While the competition is 
ongoing amongst the Emirates, synergies have been identified recently based on 
ensuring “a resilient and prosperous state even in the times of low oil prices” 
(Davidson, 2007).  
Given that the transport and logistics sectors were of great importance in the state 
endeavour towards diversification, an interview conducted by Henderson (2017) 
established the relationship between this sector and the UAE’s Foreign Policy. While 
this relationship depends on the type of market that the logistics or transport SOE is 
operating in, these SOEs have learned from experience that in more developing 
countries they can operate with minimal support from the country and their economic 
power is an effective form of diplomacy.  
In more developed markets SOE investment is considered to rely on the groundwork 
of the foreign ministry in order to be successful. Back to the interview and according 
to the Dubai government official: “In the developing world it is the case of the 
commercial interest going first. In the Western world, we have learned that if there is 
nothing political on the ground, there is the risk of a backlash, as happened with DP 
World. In these markets, the state needs to be there in order to undertake due diligence 
and lobbying” (Henderson, 2017). 
In another interview, Henderson (2017) described the role of SOE’s in raising the 
profile of the UAE in western countries through building consumer confidence via 
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sponsorship agreements. For instance, the two national carriers the Emirates and 
Etihad are running Emirates Stadium and Etihad Stadium, respectively, aiming at 
developing the UAE’s brand globally. An official from the Dubai Government stated 
that “There is an element of this which has been about building trust in the UAE. 
Emirates and Etihad were partly a strategic development. The rulers wanted to build 
confidence, so they built best-in-class airlines”. The diplomatic power of SOE’s also 
arises from their significant purchasing power and influence they can exert on the key 
market players in the west.  
In addition to the above, the UAE has also been a key influencer with its economic 
diplomacy tools related to aid and outward foreign direct investments. The case of the 
UAE’s interest in the Balkans since 1999 has witnessed significant cyclical nature over 
the past two decades (Bartlett et al., 2017). In 1999, the UAE provided significant 
foreign assistance to the Kosovo crisis to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction. The 
flow of official development assistance took the forms of grants and concessional loans 
amounting to $61 million from 2009-2013, while Abu Dhabi Fund for Development 
(ADFD) provided €36.7 million concessionary loans to Albania for the construction 
of the Tirana-Elbasan road project as well as funding Sheikh Zayed Airport in Kukes 
with an amount of €16 million. The UAE is also the 2nd largest non-EU, preceded by 
the USA, donor to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Bartlett et al., 2017).  
The most apparent expansion in commercial investments by the UAE in the Balkans 
was witnessed in Serbia. Even though Serbia may not have been at the forefront of aid, 
UAE investments have increased rapidly in the country and focused on four specific 
areas, namely aviation, urban construction, military technology and agriculture 
(Bartlett et al., 2017).  
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On the aviation front, Etihad Airways has been busy investing in foreign airlines to 
expand its strategic partners and network of destinations by leveraging the access 
points and fifth freedom enjoyed by these airlines in their respective countries. By 
2014, the Etihad Group had acquired minority equity stakes in Air Seychelles, Air 
Berlin, Virgin Australia, Aer Lingus, Jet Airways, Alitalia and Darwin Airline. The 
strategy has been to create a global network of connecting flights, with Abu Dhabi 
International Airport as the hub. The airline has now become one of a small group of 
“super connector” airlines that are making significant competitive inroads into the 
traditional national carriers (Economist, 2015).  
Focusing on Serbia, in August 2013, Etihad acquired a 49% share in the Serbian 
national carrier JAT. Etihad restructured the airline through its 5-year management 
contract and provided it with the new name of “Air Serbia”. The success of this 
investment was realised in 2014 when Air Serbia recorded a net profit of €2.7 million 
with revenues of €262 million, (an increase of 87% year-on-year) and carried 2.3 
million passengers with an increase of 68% year on year. This turned Belgrade Airport 
into one of the fastest growing airports in Europe with passenger numbers growing by 
34% in 2014. The success of Air Serbia continued into 2015 with revenues in both 
passenger and cargo divisions increasing rapidly (Bartlett et al., 2017). 
On the military technology front, The UAE recognised the potential of the well-
developed and sophisticated arms industry in Serbia which is a key constituent of its 
Economy. In October 2013, Mubadala Development Company signed an agreement 
with the Serbian government to identify areas for investment in aerospace 
manufacturing, telecoms, renewable energy and Semiconductors (Arnold, 2013). 
Numerous meetings have since taken place to develop defence cooperation between 
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the two countries which resulted in a Defence Cooperation Agreement being signed in 
April 2014 to exchange information and technologies in the defence industry. The 
agreement encompassed training of UAE personnel including military police and 
Special Forces in the military academy in Serbia and developing mid-range mortar 
systems (Malik, 2014).  
An additional outcome of the agreement is the announcement to establish a strategic 
partnership and sign another agreement on joint development and acquisition between 
Yugoimport SDPR and Emirates Advanced Research & Technology Holding LLC 
(EARTH). This collaboration resulted in the joint development of the Advanced Light 
Attack System (ALAS), which is a land-based anti-ship cruise missile, under a €200 
million contract paving the way for more collaborative work in the field of defence 
industry between the two countries. Serbia has also signed several MoUs with several 
UAE-based companies for the production of semiconductors and aircraft components 
(Bartlett et al., 2017). 
On the agriculture sector, the UAE through Al Dhahra Agricultural Company and 
Serbia has witnessed significant investments through joint venturing with the Serbian 
companies to develop a 9000 hectare of farmland in the northern province of 
Vojvodina to produce a range of crops, meat, and dairy products. The US$400 million 
deal - which was signed in March 2013 by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić 
– and entailed Al Dhahra purchasing eight state-owned agricultural companies and 
invested in several other agricultural ventures.  
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) also provided a matching loan of 
US$400 million to the Serbian Government for agricultural development. Looking 
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ahead, the ADFD plans to invest in food production in Serbia and has signed an 
agreement with the Government of Serbia aiming at developing irrigation systems, 
machinery and agricultural infrastructure. In exchange, the Serbian Government 
guarantees food exports to the UAE as part of the food security initiative of the UAE 
(Bartlett et al., 2017). 
Last but not least, in the real estate sector, there have been several significant UAE 
investments in Serbia aiming at diversifying its investment portfolio in the Balkans. In 
January 2013, Arabtec Holding announced it would open a regional headquarters in 
Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, to drive its expansion into the Balkans. Aabar is a 
sovereign wealth fund established as a private joint stock company. It is wholly owned 
by the International Petroleum Investment Company, which is in turn wholly owned 
by the Government of Abu Dhabi. Aabar’s mandate is to invest in sectors with 
significant growth potential that fulfil the investment strategy of the government. 
However, the most critical development was the decision by the Abu Dhabi 
development company Eagle Hills to invest up to €3 billion in Serbia to build Belgrade 
Waterfront which is a business, residential and commercial area along the rundown 
riverfront of Belgrade. Eagle Hills signed the contract with the Serbian government to 
redevelop the 1.8 million square meters site on 26 April 2015. The project includes a 
140,000 square meter shopping mall that will be the largest in the Balkans; 5,700 
homes to accommodate 14,000 people, eight hotels comprising a total of 2,200 rooms 
and a 200-metre high tower. A contract has been signed with Starwood Hotels and 
Resorts to run one of the hotels, the first W Hotel in South East Europe50. 
Construction is planned for over thirty years, with at least half to be completed within 
twenty years. Eagle Hills owns 68% of the project, and the Serbian government owns 
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the remaining 32%. The terms of the contract state that the Serbian government grants 
Eagle Hills a 99-year lease on the land for the regeneration scheme and in return, Eagle 
hills to provide €150 million of cash investment and €150 million as a shareholder 
loan. The company will also lend the Serbian government another €130 million to buy 
packages of land in the development area which it does not already own and to clean 
up the area. The project is stated to generate around 2000 jobs in Serbia (Bartlett et al., 
2017).  
The evolution of the UAE’s economy from a rentier state and an energy-based 
economy has witnessed tremendous achievements over the past few years. Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai had versatile development strategies which reflected their different oil 
endowments (Nyarko, 2010). The evolution and transformation were towards the goal 
of diversification away from oil. The fluctuation in oil prices is aimed to affect the 
gross domestic product no longer and thus the economy of the UAE. However as 
Shayah (2015) discussed, these efforts should not come at the expense of stability. In 
other words, inflation, fiscal balance and other economic levels should be maintained.  
Through looking at the models adopted by both Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the modus 
operandi to materialise the objectives and plans of diversification are slightly different 
but fit for purpose given the nature of these both Emirates. In the case of Abu Dhabi, 
Nyarko (2010) argues that oil explains much of its economy making up to 90% of the 
total oil produced in the United Arab Emirates. He also discussed the Emirates efforts 
to invest abroad through its vast sovereign wealth funds namely Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) that is estimated to be valued at $700-900 billion and Mubadala 
Investment Company estimated to be valued at $10 billion. There have been 
established due to the large surplus of the balance of payments throughout the years 
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which have been pumped into these funds in an attempt to diversify the sources of 
income of the Abu Dhabi Emirate.  
Shayah (2015) discussed that according to the Central Bank of the UAE, the trade 
account surplus increased from AED 153.6 billion in 2009 to AED 179.9 billion in 
2010 to reach AED 292 billion in 2011. Both ADIA and Mubadala have been engaged 
in several endeavours in order to establish cash flow away from the proceedings of the 
Oil and Gas sector in Abu Dhabi. Those investments were mainly outside the UAE 
through partnerships with Multinational Companies such as General Electric, 
Telecommunications companies in Nigeria, Alumina Bauxite in Guinea Conakry and 
renewable energy projects through Masdar (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company) in 
various developing countries (Nyarko, 2010).  
Though looking at Dubai’s strategy, the difference is mainly due to the lesser oil 
production capacity of the Emirates which is estimates at 240,000 barrels a day. 
According to Shayah (2015) and Hvidt (2009), the “Dubai Model” of economic 
development are the following: i) government-led development, ii) fast decision 
making ‘fast-track’ development, iii) a flexible labour force through importing 
expatriates, iv) by passing industrialization and creating a service economy, v) 
internationalising service provisions, vi) creating investment opportunities, vii) 
supply-generated demand, viii) market positioning via branding, and xiv) development 
in cooperation with international partners.  
Nyarko (2010) argues that the reasons for Dubai being unique are attributed to its 
business, finance and tourism facilities and its sheer gutsiness. With its free trade zones 
and the Jebel Ali port, Dubai is destined to becoming the major trade hub of the Middle 
East Region; a strategy referred to by some as the ‘Singapore model’. Tourism has 
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also been a prime focus in Dubai, by planning to attract 15 million visitors a year (5.8 
million in 2007) and offering tourists some of the biggest, most lavish shopping malls 
in the world, in addition to other activities geared to visitors to discover the essence of 
Arabian dunes and traditional sports. A critical year was 1985 when Emirates Airlines 
was inaugurated and is now fast becoming one of the largest airlines in the world. 
Dubai’s economic strategy is simple, clear and pragmatic, and is, indeed, being 
mirrored by other countries in the region and the world. Through recognising very 
early that oil would eventually be depleted, Dubai focused on becoming the trade and 
tourist destination of the Middle East. With its significant investments in 
infrastructure, Dubai also developed a business-friendly environment to attract many 
foreign companies to invest and establish regional headquarters in it through providing 
various business incentives that ensured ease of doing business at its highest possible. 
In an overall discussion of the UAE transformation and evolution as well as its 
neighbours in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Nyarko (2010)  argued that the United 
Arab Emirates has been prosperous in attracting western knowledge and expertise for 
its economic transformation. Although it has a small population, it has made up for 
this shortage through importing a considerable number of unskilled labours, mainly 
from the Asian subcontinent. While also attracting high-income expatriates from Asia, 
Europe and North America. The ability of the UAE to tolerate such an influx of foreign 
labour is a crucial building block for explaining its development and transformation 
through having flexible yet stable immigration and labour policy.  
On the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab Countries front, Shkvarya and 
Frolova (2017) argue that the proximity of challenges in the social and economic 
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development of Arab countries provide a basis for the formulation of several practical 
considerations and measures for creation of the more stable economic structure. These 
considerations include the diversification of budget revenues sources through 
industrialisation; hastening the development of solid minerals and the formation of 
new industries;  enhancing electricity and water desalination capacity; the focus of the 
concept of privatisation of state assets; revision of the social incentives targeting their 
national populations. Shkvarya and Frolova (2017) also argue that through 
implementing these measures, those countries will be more destined to attract foreign 
capital and develop the manufacturing and service sectors, especially tourism.  
Towards this end, Forstenlechner and Rutledge (2010) also argue that the Gulf states 
need to update the social contract and discussed the saturation in the public sector in 
terms of employment. Therefore, the public sector can no longer act as an employer of 
first and last resort. They call upon governments of the Gulf States to enhance 
educational attainment, diversify the economy and intervene in the labour market 
directly. Forstenlechner and Rutledge (2010) also argue that the schemes in Kuwait 
and the UAE “subsidising” nationals by topping up their private-sector salary or 
paying an above-market rate in a state-owned “private” company is only one way of 
looking at the new social contract required in the Gulf States. Thus, the states should 
differentiate between classic public-sector and highly skilled public- and quasi-
private-sector jobs, especially in the emerging high-skilled and high-tech industries.  
All in all, Forstenlechner and Rutledge (2010) argued that as long as salaries offered 
by the “classic” public sector are several factors higher than those elsewhere, it will be 
such jobs that continue to attract nationals and have the most pride and prestige 
attached to them. Thus, if the social contract is not updated to reflect contemporary 
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demographic and labour-market realities, the Gulf States will eventually witness an 
increasing number of unemployment especially with a saturated public sector and an 
increasing number of people who might not have the right connection to secure the 
classic jobs. Similarly, Yousef (2004) also argued that the unemployment rate in the 
Middle East has been growing since the 1990s and has been averaging to 15% only 
second to Sub-Saharan Africa. He also discussed the vital role that the private sector 
plays in closing the gap in unemployment.  
Yousef (2004) also describes the social contract in the Middle East as outdated and 
requires an update especially that it has been outdated due to its creating during the 
colonial construction of republican institutions throughout the Middle East which led 
to the emergence of interventionist-redistributive social contracts across the region. He 
also argues that the economic difficulties of the Middle East region in the past two 
decades have called into question the status of the region’s post-war social contract, 
especially among those too young to remember the earlier era of rapid economic 
growth. Therefore, to move the reform process beyond its current limits, governments 
will need to revive national conversations about redefining the terms of the social 
contract. 
1.3.4 Foreign Aid as a Tool of Economic Diplomacy 
Although Foreign Aid is discussed narratively in this section as an economic 
diplomacy tool, this study does not use it in the gravity model in the methodology 
chapter due to the lack of data. Thus, this has been addressed in the limitations chapter 
of the dissertation. Towards this end, this research discussed the economic statecraft 
of the UAE from trade and investment perspective in the West and developed 
countries; it is also crucial to look at the economic, diplomatic efforts the UAE placed 
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in the developing countries. The UAE along with its GCC neighbours have seen a shift 
the development aid philosophy. The so-called “emerging donors” have been used to 
describe this shift (Woods, 2008).  
Towards this, it is vital to discuss the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
which was formed in the 1960s with a mandate to coordinate and promote aid from 
donor states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). DAC is a community of shared values, in that its members largely 
problematize development as appropriate relationships between state and market in the 
liberal democratic tradition (Kragelund, 2008). With the term “Emerging donors” 
described above, however,  Young (2017b) argues against calling the GCC countries 
as “emerging” but slightly diverging from the DAC standard methodology of 
providing foreign aid or assistance.  
When looking at the UAE as part of the GCC and the Arab League, the pattern of ODA 
disbursement has seen various fluctuations for which many researchers attributed these 
fluctuations to political reasons (Almezaini, 2012). While examining the numbers, a 
surprising attribute of the Arab countries’ foreign aid since 1973 has been witnessed, 
which is its generosity. On average, Arab aid was approximately 4.7% of their 
combined GNI in the initial period from the start up to 1978 while the DAC countries 
averaged 0.3% in the same period (van den Boogaerde, 1990). Declining in the 
following years, the average annual net ODA provided by Arab countries still 
represented 1.5 per cent of their GNI during the period 1974-1994, which is 
substantially more than the average contributions of DAC countries, which amounted 
to 0.3 % of their GNI during the same period as per the OECD in 1995 (Neumayer, 
2003; Villanger, 2007).   
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Historically, there have been increased stances in which the Gulf states in general, and 
the UAE, in particular, used foreign aid for political goals related to various shifts in 
the political economy outlook. The return from foreign aid is not calculated as a pure 
financial figure. The return includes market access, market dominance, and priority 
over regional rivals in the investment/aid target space, and forward-looking 
opportunities for state-related entities to make profitable partnerships, often with a 
medium to the long-term trajectory (Young, 2017b). The clearest example of the above 
approach has been in the UAE foreign policy towards Egypt after 2013. The UAE-
Egyptian relationship continues to evolve, and so does the foreign aid program with 
Egypt in which UAE ODA’s in Egypt totalled US$8 Billion till 2016. 
 The UAE economic intervention in Egypt has included key sectors of both economies. 
The investment and aid in wheat production indicate a shared security concern over 
food security for the UAE and food stability for Egypt. The UAE investment in food 
production has been delayed in the conflict in Egypt, as the legal institutions that might 
facilitate investment have challenged some of the mechanisms of cross-border 
interaction. UAE investment in large scale construction projects in Egypt also plays to 
the Emirates’ strengths in state-related entities that can manage development goals 
hinging on an expansive property sector, fuelled by a bank sector that lends heavily to 
construction and real estate entities. The banking sector in the UAE can extend such 
large lines of credit specifically because the government deposits of oil revenues go 
into local banks and are then restricted on investment vehicles. Local banks do not 
provide favour complex debt instruments, so asset-backed loans of construction and 
real estate are privileged (Young, 2017b). 
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In conclusion, Economic Diplomacy, in literature, has been examined from many 
different angles starting from the meaning of Economic Diplomacy and its definition. 
Some authors compared it to various other forms such as Commercial diplomacy and 
business diplomacy. The literature is quite extensive when it comes to the tools. 
Governments use in order to execute their political agenda using economic diplomacy. 
G20 countries such as China have been seen to exercise various types of economic 
diplomacy in Asia, and Africa wither bilaterally or multilaterally in the UN, WTO, 
ASEAN and other international organisations. Japan, South Korea, The United States 
and the United Kingdom established specialised entities that look after their foreign 
trade and investments as well as determine actions relevant to economic diplomacy 
principles in order to achieve their foreign policy agenda objectives.  
1.4 Potential Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
The importance of this dissertation is drawn from the recommendations that it provides 
to the decision makers and the uniqueness of the variables chosen specifically for the 
United Arab Emirates. These recommendations also contribute to the United Arab 
Emirates Vision 2021 (2010). This dissertation has significant importance towards the 
fundamental transformation in the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates to 
become increasingly global in its outlook, through the international engagement of its 
trade and investment soft power to achieve key foreign policy goals. By identifying 
specific economic diplomacy means and their impact on the overall trade and 
investment flows, this dissertation serves as a guiding document to identify which 
means to be used in what region and the exact impact each attribute has on the overall 
trade and investment flows. 
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 Meanwhile, this dissertation also has its limitations, in addition to rooms for future 
research that could be conducted to continue the work in this dissertation. First and 
foremost, the research methodology that was used has been quantitative, whereas 
qualitative approaches could be employed to improve the outputs and results. 
Also, the choice of the variables for the gravity models of trade and investment could 
have been expanded to include more variable that also reflects the economic diplomacy 
tools that the United Arab Emirates use. Therefore, future research could include other 
variables that may improve the model such as the state visits, ministerial visits and 
trade missions to test their impact on both trade and investment between the UAE and 
various countries around the world. Other factors that may be looked at and included 
in future research are the visa exemption schemes applied by both the United Arab 
Emirates and other countries towards their nationals, as this also may explain the 
variation in the trade and investment flows.  
A significant factor that may be included in future researches gravity models is the 
amount of Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) either in the monetary format of 
in capacity building format. Humanitarian assistance and developmental incentives 
provided by the United Arab Emirates to developing and developed countries around 
the world may play a role in affecting the total bilateral flow of foreign direct 
investments and non-oil trade.  
A critical economic diplomacy tool that is often used by the United Arab Emirates and 
should also be evaluated in future research are joint committees. Although these 
committees take several forms based on the speciality and objectives intended out of 
them, they always include an objective to boost the bilateral foreign direct investment 
flows and non-oil trade flows. The join committees either at the foreign affairs level 
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or at the economic level may be included in future research to test the impact that they 
bring to the flows of foreign direct investments and non-oil trade as they were initially 
intended to do. It will also be interesting to see which regions these economic tools do 
are most active. 
Another element that could be explored in future research is connectivity and its 
impact on the flow of trade and investments. First, air service agreements and the 
scheduled number of flights either passenger or cargo could be explored to examine 
their impact on the flow of Trade and Investment. As the UAE proudly hosts four 
airlines namely Emirates, Etihad, Air-Arabia and Fly-Dubai, it would be interesting to 
observe the extent of their influence on trade and investments. Similarly, Ports and 
Marine linkages could also be examined especially with the sizable investments DP 
World has made across the globe to bring together a nexus of seaports connected via 
Jebel Ali and using the latest technologies in ports management. The effects of the 
number of ports operated by DP World about the magnitude of trade and investments 
of the UAE is an interesting analogy to explore. The logistics sector has played a vital 
role in leaping the UAE forward in its economic development since its inception in 
1971 and thus would also be interesting to test the extent of this sectors effects on the 
overall trade and investments. 
Also, given the important transport and logistics sectors in the diversification efforts 
and in boosting trade and investment, continuation research in this field shall be of 
great importance using a generalised gravity model to test the effectiveness of this 
sector on the trade and investment. The State-owned enterprises’, in the fields of 
aviation, maritime and road infrastructure development, role in economic diplomacy 
could also be examined. 
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Furthermore, future research should explore the possibility of including variables that 
denote the property right protections, expropriation risks, corruption and examine their 
effects on the overall flow of bilateral non-oil trade as well as the flow of foreign direct 
investments and capital flows. This variable may also be interacting with the other 
economic diplomacy tools and contribute in explaining the variation of the total trade 
and investments. Moreover, intrinsic factors to the embassies and consulates could also 
take into consideration for future research and as variables in the gravity model such 
as a number of staff, qualifications, budget, and experiences of the staff in those 
missions.   
The last but not least economic diplomacy tool that could be included in future research 
is the establishment and continuation of the bilateral Business Councils. It would be 
interesting to see if the business councils are really effective in boosting the bilateral 
foreign direct investment flows and the bilateral non-oil trade between the United Arab 
Emirates and other countries around the world. Moreover, to test for the regions that 
business councils are most effective with.  
All in All, future research areas would also include studying and testing for the 
economic diplomacy tools effectiveness against various regions separately in full-
fledged dissertations or articles, especially those regions that showed greater potential 
in this dissertation. It would be interesting also to drill down the regression analysis to 
the countries level in order to identify which economic diplomacy tool is most 
effective with which country and what economic diplomacy tools to avoid when 
dealing with each country alone. Also, of importance is the anecdotal evidence, cases 
and other examples of economic diplomacy successes or failures, as a vehicle for 
telling the economic diplomacy story. 
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Chapter 2: Methods  
This Chapter of the Dissertation outlines the high-level research aims that highlight 
the targets that are intended to be achieved in this dissertation. It will also list the 
research objectives that are intended to materialize. Thereafter, the research questions 
of my DBA thesis are listed and serve as the building blocks of this research. Each 
research questions has a set of hypotheses that have been tested throughout the 
Dissertation in order to draw conclusions and recommendations. 
2.1 Research Design 
2.1.1 Research Aims 
The aim of this dissertation is to shed lights on the impact of Economic Diplomacy in 
the UAE Foreign Policy on bilateral foreign investment and trade. In addition, the 
research is intended to shed lights on the tools of the Economic Diplomacy that are 
being used by the UAE senior officials, ministries and other non-state actors and their 
effect on the aforementioned outcomes. The research also evaluated the effectiveness 
of the used tools and whether other tools could be of greater impact on trade and 
investments flows. The ultimate target is to provide a sound and empirically tested 
recommendations and conclusions to UAE decisions makers in Foreign Policy and its 
subset “Economic Diplomacy”. 
2.1.2 Research Objectives 
The research has two main objectives that ought to be achieved through this DBA 
dissertation:  
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i] Assess the effectiveness of the Economic Diplomacy tools in delivering the 
desired outcomes on trade and investment and ultimately on the political 
bilateral and multilateral weight of the UAE. 
ii] Examine the inter-relationship between the desired trade and investment 
outcomes and the agreements either bilateral or Free Trade Agreements signed 
on a multilateral level through the GCC and their impact on the flow of trade 
and investments.  
2.1.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
To evaluate the level of impact that Economic Diplomacy has had, if any, on the 
bilateral flows of investment and trade between the UAE and its major economic 
partners. This dissertation addresses the following two research questions and 
hypothesis:   
i] RQ1- Does Economic Diplomacy affect the bilateral trade between the UAE 
and other countries? 
▪ H01: Economic diplomacy affects bilateral trade between the UAE and 
other countries. 
▪ H1: Economic diplomacy does not affect bilateral trade between the UAE 
and other countries 
ii] RQ2- Does Economic Diplomacy affect the bilateral flow of investments 
between the UAE and other countries? 
▪ H02: Economic diplomacy affects bilateral investment flow between the 
UAE and other countries 
▪ H2: Economic diplomacy does not affect bilateral investment flow between 
the UAE and other countries 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Looking into the theoretical framework of the thesis, realist theories of international 
relations argue that the foreign political agenda drives the international trade. In a 
revolutionary international system with no strong supranational governing body, it is 
the responsibility of states to ensure their own survival. Empirically, bilateral trade is 
higher amongst political alliances (Gowa & Mansfield, 1993). In opposition to realism, 
liberalism argues that trade and international discourse have a significant impact in 
influencing foreign relations. This framework argues that countries are more 
concerned with absolute gains.  
While commercial liberalism particularly argues that the gains of international trade 
and capital flows will lead to greater peace as countries increase economic ties, and 
reduce tensions in the international politics  (Moravcsik, 2001). All in All, Realism 
and liberalism represent ideal types, the relationship between politics and international 
trade is usually far more complex, and causality between the two might be both ways 
and either way.  Similar to trade, the economic literature has also argued that quality 
of government in the host country and bilateral political relationship affect Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) (Gawarkiewicz & Tang, 2017). 
Politics, both home and international, are important determinants of the FDI. 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), which have various portfolios of investments 
abroad usually demand a risk premium for the uncertainty associated with instability 
in the country they invest in and thus will invest less or require a higher risk adjusted 
rate of return (Busse & Hefeker, 2007).. The flow of investments are also affected by 
the trade barriers being tariff or non-tariff related. Hence, if political tensions restrict 
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trade between two countries, MNEs would have less incentive to invest across the 
border (Gawarkiewicz & Tang, 2017). 
In order to oppose the effects of politics on trade and investments, international 
economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization WTO and bilateral 
investment treaties have helped to insulate international economic transactions from 
politics (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009). The WTO main mandate is that works to reduce 
trade barriers in both the trade of goods and services under the GATT and GAATTS. 
While the membership in the WTO may decrease the influence of tension on trade as 
its liberalization rules limit mercantilist practices like discriminatory tariffs, the WTO, 
at the same time has no enforcement mechanism on its rulings. Despite the absence of 
an enforcement mechanism other than the dispute settlement body, most countries, 
knowing the resulting trade war would hurt their interests, comply with the WTO and 
avoid mercantilist practices, fostering growing trade amongst all WTO members 
(Bello, 1996). 
2.3 Data Collection and Model 
The research methodology will comprise of a quantitative approach that will lead to 
test each hypothesis and arrive at a conclusion. The reason I choose such an approach 
is because the thesis will focus on various variables related to trade and investments 
and its correlation with economic growth and the changes they both bring to the 
intergovernmental legal and political stance. The gravity model has been applied to a 
wide variety of goods and services moving across regional and national borders under 
different circumstances since the early 1940s (Oguledo & Macphee, 1994). Some other 
researchers refer to the sixties era as the econometric studies were spawning especially 
the work of Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) while a more classic yet early 
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application of the gravity model in analysing international trade was used by 
Linnemann (1966).  
According to (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2003) the gravity model or equation is one 
of the most empirically successful methods in economics. It relates bilateral trade 
flows to GDP, distance, and other economic and trade factors. It has been widely used 
to infer-trade flow effects of institutions such as customs unions, exchange-rate 
mechanisms, ethnic ties, linguistic identity, and international borders. Contrary to what 
is often stated, the empirical gravity equations do not have a theoretical foundation. 
The theory, first developed by Anderson (1979), tells us that after controlling for size, 
trade between two regions is decreasing in their bilateral trade barrier relative to the 
average barrier of the two regions to trade with all their partners. Intuitively, the more 
resistant to trade with all others a region is, the more it is pushed to trade with a given 
bilateral partner.  
One methodology is building a causal model of UAE-X countries trade and growth for 
policy analysis. Hoa (2007) used an approach that he first introduced in 2002 called 
the Generalized Gravity Theory (GGT). This dissertation uses a similar approach to 
empirically study foreign trade and investment flows and its causal link with economic 
growth in the UAE. The main features of the GGT modelling approach is that it 
assumes no a priori (for example linear and log-linear) functional forms. The GGT 
modelling approach incorporates foreign direct investments, services and other reform 
and non-economic events that had an effect on the volumes of trade and investment 
flows in the recent years; and it explicitly incorporates interdependence between trade, 
growth and major macroeconomic activities in the trading economies (Krueger, 2007).  
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As there are multiple factors influencing trade and investment flows, this study 
attempts to address them using a gravity model used by Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011) 
for the trade flows and the model used by Gawarkiewicz and Tang (2017) for the 
investment flows.  Data has been collected from historical data that exists within the 
databases of the federal and local authorities such as the Federal Customs Authority, 
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, The Central Bank, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation and statistics centres of each emirate where 
applicable. The data set will involve the flows of trade and investments, statistical data 
on the bilateral agreements, statistical data on the multilateral free trade agreements, 
and the number of embassies and trade offices as well as their geographic locations. 
While some data related to the macroeconomic indicators will be obtained from 
international databases such as the CIA Fact Book, The World Bank, UNCTAD, the 
IMF and the Economist Intelligence Unit databases. 
2.3.1 Gravity Model for Trade  
Bilateral foreign trade plays a key role in the process of economic development in any 
country. The overall trade nexus comprises of the flow of exports and exports into and 
out from the country to its counterpart and carries the same importance in this case. 
Each country ultimately imports raw materials, intermediate and capital goods to 
expand and improve its production base and to support the export growth if these goods 
are not available domestically. In addition, the imports of consumer goods are also 
important to provide the necessary supply for the domestic demand for goods. On the 
contrary, the export of goods is essential to counter the foreign exchange gap, to 
enhance the import capacity of the country and to reduce dependence on foreign aid. 
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It is believed that boosting the import capacity has positive effects on the efforts 
exerted by a country towards industrialisation and boosts the overall economic 
activities, which, in turn, could enhance the economic growth. Therefore, the country’s 
participation in the global trade is considered the  most important enabler to fast 
economic growth and development (Rahman, 2009). The gravity model has been 
applied to a wide variety of goods and factors of production moving across regional 
and national boundaries under different circumstances since the early 1940s and was 
used to estimate trade flows especially when derived from a linear expenditure system 
(Oguledo & Macphee, 1994).  
Towards this end, Rahman (2009) argues that there are various ranges of applied 
research where the gravity model is used to examine the bilateral trade patterns and 
trade relationships. He also confirmed that those studies use the gravity model both for 
the aggregate bilateral trade and also for product level trade. Both the cross -section 
and panel data approaches have been used by these studies. Some examples of the uses 
of gravity model in estimating trade relations have been examined. Rahman (2003) 
examines the determinants Bangladesh trade using panel data estimation technique and 
generalized gravity model. The author considers both economic and natural factors 
when estimating the gravity model. The study covers data of 35 countries for 28 years 
(1972-99).  
Batra (2006) had also used an augmented gravity model to estimate India’s trade 
potential. The model is based on cross-section data of 2000, in addition, he attempted 
to analyse the world trade flows and the coefficients to predict Indians trade potential. 
According to Christie (2002) Gravity models have been used extensively in recent 
years to try to quantify potential trade levels, particularly with transition countries. She 
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discussed the variables of the gravity model in the case of Southeast Europe, with a 
specific emphasis on trade flows with and within south-east Europe. In a sample of 76 
countries, Kalbasi (2001) examined the volume and direction of trade for Iran dividing 
the countries into developing and industrial countries.  
On similar lines,  Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997) used cross-section and panel data in 
applying the gravity model to examine roles of trading blocs, currency links, and 
others. Analysing the bilateral trade patterns worldwide (Frankel, Wei, Canzoneri, & 
Goldstein, 1995)  examined the impact of currency blocs and exchange rate stability 
on trade. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), and Magee (2003) analysed the impact 
of multilateral factors on bilateral trade flows. In addition to the examples above, a 
more recent development of a gravity model was done by UNCTAD-WTO Trade 
Centre and it is called TradeSim. It is being used to estimate the trade potential for 
countries with limited trade relations in the past especially transition economies. The 
main purpose of it is to analyse the bilateral trade flows of developing countries with 
their trading partners (Batra, 2006). 
In estimating the trade relations based on various variables, this study used a gravity 
model following the work of Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011). This entails the inclusion 
of the instruments of economic diplomacy in a traditional trade model. As this thesis 
deals with the actual repercussions and impacts of economic diplomacy tools on the 
level of bilateral trade flows, the choice of the gravity model is almost unavoidable 
especially that the gravity model presently is accepted both in academic and in policy 
circles  (Yakop & van Bergeijk, 2011). In addition, robustness and general acceptance 
of the method are essential for the analysis conducted in this dissertation.  
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The Augmented gravity model equation to be estimated is as follows:  
ln(Xij)= β0 + β1 ln(Dij)+ β2 ln(Yi*Yj) + β3 ln(Popi * Popj)+β4 ln(Areai * Areaj)+β5 
EmbConij +β6 EmbConji+ β7 Landlockedij+ β8 Islandij+β9 Languageij+β10 
BorderShare ij+β11 Colonizedij+β12 FTAij+β13 BITij+β14 DTAij+ℇij 
Where i and j denotes the countries and Xij denotes the value of the total bilateral trade 
between i and j. 
The explanatory variables in the augmented gravity model are as follows1: 
i] Distance: D is the distance between country i and country j measured between 
the two latitude-longitude combinations. A major proportion of trade today 
goes by air (and not by sea or land) and therefore the air routes provide the 
most convenient justification for using the straight line or great circle measure 
of distance. The ultimate justification is of course given by the fact that this 
measure seems to be a reasonable measure of averaging across different modes 
of transportation and works well in practice. The data was obtained using 
distance calculations between the GPS Coordinates of the capital cities in both 
countries. 
ii] GDP per Capita: Y denotes the GDP per capital PPP – Purchase Power Parity 
- in US Dollars for each country i and j for a given year. The data was obtained 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit databases that were derived from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). From a mathematical perspective, it is 
indeed equivalent, whether the use of explanatory variables as GDP and per 
capita GDP, or as GDP and population, in this dissertation the former has been 
chosen. In particular the specification with GDP per capita allows to explore 
the link between a country’s trade and its stage of development. Several 
                                                 
1 See Table 1 in Appendix 
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explanations have been provided in the literature for inclusion of GDP per 
capita as an independent variable in addition to GDP. One possible explanation 
for the independent effect of per capita GDP is that the demand for foreign 
merchandise is superior as it appeals more to the consumers of one country 
more than the local merchandise. Other possibilities arise out of the literature 
on endogenous growth. For example, the process of development may be led 
by the innovation or invention of new products that are then demanded as 
exports by other countries. It is also useful to focus explicitly on GDP per 
capita as a determinant of trade.  
The standard gravity model predicts that countries with similar levels of output 
per capita will trade more than countries with dissimilar levels (Batra, 2006). 
This is true of the Helpman and Krugman (1985) theory, as it states that the 
magnitude of bilateral trade flows should increase with increasingly equal 
distribution of national income i.e. GDP Per Capita between both countries. 
This however contradicts the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin theories of trade that 
predict that countries with dissimilar levels and also types of produce will trade 
more than countries with similar levels (Heckscher & Ohlin, 1991). The Linder 
hypothesis (Linder, 1961) states that that the volume of trade between two 
countries is larger the closer they are in terms of per capita income; this fact is 
due to the export potentiality developed in the two markets by the similar 
national demand patterns that accompany similar levels of income (Basevi, 
1970). This hypothesis is often viewed as similar to the Krugman-Helpman 
theory in its predictions.  
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iii] Population Pop: Denotes the average population of countries I and j for a given 
year. The values were obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit that was 
derived from the International Monetary Fund IMF statistics. The population 
variable was also used in many scholarly works when estimating trade flows 
as a determinant factor of the magnitude of goods and services among 
countries. In addition to the above standard variables in the gravity model, 
another explanatory variable  has been added similar to the one developed by 
Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011) and the variables used by Batra (2006). 
iv] Embassy or/and Consulate EmbCon: This variable denotes the number of 
embassies and consulates of each country I and j that have been established in 
both countries at any point in time. The Data was obtained from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates.  
v] Area: the area of the country in square kilometres as reported in the CIA World 
Fact Book 2018 (The Central Intelligence Authority, 2018). In addition to the 
above explanatory variables, the research intends to assess the impact of 
geographical and historical factors between countries on bilateral trade as well 
as examine the effects of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Therefore, 
dummy variables were used as shown below: 
vi] Language Lang: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether countries 
i and j share a common language or not. The data was constructed based on the 
official languages of the countries as obtained from CIA world Fact book 2018. 
vii] Border Share: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether countries i 
and j share borders together. The data was constructed via geographical maps 
obtained from Google.com.  
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viii] Land Locked: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether country j 
is landlocked or not. The Data was obtained from CIA World Fact Book 2018.  
ix] Colonized Col: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether country i 
and j have been both colonized and not. The Data was obtained from CIA 
World Fact Book 2018. 
x] Island: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether country j is an 
island or not. The Data was obtained from CIA World Fact Book 2018. 
xi] FTA: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether a Free Trade 
Agreement is in place between countries i and j. this dissertation only included 
Free Trade Agreements that are signed, ratified and are currently in effect. The 
Data was obtained from the UAE Ministry of Economy.  
xii]  BIT: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether a Protection and 
Promotion of Investment Agreement is in place between countries i and j. This 
research only included Protection and Promotion of Investment Agreements 
that are signed, ratified and are currently in effect. The Data was obtained from 
the UAE Ministry of Finance. 
xiii] DTA: the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreement is in place between countries i and j. 
this research only included Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreements that are signed, ratified and are currently in effect. The Data was 
obtained from the Ministry of Finance UAE. The data collected covers the 
period from 1999 till 2016 for 185 countries that are trading partners with the 
UAE. Due to unavailability of bilateral trade data and incomplete historical 
economic indicators, the following countries were excluded from the data 
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sheet: Andorra, Israel, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, North Korea, Palestine, 
San Marino, Somalia, and South Sudan. 
2.3.2 Gravity Model for Investment Flows 
The work of Pollins (1989b) followed by (Hoa, 2007) and more recently the paper 
published by Gawarkiewicz and Tang (2017). This dissertation uses the gravity model 
augmented with political variables as a ‘distance’ variable as used by Gawarkiewicz 
and Tang (2017). The dependent variable in the augmented Gravity model developed 
below is the log bilateral FDI volume (ln(FDI)). To measure the size of a pair of 
countries, i and j, the log of FDI flows are determined by the log product of both sides 
GDP (ln(GDP)), the log of product of their population (ln(population).  
The key variables of interests are legislations and bilateral and regional agreements in 
the past when making an investment decision (BIT, DTA, FTA) while also adding the 
diplomatic missions to test for diplomacy effect on the flow of capital between the 
UAE and other countries and regions. Moreover, dyad random effects øij has been 
included to allow the error term ℇijt to be clustered at country level. Note the dyad 
random effects would absorb the effects of time constant factors such as the existence 
of embassies, and the binary dummy variables.  
The model reflects the same variables in trade in order to compare and contrast and 
arrive at a conclusion of which factors affect the flow of investments and trade in which 
regions. As there will be a large number of observations where the FDI figure is zero 
and this limits the variation in the FDI variable, Hence, the baseline model for annual 
bilateral FDI flow is: 
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Prob( FDIijt >0 ) = Φ( γ0 + γ 1 ln(GDPijt) + γ2· ln(Dij)+ γ3· ln(Popijt)+γ4· ln(Areaij)+ 
γ5·(EmbConijt )+γ6· (EmbConjit)+γ7·(Landlockedij)+γ8·(Islandij)+γ9·( Languageij)+γ 
10·( BorderShare ij )+ γ 11·( Colonizedij )+ γ 12·( FTAijt)+ γ 13·( BITijt)+γ 14·( DTAijt) +øi+ 
øj +  µijt). 
Where Φ is the density function for a normal distribution, and  
ln( FDIijt ) = θ0 + θ 1·ln(GDPi*GDPj)+θ 2· ln(Dij)+θ 3· ln(Popi * Popj)+θ 4· ln(Areai * 
Areaj)+θ 5·( EmbConij )+θ 6· (EmbConji)+ θ7·( Landlockedij) + θ 8·( Islandij)  + θ 8·( 
Languageij)+ θ 8·( BorderShare ij) + θ 8·( Colonizedij) + θ 8·( FTAij)+ θ 8·( BITij) + θ 
8·( DTAij) +øi +øj + υijt  
The variables above in the model have already been explained in Table 1 of the 
Appendix2. 
2.3.3 Econometric Issues 
This section showcases the diagnostic statistical techniques to determine the model 
fitness with the data that have been compiled. Since this dissertation has explanatory 
variables along with dummy variables, the natural logarithm of the variables have been 
used such that systematic changes in the spread of the residuals with the dependent 
variable is minimized. The purpose is to remove that systematic change in the spread 
and achieve a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the main econometric issues that shall be examined 
in this thesis are normality, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity. 
                                                 
2 See Appendix – Table 1 
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2.3.3.1 Normality 
Statistical errors are common in scientific literature and about half of the published 
articles have at least one statistical error (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). Therefore, 
there is a need to check the assumption of normality, namely parametric tests, because 
the model validity depends on it. The aim of this subsection is to overview checking 
for normality in statistical analysis using Stata/IC 15. 
First, visual inspection of the distribution techniques was performed to assess 
normality, although this approach is usually unreliable and does not guarantee that the 
distribution is normal. However, when data are presented visually, readers of an article 
can judge the distribution assumption by themselves.  
As shown in (see Appendix – Figure 1), the Probability-Probability Plot (P-P Plot) was 
generated and shows that data follow a normal distribution for the following 
explanatory variables: Total Trade, Distance, Yij*Yji, Area i * Area j, and Pop i * 
Pop j except the EmbCon ij and EmbCon ji which are shown to not be normally 
distributed. However, all the dummy variables have shown non-normality which was 
expected due to their binary attributes. After that, statistical normality test was 
conducted in order to test for normality, namely the Shapiro-Wilk W Test for normal 
data (see Appendix – Table 3). Therefore, as shown in the table above, the normal 
approximation to the sampling distribution of W is not valid. Moreover, the Prob. > z 
value is less than 0.05, therefore the null hypothesis that the data are normally 
distributed is rejected. Hence, there is no evidence to support the normality of the 
independent variables data.  
However, Shapiro-Wilk's test has an issue when it comes to large data sets i.e. when 
you feed it more data, the chances of the null hypothesis being rejected becomes larger. 
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So, what happens is that for large amounts of data even very small deviations from 
normality can be detected, leading to rejection of the null hypothesis event though for 
practical purposes the data is more than normal enough. As shown in Appendix - Table 
3, a skewness and kurtosis tests were performed that show each variable characteristic 
in that regard. As a general rule of thumb: If skewness is less than -1 or greater than 1, 
the distribution is highly skewed. If skewness is between -1 and -0.5 or between 0.5 
and 1, the distribution is moderately skewed. If skewness is between -0.5 and 0.5, the 
distribution is approximately symmetric (Brown, 2008-2017). 
Consequently, the table shows that the following variables are highly skewed: Area 
i*Area j, Language, Island, BIT, DTA and EmbCon ij. While moderate skewness was 
observed in the following variables: Distance and EmbCon ji. Finally, approximate 
symmetry is observed in the following explanatory variables: Yij*Yji, and Pop i*Pop j. 
For Kurtosis, the rule of having excess kurtosis that was applied is that if the value of 
the kurtosis is less than -2 and the smallest acceptable kurtosis is 1. Therefore, for all 
variables, it is observed that kurtosis is within the acceptable range. In addition, and 
due to the large number of observation in our panel data the P-P Plot of the error term 
was used as shown in Appendix – Figure 3, the Probability-Probability Plot (P-P Plot) 
of the Error term shows that there is enough evidence that the data follows a normal 
distribution for the panel data. Therefore, and in light of all of the above, there is an 
overwhelming evidence that the panel data follows a normal distribution. 
2.3.3.2 Multicollinearity 
In order to test for multicollinearity, simple correlation table was generated as well as 
the Variance Inflation Factor to test for autocorrelation and hence multicollinearity. 
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Therefore, simple correlations are small (refer to Appendix – Table 5), in addition the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was conducted in order to measure how much the 
variance of the estimated regression coefficient are inflected as compared to when the 
predictors variables are not linearly related.  It was observed (See Appendix – Table 
6) that all VIF’s are less than 10 which leads to conclude that there is no evidence of 
having a multicollinearity problem. 
2.3.3.3 Heteroscedasticity 
To test for heteroscedasticity, two techniques were used. First, the visual inspection of 
the residuals plotted against the fitted values was used (See Appendix – Figure 2). It 
was observed that the plot of residuals shows some uneven envelope of residuals, so 
that the width of the envelope is considerably larger for some values of X than for 
others. Therefore, a more formal test for heteroscedasticity is conducted namely the 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity to detect any linear form 
of heteroscedasticity (See Appendix – Table 7). Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests 
the null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that the 
error variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables. As shown in the 
results of the test, Chi-square value is 453.73 which is large enough to reject the null 
hypothesis, as evidence of heteroscedasticity.  
2.3.3.4 Model Selection  
This presents Panel Data Fixed Effects, Random Effect, and Pooled Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) Model. As the data is in panel format, it is inevitable to evaluate for 
Pooled OLS, fixed and random effects and determine which model to use. I ran the 
tests according to the methodology described by Park (2011) for panel data modelling 
and selection. 
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Appendix – Table 8 shows the results of the F-test which test for fixed effects in both 
the trade and investment models. As the p-value is less than 0.05, there is a significant 
fixed effect and a significant increase in the goodness-of-fit in the fixed effect model 
in both trade and investment models; therefore, the fixed effects model is better than 
the pooled OLS. Appendix – Table 9 shows the results of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test results for both the trade model and the investment model which 
has a p-value less than 0.05, and hence there is a significant random effect in the panel 
data of both Trade and Investment, and that the random effect model is able to deal 
with heterogeneity better than does the pooled OLS. 
To select which model to use either fixed effects model or random effects model for 
trade and investment models. The Hausman test for both the Trade Model and the 
Investment Model have been used but was inconclusive as shown in Appendix – Table 
10. The Hausman test returns -196.16 for Trade data and -14.99 for Investment data 
and warns that data fail to meet the asymptotic assumptions in both cases. Although 
the chi-squares score is small enough not to reject the null hypothesis, it is not 
conclusive that the random effect model is better than its fixed counterpart. 
However, given the problem with fixed effects model which fails to estimate any time-
invariant explanatory variable, which exist in the panel data. In addition, to the fact 
that Hausman test was inconclusive to reject or not to reject the null hypothesis for 
both panel data sets. Therefore, this dissertation requires the use of Generalized Least-
Square Random Effects model with robust standard errors for both trade data and 
investment data. 
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2.3.3.5 Overall Model Assessment Outcomes 
As shown in the previous subsections on the econometric issues examined in this 
dissertation, it has been concluded that all the assumptions have been met, except 
heteroscedasticity assumptions. Therefore, in order to correct the heteroscedasticity 
issue, the Panel Data linear-regression with Generalised Least-Square Random Effects 
model with robust standard errors in both trade as well as investment augmented 
gravity models have been used in this dissertation. Therefore, the model fits the data 
and the model shall be used for evaluating the hypothesis in the subsequent chapters. 
Summary statistics of both models have been performed and are exhibited in 
Appendix-Table 2. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
Results are the outcome of our research within which it shall summarise the data 
collected and the statistical treatment of them. In addition to the observations and 
measurements recorded while conducting the procedures described in the 
methodology chapter while addressing the research questions raised in chapter 2 and 
any hypotheses formulated there.  
3.1 Trade Results and Regression Analysis 
First, the regression was performed on the data to estimate the results of the augmented 
gravity model for total trade (See Appendix - Table 9). There is enough evidence to 
support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data well. There is also 
have enough evidence that 72.29% of the variation of total trade is explained by the 
variation of the independent variables. The remaining 27.71% variations are attributed 
to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. The model 
successfully ran across 3156 observations of 185 countries. 
We are moving on to look at the explanatory variables results. The coefficient of 
Distance is negative and highly significant (-1.07). This implies that the UAE tends to 
trade less with more distant countries (p-value =0). The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to 
increase with countries which have higher GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive 
and equals 1.07. The variable Yj * Yi demonstrated very high significance (p-
value=0). When looking at the population variables coefficients, it has been observed 
that there is a higher tendency to do trade when the UAE’s and its partner’s population 
grows, and the magnitude of increase in trade is the highest among all coefficients and 
is statistically significant (p-value=0). This may be attributed to the growth in demand 
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by the consumers on one end, while there are abundance and variation in the offered 
goods from the other end. This ultimately leads to an increase in total bilateral trade. 
On the contrary to the population variable, it has been observed that Area negatively 
affects the total bilateral trade of the UAE. The larger the trading partner is in total 
area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. The variable also 
shows high significance statistically (p-value =0). The bilateral trade of the UAE has 
been shown to be influenced by diplomatic missions and consulates, the model 
provides enough evidence with high significance (p-value=0.004) that the Total 
Bilateral Trade of the UAE is negatively related to the number of UAE Missions, 
Embassies and Consulates abroad as the coefficient is negative and equals to -0.242. 
However, the variable of the number of foreign Embassies and Consulates in the UAE 
is shown to be statistically insignificant with a p-value=0.152. Next is to observe the 
results of the dummy variable in our augmented gravity model. 
As shown in the same table, it has been observed that there is a very high significance 
of having a common language with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language, in 
influencing the trade flows positively. Therefore, having Arabic as an official language 
in a country tends to increase the Bilateral Total Trade. The language variable 
coefficient is equal 1.72 wish a p-value equals 0. Interestingly, the Model predicts an 
insignificant negative impact of having a border with the UAE on the Total Bilateral 
Trade flow as the coefficient is -0.318and the p-value is equal to 0.765. 
Our trade model shows an insignificant positive impact of being a landlocked country 
on the total bilateral trade with the UAE, as the coefficient is equal to 0.034 (p-
value=0.905). In the case of that trading country being ever colonized, the results 
obtained from the augmented gravity model show an insignificant positive coefficient 
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of 0.739 (p-value=0.36). Similarly, the countries attribute of being an island or not is 
statistically insignificant in our model and thus has no linear relationship with the total 
bilateral trade (p-value=0.893).  
On the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between 
FTA’s and total bilateral trade (p-value=0.189). Moreover, the total bilateral trade 
between the UAE and other countries is shown to be non-linearly related to having an 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income (DTA). Therefore, both variables are insignificant with p-
values equal to 0.319 and 0.054, respectively. 
3.1.1 Analysing the UAE Trade per Geographic Regions  
In an attempt to examine the effects of the economic diplomacy tools on the total trade 
geographically, the 185 countries were divided into their respective regions as per the 
United Nations standards, the World Bank Standard. Also, the current classification 
used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the UAE has been taken into consideration 
when doing the former. The gravity model was tested to observe the effects of the 
variation in the independent variables on the dependent variable namely Total Trade 
using the Random Effects GLS model. Next is to look at the regions in alphabetical 
order. A graphical representation of the results for the trade model is shown in 
Appendix - Figure 4 for the factors that boost the bilateral non-oil trade and Appendix 
- Figure 5 for the factors that reduce the bilateral non-oil trade. 
3.1.1.1 Sub Saharan Africa – An Emerging Market with Potential for the UAE 
As observed in the results, there is enough evidence to support the validity of the model 
and that the model fits the data well. There is also enough evidence that 61.81% of the 
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variation of total trade is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The 
remaining 38.19% variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included 
in our Gravity Model. Next is to observe the results of the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables. 
The coefficient of Distance is negative but insignificant (p-value=0.511). The UAE’s 
bilateral trade tends to increase with Sub Saharan African countries which have higher 
GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals 1.51. The variable Yj * Yi 
demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking at the population 
variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency to make a trade 
with sub-Saharan African countries that have a higher population, the variable is 
statistically significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with all countries, it is observed that Area negatively affects the 
total bilateral trade of the UAE with Sub Saharan Africa. The larger the trading partner 
is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. It is 
also observed that Area is the largest negative coefficient of -22.12 with a p-value=0. 
This attribute effect is mainly because of the vast areas in Africa, and population 
distribution hinders the flow of trade as connectivity is a significant drawback. The 
variable also shows high significance statistically. 
The bilateral trade of the UAE has been shown to be influenced by diplomatic missions 
and consulates in Sub Saharan Africa, the model provides enough evidence with high 
significance that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is negatively related to the 
number of Foreign Sub Saharan Countries Embassies and Consulates in the UAE as 
the coefficient is negative and equals -0.645 (p-value=0). Similarly, the variable of the 
number of the UAE Embassies and Consulates in Sub Saharan Africa is shown to be 
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negatively related to total trade as the coefficient is equal -0.733 with a p-value=0 after 
that is to observe the results of the dummy variables in our augmented gravity model. 
Similarly, with the previous model of all countries, it is observed with a very high 
significance that having a common language with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official 
language, is influencing the trade flows positively (p-value=0). Therefore, having 
Arabic as an official language in a Sub-Saharan African Country tends to impact the 
Bilateral Total Trade positively. The language variable coefficient is 3.79. While it 
also makes sense and in line with the common understanding of the trade dynamics, 
and similar to the regression model in Section 3.1, it is also observed that there is an 
insignificant negative impact of being a landlocked Sub Saharan African country on 
the total bilateral trade with the UAE, as the coefficient is equal -1.02 with (p-
value=0.101). Moreover, an insignificant negative impact of being an island in Sub 
Saharan Africa, on the total trade with the UAE has been observed (p-value=0.236). 
The regression model omitted the variable Border-Share due to collinearity issue. 
On the legislative front, the model omitted the FTA variable due to collinearity issues 
in the regression model of the Sub Saharan Africa Region. However, the total bilateral 
trade between the UAE and Sub Saharan Africa is shown to be significantly and 
positively related to having an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(BIT/IPPA) as the coefficient is equal to 1.99 and is the second largest coefficient, 
with a p-value = 0.002. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to support that the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is linearly related to 
Bilateral Total trade with sub-Saharan Africa but negatively impacts the total flow of 
bilateral non-oil trade between the UAE and Sub Saharan Africa (p-value=0.028). 
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3.1.1.2 Arab Countries Trade with the UAE 
This Section examines the regression model by analysing the coefficients when the 
trading partners of the UAE are members of the Arab League, a multilateral 
organisation that its members constitute the Arab world, to estimate the results of the 
augmented gravity model for total trade. As observed in the results, there is enough 
evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data well.  
There is also enough evidence that 63.6% of the variation of total trade is explained 
by the variation of the independent variables. The remaining 36.4% variations are 
attributed to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. The 
analysis shall be on the results of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. The 
distance coefficient is negative but insignificant (p-value=0.118). The UAE’s bilateral 
trade tends to increase with Arab countries which have higher GDP per Capita as the 
coefficient is positive and equals 0.938. The variable Yj * Yi demonstrated very high 
significance (p-value=0). When looking at the population variables coefficients, it is 
observed that there is a higher tendency to make a trade with Arab states of the higher 
population; thus, the variable is statistically significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to previous regression models, it is also observed that Area negatively affects 
the total bilateral trade of the UAE with the Arab World. The larger the trading partner 
is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. It is 
observed that the Area is the largest negative coefficient. This effect is attributed to 
the vast areas in some Arab countries, and the population distribution hinders the flow 
of trade as connectivity is a major drawback as well as infrastructure. There might also 
be an element of political instability which rendered many areas inaccessible due to 
conflict. The variable also shows high significance statistically (-p-value=0.005). 
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The bilateral trade of the UAE is not influenced by diplomatic missions and consulates 
of Arab partner countries in the UAE; the model does not provide enough evidence 
that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is related to the number of Arab Countries 
Embassies and Consulates in the UAE (p-value=0.685). Similarly, the variable of the 
number of UAE Embassies and Consulates in Arab Countries is insignificant thus there 
is no evidence that UAE Embassies and Consulates are related to the total bilateral 
trade with Arab Countries (p-value=0.114).  
It is now moving on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model. It is observed that the variable of common language with the UAE, i.e. 
Arabic as an official language, has been omitted from the regression model due to 
collinearity issues. This complies with the common principles as the variable will 
always have the same value across all observations, i.e. all countries have Arabic as 
an official first language. 
Similarly, the variables landlocked, border-share and colonised have also been omitted 
due to collinearity issues. The omission is because those countries are similar to the 
UAE in these attributes and thus collinearity has been observed. Interestingly, it is 
observed that there is an insignificant positive impact of being an island in the Arab 
World, on the total trade with the United Arab Emirates (p-value=0.075). On the 
legislative front, there is not enough evidence that the Free Trade Agreement and the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) are linearly related to 
the total trade of the UAE with its partner Arab country (p-value=0.217 and 0.336). 
So, it is observed that there was a negative effect of Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) on the Total Trade of the UAE with the Arab states 
as a coefficient equals -0.381 with a significant p-value = 0.022.  
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3.1.1.3 Australasia: Is Distance an Issue? 
First, the regression on the data was performed to estimate the results of the augmented 
gravity model for total trade, however this section only tests for the countries in 
Australasia namely Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, while the Pacific 
islands have been categorised in the Oceania category due to their similar 
characteristics and demographics and attributes.   
It is observed that several variables were omitted from the regression model due to 
collinearity issue. The variables are Language, Border-Share, Landlocked, Island, 
Colonized, Free Trade Agreement and Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (BIT). As also observed in the results, there is enough evidence to support 
the validity of the model and that the model fits the data well. There is also have 
enough evidence that 95.28% of the variation of total trade is explained by the variation 
of the independent variables. The remaining 4.72% variations are attributed to other 
variables that may not have been included in our Gravity Model. Then, is to observe 
the results of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
The coefficient of Distance is positive and highly significant (29.39). This implies that 
the UAE tends to trade more with farther Australasian countries. Interestingly, there is 
enough evidence that the bilateral trade between the UAE and Australasia is negatively 
influenced by the variation of the GDP per Capita of both sides (p-value = 0.022). 
When looking at the population variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a 
higher tendency to make a trade with Australasian countries that have a higher 
population, the variable is statistically significant (p-value=0). In contrast to the 
previous regions, it is observed that Area positively affects the total bilateral trade of 
the UAE with Australasia. The larger the trading partner is in total area in square 
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kilometres, the more the total trade value between them. The variable also shows high 
significance statistically (p-value=0). 
The bilateral trade of the UAE is not related to the number of diplomatic missions and 
consulates. There is not enough evidence the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is 
linearly related to the number of Embassies and Consulates in both the UAE and its 
trading partner in Australasia and vice versa (p-value=0.373 and 0.772). Next moving 
on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented gravity model. As 
most of the dummy variables were omitted due to collinearity. The only value that is 
reported in the regression model is the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA). Despite that, there is not enough evidence that the variable DTA is 
linearly related to the dependent variable of Total Trade (p-value=0.932). 
3.1.1.4 Caribbean 
In the case of the UAE’s trade relation with the Caribbean, the same regression was 
conducted on the data to estimate the results of the augmented gravity model for total 
trade. However, it is only to test for the Caribbean countries. It is observed that several 
variables were omitted from the regression model due to collinearity issue. The 
variables are Language, BorderShare, Landlocked, Free Trade Agreement and 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT).  
There is enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits 
the data well. There is also enough evidence that 47.96% of the variation of total trade 
is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The remaining 52.04% 
variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity 
Model. Then is to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
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The coefficient of Distance is positive, similar to the case of Australasia, and highly 
significant (p-value=0.003). This implies that the UAE tends to trade more with farther 
Caribbean countries.  
The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with the Caribbean countries which have 
higher GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals 1.79. The variable Yj 
* Yi demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking at the population 
variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency to make a trade 
with Caribbean countries that have a higher population, the variable is statistically 
significant (p-value=0). Similar to the previous regions, there is enough evidence that 
the total area in a square kilometre of the countries is linearly and negatively related 
to the total bilateral trade between the UAE and the Caribbean countries (p-value=0). 
The bilateral trade of the UAE is not influenced by diplomatic missions and consulates 
in the Caribbean; the model does not provide enough evidence that the Total Bilateral 
Trade of the UAE is related to the number of Foreign Caribbean Countries Embassies 
and Consulates in the UAE (p-value=0.203). Moreover, the variable of the number of 
UAE Embassies and Consulates in the Caribbean is also shown to be statistically 
insignificant (p-value=0.773) thus there is no evidence that UAE Embassies and 
Consulates are linearly related to the total bilateral trade with the Caribbean Countries.  
Now, is to move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model and taking into consideration the ones which were omitted as previously 
explained. It is observed that there is an insignificant positive impact of being an island 
in the Caribbean, on the total trade with the UAE (p-value=0.447). While there is also 
enough evidence that boing ever colonised has a positive impact on the total bilateral 
non-oil trade between the UAE and the Caribbean (p-value=0.002). On the legislative 
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front, there is not enough evidence that the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) variable is linearly related to the dependent variable of Total Trade 
(p-value=0.744).  
3.1.1.5 East Asia 
In this subcategory of regional groupings, the results of the augmented gravity model 
for total trade are analysed for the countries in East Asia. As observed in the results, 
there is enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits 
the data well. There is also enough evidence that the variation of the independent 
variables explains 94.09% of the variation of total trade. The remaining variations 
(5.91%) are attributed to other variables that not to be included in our Gravity Model. 
The following variables were omitted from the regression model due to collinearity 
issues: Language, BorderShare, and Colonized. Next is to observe the results of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. The coefficient of Distance is negative and 
significant (p-value=0.16). This implies that the UAE tends to trade less with more 
distant East Asian countries. The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with East 
Asian countries which have higher GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and 
equals 1.32. The variable Yj * Yi demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). 
When looking at the population variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a 
higher tendency to make a trade with East Asian countries that have a higher 
population, the variable is statistically significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with some regions such as Africa and the Arab World, it is observed 
that Area negatively affects the total bilateral trade of the UAE with East Asia. The 
larger the trading partner is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade 
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value between them. It is similarly observed that Area is the largest negative 
coefficient. This effect is attributed likewise to the vast areas in East Asia and 
population distribution, which hinder the flow of trade as connectivity is a significant 
drawback. The variable also shows high significance statistically (p-value=0). 
The bilateral trade of the UAE has been shown to be influenced by diplomatic missions 
and consulates of East Asian countries in the UAE, the model provides enough 
evidence with high significance that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is positively 
related to the number of Foreign East Asian Countries Embassies and Consulates in 
the UAE (p-value=0.026). However, the variable of the number of UAE Embassies 
and Consulates in East Asia is shown to be statistically insignificant with a p-
value=0.385. Thus there is no evidence that UAE Embassies and Consulates are 
linearly related to the total bilateral trade with East Asian Countries.  
Now to move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented gravity 
model. While it also makes sense and in line with the common understanding of the 
trade dynamics, and similar to the regression model in section 3.1, it is observed that 
there is an insignificant negative impact of being a landlocked East Asian country on 
the total bilateral trade with the UAE (p-value=296). Similarly, there is not enough 
evidence that being an Island East Asian country is negatively related to the total 
bilateral trade between the UAE and the East Asian region (p-value=0.385).  
On the legislative front, there is enough evidence that having a Free Trade Agreement 
is negatively related to the total bilateral trade between the UAE and that East Asian 
Country (p-value=0). However, the total bilateral trade between the UAE and East 
Asian countries is shown to be significantly and positively related to having an 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) as the coefficient is 
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equal to 1.15 and is the second largest coefficient with a p-value = 0. In contrast, there 
is not enough evidence to support that the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) is linearly related to Bilateral Total trade with sub-Saharan Africa 
(p-value=0.603). 
3.1.1.6 Europe 
This subsection is to observe the outcome of the regression analysis of the augmented 
gravity equation for the case of European countries. As observed in the results, there 
is enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data 
well. There is also enough evidence that 85.74% of the variation of total trade is 
explained by the variation of the independent variables. The remaining 14.26% 
variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity 
Model. 
Then to move on to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
The coefficient of Distance is positive but insignificant (p-value=0.968). The UAE’s 
bilateral trade tends to increase with European countries which have higher GDP per 
Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals 1.525. The variable Yj* Yi 
demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking at the population 
variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency to make a trade 
with European countries that have a higher population, the variable is statistically 
significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with some regions, it is observed that Area negatively affects the 
total bilateral trade of the UAE with Europe. The larger the trading partner is in total 
area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. It is observed 
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that Area is the largest negative coefficient also similar to many other regions that were 
examined in this dissertation. The variable also shows high significance statistically 
(p-value=0). 
On a diplomatic front, the bilateral trade of the UAE has been shown to be not 
explained by diplomatic missions and consulates in Europe, the model does not 
provide enough evidence that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is linearly related 
to both the number of Foreign European Countries Embassies and Consulates in the 
UAE as well as the number of UAE Embassies and Consulates in Europe. The p-value 
for the variables EmbCon ji and EmbCon ij is 0.845 and 0.681 respectively. 
Next is to move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model. First, it has been observed that the following variables were omitted 
from the regression model due to collinearity issues: BorderShare and Language. 
While it also makes sense and in line with the common understanding of the trade 
dynamics, and similar to the regression model in section 3.1, it is observed that there 
is a negative impact of being a landlocked European country on the total bilateral trade 
with the UAE, but there is not enough evidence to support the former due to 
insignificant p-value equals 0.51.  
It is observed that there is an insignificant positive impact of being an island in Europe, 
on the total trade with the United Arab Emirates (p-value=0.314). Moreover, being 
previously colonised has also been shown to impact the bilateral flow of trade 
positively but insignificantly between the UAE and Europe (p-value=0.269). On the 
legislative front, it is observed that there is a positive impact (β=0.461) of having a 
Free Trade Agreement with European countries on the overall bilateral trade (p-
value=0.007). However, the total bilateral trade between the UAE and Europe is shown 
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to be insignificant thus not related to having an Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (BIT/IPPA) (p-value=134). Similarly, there is not enough evidence to 
support that the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is 
linearly related to Bilateral Total trade with Europe (p-value=0.177). 
3.1.1.7 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
The Gulf Cooperation Council is a particular multilateral organisation that the UAE is 
a member of. This region has several special trades and customs arrangements as well 
as free trade agreements in place. Also, the demographics of the members’ countries 
are very similar. As shown in the results, there is enough evidence to support the 
validity of the model and that the model fits the data well. There is also enough 
evidence that 91.22% of the variation of total trade is explained by the variation of the 
independent variables. The remaining 8.78% variations are attributed to other variables 
that may not be included in our Gravity Model. Next is to observe the results of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
The diplomatic representation variable EmbCon ij which represent the number of 
Foreign GCC Embassies and Consulates in the UAE and the number of UAE 
Embassies and Consulates in the GCC countries have been both omitted from the 
model due to collinearity issues. Therefore, there is not enough evidence that 
embassies and consulates of the UAE in the Gulf Cooperation Countries are linearly 
related to the total bilateral trade.  
In contrast, having Gulf Cooperation Countries embassies and consulates in the UAE 
is positively related to the total non-oil trade with high significance (p-value=0). 
Interestingly, there is not enough evidence that the Distance is linearly related to the 
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total bilateral trade between the United Arab Emirates and Gulf Cooperation Council 
member countries (p-value=0.298). The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with 
Gulf Cooperation Council member countries which have higher GDP per Capita as the 
coefficient is positive and equals 0.8. The variable Yj * Yi demonstrated statistical 
significance (p-value=0.018). When looking at the population variables coefficients, 
it is observed that there is a higher tendency to make a trade with Gulf Cooperation 
Council member countries that have a higher population, the variable is statistically 
significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with some other regions, it is observed that Area negatively affects 
the total bilateral trade of the UAE with Gulf Cooperation Council member countries. 
The larger the trading partner is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total 
trade value between them. It is observed that the Area is the largest negative 
coefficient. The variable also shows high significance statistically (p-value=0). After 
the above is to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented gravity 
model. 
First, as observed, the following variables were omitted from the regression model due 
to collinearity issues: Language, Landlocked, Colonized, FTA, BIT and DTA. 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence that those variables are linearly related to the 
total bilateral trade between the UAE and Gulf Cooperation Council member 
countries. When looking at the other variables, it has been observed that there is a 
significant negative impact of being an island in the Gulf Cooperation Council region, 
on the total trade with the UAE (p-value=0).  
Interestingly and in line with shared understanding of the trade dynamics globally, it 
is observed that sharing borders with the Gulf Cooperation Council is the most 
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significant coefficient that positively impacts the total bilateral trade between the 
United Arab Emirates and the GCC countries. The significance of this coefficient with 
high and equals p-value=0.019. 
3.1.1.8 North America 
In this section, the regression on the data to estimate the results of the augmented 
gravity model for total trade was conducted, to test for the countries in North America.  
As observed in the results, there is enough evidence to support the validity of the model 
and that the model fits the data well. There is also enough evidence that 94.66% of the 
variation of total trade is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The 
remaining 5.34% variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included 
in our Gravity Model. 
Then is to move on to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The coefficient of Distance is negative and highly significant (-12.46). This 
implies that the UAE tends to trade less with more distant North American countries. 
The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with North American countries which have 
higher GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals 1.13. The variable Yj 
* Yi demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking at the population 
variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency to make a trade 
with North American countries that have a higher population (β=1.96), the variable is 
statistically significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with some other regions, it is observed that Area negatively affects 
the total bilateral trade of the UAE with North America. The larger the trading partner 
is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. It is 
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observed that Area is the largest negative coefficient (β=-22.62). The variable also 
shows high significance statistically (p-value=0). 
The bilateral trade of the UAE has been shown to be not explained by diplomatic 
missions and consulates in North America, the model does not provide enough 
evidence that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is linearly related to both the 
number of Foreign North American Countries Embassies and Consulates in the United 
Arab Emirates as well as the number of United Arab Emirates Embassies and 
Consulates in North America. The p-value for the variables EmbCon ji and EmbCon 
ij is 0.421 and 0.197, respectively. Next is to move on to observe the results of the 
dummy variable in our augmented gravity model. 
The following variables were omitted from the regression model due to collinearity 
issues: Language, BorderShare, Landlocked, Island, FTA and BIT. Therefore, there is 
not enough evidence that those variables are linearly related to the total bilateral trade 
between the UAE and North American countries. The attribute of being ever colonised 
has been shown to evidently and positively affect the total bilateral non-oil trade 
between the United Arab Emirates and the North American Countries with statistically 
high significance (p-value=0). However, there is not enough evidence to support that 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is linearly related to 
Bilateral Total trade with North America (p-value=0.990). 
3.1.1.9 Oceania: The Pacific Islands Trade with the UAE 
For the Oceania region which mainly comprises of the small islands in the Pacific 
Ocean, the regression was performed on the data to estimate the results of the 
augmented gravity model for total trade was performed to test for the countries in 
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Oceania. As observed in the results, there is enough evidence to support the validity 
of the model and that the model fits the data well. There is also enough evidence that 
the variation of the independent variables explains 38.82% of the variation of total 
trade. The remaining 61.18% variations are attributed to other variables that may not 
have been included in our Gravity Model. 
It is then moving on to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The coefficient of Distance is negative and highly significant (β=-4.53, p-
value=0.016). This implies that the UAE tends to trade less with more distant 
Oceanic/Pacific islands countries. On the contrary to all other regions, there is not 
enough evidence that the variation in the UAE’s total bilateral trade with Oceanic 
countries is explained by the variation of the GDP per Capita of both trading partners 
as the p-value is equal 0.607. When looking at the population variables coefficients, it 
has been observed that there is a higher tendency to make trade with oceanic countries 
that have a higher population, the variable is statistically significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with all countries, it has been observed that Area negatively affects 
the total bilateral trade of the UAE with Oceania. The larger the trading partner is in 
total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. It is 
observed that Area is the largest negative coefficient (β=-15.20). This effect is 
attributed mainly to the poor connectivity that poses a major drawback. The variable 
also shows moderate significance statistically with a p-value equal to 0.001. 
The diplomatic representation variable EmbCon ij which denotes the number of UAE 
Embassies and Consulates in the Oceanic countries have been omitted from the model 
due to collinearity issues. Therefore, there is not enough evidence that the variation in 
the number of embassies and consulates of the UAE in Oceanic countries explains the 
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variation of the total bilateral trade. However, the diplomatic representation variable 
EmbCon ji which denotes the number of Oceanic countries Embassies and Consulates 
in the UAE does not show enough evidence that the variation in the number of Oceanic 
countries Embassies and Consulates in the UAE explains the variation the total 
bilateral trade between those countries and the UAE (p-value=0.666). 
Subsequently is to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented gravity 
model. The following variables were omitted from the regression model due to 
collinearity issues: Language, BorderShare, Landlocked, Colonized, FTA and BIT. 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence that those variables are linearly related to the 
total bilateral trade between the UAE and Oceanic countries. Being an Island in 
Oceania and the Pacific tends to have a positive impact on the total bilateral trade 
between the United Arab Emirates and those countries (p-value=0.003). On the 
Bilateral Agreements front, there is not enough evidence to support that the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is linearly related to Total Bilateral 
Total trade with Oceania (p-value=0.955). 
3.1.1.10 South America 
The regression on the data was performed to estimate the results of the augmented 
gravity model for the total trade for the countries in South America. As observed in 
the results, there is enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the 
model fits the data well. There is also enough evidence that 54.02% of the variation of 
total trade is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The remaining 
45.98% variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included in our 
Gravity Model. 
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Then is to move on to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The coefficient of Distance is negative and significant (β=-14.967). This 
implies that the UAE tends to trade less with more distant South American countries 
(p-value=0) as the total trade variation is evident to be explained by the variation in 
distance. The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with South American countries 
which have higher GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals 3.389. The 
variable Yj * Yi demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking at 
the population variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency to 
make trade with South American countries that have a higher population, the variable 
is statistically significant (p-value=0).  
On the contrary with most of the regions, although it is observed that Area negatively 
affects the total bilateral trade of the UAE with South American Countries (β=-7.2), 
there is not enough evidence that the Area size in kilometre square of the countries 
affects the bilateral flow of non-oil trade between the UAE and South American 
Countries. 
The bilateral trade of the UAE has been shown to be not influenced by diplomatic 
missions and consulates in South America, the model does not provide enough 
evidence that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is related to the number of UAE 
Embassies and Consulates in South American Countries (p-value=0.526), thus there is 
not enough evidence that the variation in total bilateral trade between the UAE and 
South American trading partners is explained by the variation in the number of 
embassies and consulates the UAE has in the South American Region. Similarly, the 
variable of the number of Foreign South American Embassies and Consulates in the 
UAE is shown to be statistically insignificant (p-value=0.693). Thus, there is no 
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evidence that the variation in the number of South American Countries Embassies and 
Consulates in the UAE explains the variation of the total bilateral trade with between 
the UAE and the same region. Next is to move on to observe the results of the dummy 
variable in our augmented gravity model. 
The following variables were omitted from the regression model due to collinearity 
issues: Language, BorderShare, Island, FTA and BIT. Therefore, there is not enough 
evidence that those variables, explain the variation ij the total bilateral trade between 
the UAE and South American countries. In addition, and although the variable 
Landlocked was included in the regression output table of the augmented gravity 
equation, it is observed that the there is no evidence that being a landlocked country in 
South America explains the variation of the total bilateral trade between the UAE and 
South American countries, and this variable is not evident to be linearly related to the 
total bilateral trade between the UAE and the same region (p-value=0.135).  
However, being ever colonised is an attribute that showed a highly significant positive 
relationship with the trade between the UAE and South American Countries. The 
model provides enough evidence that the variation in the total non-oil trade between 
the United Arab Emirates and South America is explained and positively related to the 
fact of being a previous colony (p-value=0.033). Finally, there is not enough evidence 
to support that the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is 
linearly related to Bilateral Total trade with South America, and thus having the 
Double Taxation Agreement, or not,  does not explain the variation in the trade 
between the UAE and the same region (p-value=0.882). 
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3.1.1.11 West Asia 
Moving to the West Asia region, which constitutes many landlocked countries with an 
abundance of natural resources and is known to face connectivity problems as well as 
market access. At the same time, there are vast countries with gigantic economic 
weights in the same region such as India. Therefore, the regression on the data to 
estimate the results of the augmented gravity model for total trade was performed to 
test for the countries in West Asia. As observed in the results, there is enough evidence 
to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data well. There is also 
enough evidence that 86.64% of the variation of total trade is explained by the variation 
of the independent variables. The remaining 13.36% variations may be explained by 
other variables that may not have been included in our Gravity Model. 
Then is to move on to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The coefficient of Distance is negative and highly significant (p-
value=0.009). This implies that the UAE tends to trade less with more distant West 
Asian countries. The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with West Asian countries 
which have higher GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals β=1.047. 
The variable Yj * Yi demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking 
at the population variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency 
to make trade with West Asian countries that have a higher population (β=1.707), the 
variable is statistically significant (p-value=0).  
Similar to the case with all countries, it is observed that Area negatively affects the 
total bilateral trade of the UAE with West Asia. The larger the trading partner is in 
total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. It is 
observed that Area is the largest negative coefficient (β=-10.439). This effect is mainly 
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explained by the vast areas in West Asia and population distribution that hinder the 
flow of trade as connectivity is a significant drawback in many parts of West Asia. The 
variable also shows high significance statistically (p-value=0.013). 
The bilateral trade of the UAE is not influenced by diplomatic missions and consulates 
in West Asia; the model does not provide enough evidence that the Total Bilateral 
Trade of the UAE is related to the number of Foreign West Asian Countries Embassies 
and Consulates in the UAE (p-value=0.206). Similarly, the variable of the number of 
UAE Embassies and Consulates in West Asia is shown to be statistically insignificant 
(p-value=0.147). Thus, there is no evidence that the variation in the total bilateral trade 
between the UAE and West Asia is explained by the variation in the number of UAE 
Embassies and Consulates in the capitals and major cities. 
We are moving on now to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model. The following variables were omitted from the regression model due 
to collinearity issues: Language, BorderShare, and FTA. Therefore, there is not enough 
evidence that these variables explain the variation in total bilateral trade between the 
UAE and South American countries. In addition, it is observe that the there is enough 
evidence that being a landlocked country in West Asia, or not, explains the variation 
of the total bilateral trade between the UAE and West Asian countries, and this variable 
is evident to be linearly related to the total bilateral trade between the UAE and the 
same region, and the relationship is positive. Thus, more trade is observed when the 
country of West Asia is landlocked (β=1.39, p-value=0.024).  
Interestingly, it is observed that there is an insignificant positive impact of being an 
island in West Asia such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka, on the total trade with the 
United Arab Emirates. Thus, there is not enough evidence that the variable Island 
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explains the variation in the total bilateral trade between the UAE and West Asia (p-
value=0.223). Moreover, it is observed from the regression of the augmented equation 
output that there is enough evidence that the variation in the Colonized variable 
explains the variation in the total bilateral trade between the UAE and West Asia 
(β=2.42, p-value=0.011). Thus, the UAE tends to have more bilateral trade flows with 
countries which have been previously colonised. 
On the legislative front, the model omitted the FTA variable due to collinearity issues 
in the regression model of the West Asia Region. However, the total bilateral trade 
between the UAE and West Asia is shown to be insignificant and not related to having 
an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) (p-value=0.364). 
Also, there is not enough evidence to support that the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
on Income Agreement (DTA) is linearly related to Bilateral Total trade with West Asia 
(p-value=0.118). 
3.1.2 The UAE Trade Potential with the G20 Countries 
This subsection examines the output of the regression on the data from the augmented 
gravity model for total trade for the countries that are members of the G20 group. As 
observed in the results, there is enough evidence to support the validity of the model 
and that the model fits the data well. There is also enough evidence that 78.91% of the 
variation of total trade is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The 
remaining 21.09% variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included 
in our Gravity Model. 
Then is to move on to observe the results of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The coefficient of Distance is negative but insignificant (p-value=0.848). 
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The UAE’s bilateral trade tends to increase with G20 countries which have higher 
GDP per Capita as the coefficient is positive and equals 0.862. The variable Yj * Yi 
demonstrated very high significance (p-value=0). When looking at the population 
variables coefficients, it is observed that there is a higher tendency to make trade with 
G20 countries that have a higher population, the variable is statistically significant (p-
value=0).  
Similar to many of the regions, it is observed that Area negatively affects the total 
bilateral trade of the UAE with G20 countries (β=-11.60). The larger the trading 
partner is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total trade value between them. 
The coefficient also shows high significance statistically (p-value=0) which supports 
that the variation in the total bilateral trade between the UAE and G20 countries is 
explained by the variation in the total area size in kilometre square of its trading partner 
within the G20 countries. 
The bilateral trade of the UAE has been shown to be influenced by diplomatic missions 
and consulates in G20 countries, the model provides enough evidence with high 
significance that the Total Bilateral Trade of the UAE is positively related to the 
number of G20 Countries Embassies and Consulates in the United Arab Emirates as 
the coefficient is positive and equals β=0.6 (p-value=0). Thus, there is enough 
evidence that the variation in total bilateral trade between the UAE and G20 trading 
partners is explained by the variation in the number of embassies and consulates of the 
G20 member countries have in the UAE. However, the variable of the number of UAE 
Missions, Embassies and Consulates in the G20 Countries is shown to be statistically 
insignificant with a p-value=0.688 thus there is no evidence that the variation in the 
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number of UAE Missions, Embassies and Consulates in the G20 countries explains 
the variation of the total bilateral trade with between the UAE and the same region.  
Next is to move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model. At first, it was observed that the following variables were omitted from 
the regression model due to collinearity issues: BorderShare, Landlocked, and FTA. 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence that these variables explain the variation in the 
total bilateral trade between the UAE and G20 countries. Being previously a colony 
has been shown in the gravity model regression output to be statistically significant (p-
value=0.004) and positively related to the bilateral flow of non-oil trade between the 
UAE and the G20 countries. 
Moving on, as the variable Island was included in the regression output table of the 
augmented gravity equation, it is observed that there is not enough evidence that being 
an island country in the G20 explains the variation of the total bilateral trade between 
the UAE and G20 countries (p-value=0.692). Also, having a common language 
positively impacts the flow of bilateral non-oil trade between the UAE and the G20 
countries as there is enough evidence that the variation in the language variable 
explains the variation on the total flow of bilateral non-oil trade (p-value=0.028). 
On the legislative front, there is not enough evidence to support that the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is linearly related to Bilateral Total 
trade with G20, and thus having the Double Taxation Agreement, or not,  does not 
explain the variation in the trade between the UAE and the same region (p-
value=0.569). Similarly, there is not enough evidence to support that having an 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) is linearly related to 
Bilateral Total trade with G20, and thus having an Investment Promotion and 
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Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) does not explain the variation in the trade between 
the UAE and the same region and impacts it positively (p-value=0.851). 
3.2 Investment Results and Analysis 
The regression on the data was conducted to estimate the results of the augmented 
gravity model for investment flows (See Appendix - Table 10). The Random Effect 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) model regression omitted 69 groups/countries due to 
zero flows of investments over the 18 years of 1999 till 2016. Therefore, the number 
of groups/countries are 126 in this regression with a total of 907 observations. There 
is enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. 
There is enough evidence that 24.07% of the variation of total foreign direct 
investment flows – inward and outward - is explained by the variation of the 
independent variables. The remaining 75.93% variations are attributed to other 
variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model.  
First, by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach followed 
in previous chapters, the coefficient of the combined GDP - nominal is positive and 
highly significant (p-value=0). Therefore, there is enough evidence to support the 
assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, from and to 
the UAE tend to be higher with countries that have higher nominal GDP. When 
looking at the distance variable, it is noticed to have a negative coefficient; however 
due to the high p-value=0.514, there is not enough evidence that the variation in 
distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments. 
When examining the population variable coefficients, it is also observed that there is 
a higher tendency to have more foreign direct investment flows inward and outward 
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when the UAE’s and its partner’s population are higher, this is evident as the 
significance is high (p-value=0). This may be attributed to the growth in demand by 
the consumers on one end, which affects the investment appetite of the investors in 
their projected financial flows and other due diligence exercises. 
On the contrary to the population variable, it is observed that Area negatively affects 
the total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE. The larger the other 
country is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total flow of foreign direct 
investments between the UAE and the partner as mentioned above country. The 
variable also shows moderate significance statistically with a p-value=0.039. 
The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesized to be influenced by 
the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad, however in our 
model and given the data that was examined, there is not enough evidence to support 
that the existence of foreign missions in the UAE and the existence of UAE missions 
abroad, affect the variation in the total foreign direct investments outward and inward 
into and from the UAE. It is observed that the p-values of both variables that 
correspond to the existence of UAE missions and Foreign missions to be 0.420 and 
0.778 respectively. 
Now is to move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. The first variable observed is the landlocked 
variable. There is not enough evidence that for a country is landlocked, the attribute 
therefore does not explain the variation in the total foreign direct investments from and 
to the UAE from the country (p-value=0.313). Similar to the previous variable, the 
countries attribute of being an island or not is statistically insignificant in our model 
and thus has no linear relationship with the total foreign direct investment flows, i.e. 
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the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows is not explained by the 
variation in the island variable (p-value=0.774).  
As shown in the same table referenced above, it is observed that there is a very high 
significance of having a common language with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official 
language, in influencing the flows of foreign direct investments both ways positively. 
Therefore, having Arabic as an official language in a country tends to increase the total 
Foreign Direct investment flows between the UAE and the other Arabic speaking 
country (p-value=0.003).  
In contrast, there is not enough evidence to support that the foreign direct investment 
flows both ways between the UAE and other countries are influenced by having 
borders, i.e. neighbouring the UAE (p-value=0.347). In the case of a country being 
ever colonized, the results obtained from the augmented gravity model for investment 
show that there is not enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct 
investment flows both ways between the UAE and the world is explained by the other 
country being colonized historically or not as the p-value is equal to 0.504. 
On the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between 
FTA’s and bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and outward of the 
UAE (p-value=0.612). Also, bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and 
outward of the UAE is shown to be non-linearly related to having an Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) (p-value=0.407). However, the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is shown also to be not 
statistically significant to explain the variation of the total bilateral flows of foreign 
direct investments inward and outward of the UAE (p-value=0.139). Therefore, there 
is not enough evidence that having the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
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Agreement (DTA) is affecting the total bilateral flows of foreign direct investments 
inward and outward of the UAE. 
In the following sections, the effects of the explanatory variables and the dummy 
variables on the total foreign direct investments flow from and to the UAE are tested 
in relation with the regions of the world, similar to the approach followed in the 
previous chapter on trade analysis.  
3.2.1 Analysing the UAE Investments per Geographic Regions 
In an attempt to examine the effects of the economic diplomacy tools on the total 
investments geographically, the 126 countries were divided to their respective regions 
as per the United Nations standards, the World Bank Standard. The current 
classification used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the UAE was also taken into 
consideration. The gravity model was examined to observe the effects of the variation 
in the independent variables on the dependent variable namely Total Investment using 
the Random Effects GLS model. Next is to look at the regions results in alphabetical 
order. A graphical representation of the results for the investment flows model is 
shown in Appendix - Figure 6 for the factors that boost the bilateral foreign direct 
investments flows and Appendix - Figure 7 for the factors that reduce the bilateral 
foreign direct investments flows. 
3.2.1.1 Investment Analysis of the UAE with Sub-Saharan Africa 
In continuation to the above analysis on the augmented gravity model for investments, 
moving on now to perform the regression on the data to estimate the results of the 
augmented gravity model for investment flows per region, and in this Section, the 
flows of foreign direct investments both ways between the UAE and Sub Saharan 
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African countries have been examined. The results are of 28 countries in Africa 
included in our Random Effect GLS model regression. 
There is enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits 
the data. There is also enough evidence that 14.89% of the variation of total foreign 
direct investment flows – inward and outward – between the UAE and Sub Saharan 
Africa is explained by the variation of the independent variables. The remaining 
85.11% variations are attributed to other variables that may not be included in our 
Gravity Model. 
First, by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach followed 
in previous chapters. The regression results of the combined GDP - nominal variable 
have been observed, and accordingly it is concluded that there is not enough evidence 
to support the assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, 
from and to the UAE tend to be higher with Sub Saharan African countries that have 
higher nominal GDP (p-value=0.156).  Therefore, the variation in the total foreign 
direct investments flows is not explained by the variation of both countries GDP. 
When looking at the distance variable, it is noticed that there is a negative coefficient, 
however, due to the high p-value=0.541, there is not enough evidence that the variation 
in distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments from and to the 
UAE from Sub Saharan Africa. Also, and when examining the population variable 
coefficients, there is not enough evidence that the total foreign direct investment flows 
inward and outward when the UAE’s and its partner’s population are not related to the 
variation in the population size of both countries (p-value=0.130). Similar to the 
population variable, it is observed that Area seems not to have a linear relationship 
with the total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE. There is not 
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enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows from 
and to the UAE is explained by the variation in both countries total area in square 
kilometres. The variable is statistically insignificant (p-value=0.748). 
The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesized to be influenced by 
the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad, however in our 
model and given the data examined, there is not enough evidence to support that the 
existence of foreign missions in the UAE and the existence of UAE missions abroad, 
affect the variation in the total foreign direct investments outward and inward into and 
from the UAE. It is observed that the p-values of both variables that correspond to the 
existence of UAE missions and Foreign missions to be 0.396 and 0.911 respectively. 
We are moving on not to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. The first variable observed is the landlocked 
variable. There is not enough evidence that for a Sub Saharan African country being 
landlocked, explains the variation in the total foreign direct investments from and to 
the UAE from Sub-Saharan Africa (p-value=0.071). The Sub-Saharan African 
countries attribute of being an island or not is statistically insignificant in our model 
and thus has no linear relationship with the total foreign direct investment flows, i.e. 
the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows is not explained by the 
variation in the island variable (p-value=0.836).  
As shown in the same table referenced above, it is observed that there is insignificance 
of having a common language with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language, in 
influencing the flows of foreign direct investments both ways (p-value=0.173). 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence that having Arabic as an official language in 
a country is linearly related to the total Foreign Direct investment flows between the 
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UAE and the other Arabic speaking country in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also observed 
that in the regression output, the variables BorderShare, Colonised and FTA have been 
omitted due to collinearity issues. Therefore, they have been excluded from the model 
for Sub Saharan Africa.  
On the legislative front, the regression output indicated that the bilateral total foreign 
direct investment flows to be non-linearly related to having an Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Avoidance of Double Taxation on 
income Agreement (DTA) as the p-values are equal to 0.433 and 0.435 respectively. 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence that the variation in having the Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) explains the variation in the total bilateral 
flows of foreign direct investments inward and outward of the UAE with Sub Saharan 
Africa. 
3.2.1.2 Investment Analysis of the UAE with the Arab Region 
Next, the regression was performed on the data to estimate the results of the augmented 
gravity model for investment flows between the UAE and Arab countries that are 
members of the Arab League of nations. We have enough evidence to support the 
validity of the model and that the model fits the data. We also have enough evidence 
that 14.33% of the variation of total foreign direct investment flows – inward and 
outward – between the UAE and the Arab Countries is explained by the variation of 
the independent variables. The remaining 85.67% variations are attributed to other 
variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. 
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We shall begin by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach 
we followed in previous chapters. We first observe the regression results of the 
combined GDP - nominal variable, and accordingly, we conclude that we have enough 
evidence to support the assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and 
outward, from and to the UAE tend to be higher with Arab countries that have higher 
nominal GDP (p-value=0.011).  Therefore, the variation in the total foreign direct 
investments flows is explained by the variation of both countries GDP. 
When looking at the distance variable, we notice a negative coefficient; however due 
to the high p-value=0.661, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments between the UAE and 
Arab Countries. Also, and when examining the population variable coefficients, we 
conclude that we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total bilateral 
flows of foreign direct investments is not explained by the variation in the population 
of the UAE and the Arab countries (p-value=0.164). On the same lines, we also 
conclude that we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total bilateral 
flows of foreign direct investments between the UAE and the Arab countries is not 
explained by the variation of the total area in square kilometres of the UAE and the 
Arab countries (p-value=0.669). 
The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesized to be influenced by 
the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad, however in our 
model and given the data we examined, we do not have enough evidence to support 
that the existence of foreign missions in the UAE affect the variation in the total foreign 
direct investments outward and inward into and from the UAE. We observed the p-
value of the variable above that corresponds to the existence of Foreign missions in 
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the UAE to be 0.139. Also, the variable EmbCon ij which is attributed to the number 
of UAE missions in a specific country at a specific time does not explain the variation 
in the total bilateral non-oil trade between the UAE and the Arab countries (p-
value=0.610). We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our 
augmented gravity model for the investment flows. As shown in the regression model 
output, we observed that several other variables had been omitted from the model due 
to collinearity issues and they are as follows: Landlocked, Island, Language, 
BorderShare, and Colonised.  
On the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between 
FTA’s and bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and outward of the 
UAE (p-value=0.945). Also, bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and 
outward of the UAE is shown to be non-linearly related to having an Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) as the p-values are equal to 0.338 and 0.388 
respectively. We, therefore, do not have enough evidence that having the variation in 
the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) variables explain the variation in 
the total flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE and the Arab countries.  
3.2.1.3 Investment Analysis of the UAE with Australasia 
In this subsection, the regression was performed on the data to estimate the results of 
the augmented gravity model for investment flows with Australasia. We have enough 
evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. We also 
have enough evidence that 71.97% of the variation of total foreign direct investment 
flows – inward and outward – between the UAE and Australasia is explained by the 
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variation of the independent variables. The remaining 28.03% variations are attributed 
to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. We shall begin by 
looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach we followed in 
previous chapters. 
As the significance of the combined GDP – nominal variable is not evident in our 
model, with a p-value=0.287,  we do not have enough evidence to support the 
assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, from and to 
the UAE tend to be higher with countries that have higher nominal GDP. Thus, the 
variation in the total flows of foreign direct investment between the UAE and 
Australasia is not explained by the variation in the gross domestic product of both the 
UAE and Australasia countries.  
Similarly, When looking at the distance variable, we notice that we do not have enough 
evidence that that variation in foreign direct investment flows between the UAE and 
Australasia is explained by the variation in the distance in kilometres (p-value=583. 
Also, and when examining the population variable coefficients, we assume a higher 
tendency to have more foreign direct investment flows inward and outward when the 
UAE’s and its partner’s population are higher, however, we do not have enough 
evidence to support this assumption as the p-value=0.216. We also observed that the 
area in square kilometres does not explain the variation in bilateral total non-oil trade 
between the UAE and Australasia (p-value=0.285). 
As discussed in previous chapters that the total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments 
is hypothesized to be influenced by the existence of the foreign missions as well as 
UAE missions abroad, however in our model and given the data we examined, we do 
not have enough evidence to support that the existence of foreign missions in the UAE 
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and the existence of UAE missions abroad, affect the variation in the total foreign 
direct investments outward and inward into and from the UAE. We observed the p-
values of both variables that correspond to the existence of UAE missions and Foreign 
missions to be 0.560 and 0.828 respectively. 
We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. We observed from the regression results that 
the following variables were omitted due to collinearity issues. The variables are 
Landlocked, Island, Language, BorderShare, Colonized, Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA), and the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT). Although on 
the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) and bilateral flows of 
foreign direct investments inward and outward of the UAE (p-value=0.233). 
Therefore, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) variable explains the variation of the 
total bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and outward of the UAE with 
Australasia. 
3.2.1.4 Investment Analysis of the UAE with the Caribbean 
In furtherance to previous sections, we move on now to perform the regression on the 
data to estimate the results of the augmented gravity model for investment flows 
between the UAE and the Caribbean countries. The regression results have been 
omitted mostly due to collinearity, however, and because the number of observations 
is only 6, which indicate that throughout the past 18 years, the investment flows with 
the Caribbean have been very minimal as shown in our data gathered for the years 
from 1999 till 2016. Therefore, we do not have enough observations on this specific 
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region to obtain the regression analysis output as shown in the table above and obtain 
the results to check our assumptions for each of the model variables. 
3.2.1.5 Investment Analysis of the UAE with East Asia 
When looking at the East Asia regression output, we have enough evidence to support 
the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. We also have enough 
evidence that 19.85% of the variation of total foreign direct investment flows – inward 
and outward – between the UAE and East Asian countries are explained by the 
variation of the independent variables. The remaining 80.15% of the variations are 
attributed to other variables that may not be included in our augmented Gravity Model 
for foreign direct investments. We shall begin by looking at the explanatory variables 
results similar to the approach we followed in previous chapters. 
The coefficient of the combined GDP - nominal is positive and significant (p-
value=0.017). Therefore, we have enough evidence to support the assumption that the 
foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, from and to the UAE tend to be 
higher with countries that have higher nominal GDP. In other words, we have enough 
evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows between the 
UAE and East Asia is explained by the variation of the combined GDP of both 
countries over the past 18 years.   
When looking at the distance variable, we notice a positive coefficient; however, due 
to the high p-value=0.399, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance explains the variations in the total flows of the foreign direct investments 
between the UAE and East Asian countries. Also, and when examining the population 
variable, we assume a higher tendency to have more foreign direct investment flows 
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inward and outward when the UAE’s and its partner’s population are higher, however, 
as the p-value is equal 0.095, we do not have enough evidence to support the former 
assumption. Thus, we also do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total 
foreign direct investment flows between the UAE and East Asia countries is explained 
by the variation in the combined population of both partner nations over the 18 years 
from 2009 till 2016. 
On the contrary to the population variable, we assume that Area positively affects the 
total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE. The assumption is that the 
larger the other country is in total area in square kilometres, the more the total flow of 
foreign direct investments between the UAE and the partner as mentioned above 
country. However and due to the fact that the variable is shown to be insignificant in 
our regression output for East Asia (p-value=0.134), we conclude that we do not have 
enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows between 
the UAE and East Asia countries is explained by the variation in the combined Areas 
in square kilometres of both partner nations over the 18 years from 2009 till 2016. 
The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesized to be influenced by 
the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad, however in our 
model and given the data we examined, we do not have enough evidence to support 
that the existence of foreign missions in the UAE and the existence of UAE missions 
abroad, affect the variation in the total foreign direct investments outward and inward 
between the UAE and East Asian countries. We observed the p-values of both 
variables that correspond to the existence of UAE missions and Foreign missions to 
be 0.236 and 0.390 respectively. 
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We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. The first variable we observed is the 
landlocked variable. We do not have enough evidence that for a country is landlocked; 
the attribute, therefore, does not explain the variation in the total foreign direct 
investments from and to the UAE from the country. We observed a p-value=0.633. 
Similar to the previous variable, the East Asian countries attribute of being an island 
or not is statistically insignificant in our model and thus has no linear relationship with 
the total foreign direct investment flows, i.e. the variation in the total foreign direct 
investment flows is not explained by the variation in the island variable (p-
value=0.436).  
As discussed in the previous chapters, we assumed that having a common language 
with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language is influencing the flows of foreign 
direct investments both ways positively. Therefore, the assumption is that having 
Arabic as an official language in a country tends to increase the total Foreign Direct 
investment flows between the UAE and the other Arabic speaking country, however, 
in the case of East Asia, the variable has been omitted due to collinearity issues. 
Similarly, and in line with the prevailing investment principles, we assumed that the 
foreign direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and other countries is 
positively influenced by having borders, i.e. neighbouring the UAE however in the 
case of East Asia, the variable has been omitted due to collinearity issues. In the case 
of that trading country being ever colonised, the results obtained from the augmented 
gravity model show that we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total 
foreign direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and the world is explained 
by the other country being colonised historically (p-value=0.272). 
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On the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) and bilateral flows of 
foreign direct investments inward and outward between the UAE and East Asia (p-
value=0.464). In contrast, the bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and 
outward of the UAE is shown to be negatively related to having an Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) (p-value=0.04). Therefore, the 
variation in the total flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE and East 
Asian countries is explained by the variation in the Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) variable. However, as the coefficient of the 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) variable is negative, we 
conclude that having a BIT with East Asian countries negatively affects the flows of 
foreign direct investments both ways, which contradicts with our assumptions.  
Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement variable is shown to be statistically significant to 
explain the variation of the total bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward 
and outward between the UAE and East Asian countries. FTA is positively related to 
the total flows of foreign direct investments between the UAE and East Asian countries 
(p-value=0.027). We, therefore, have enough evidence that having the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) is positively affecting the total bilateral flows of foreign direct 
investments inward and outward between the UAE and East Asia. 
3.2.1.6 Investment Analysis of the UAE with Europe 
As Europe regression output for the investment gravity model is observed, we have 
enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. 
We also have enough evidence that 40.24% of the variation of total foreign direct 
investment flows – inward and outward – between the UAE and Europe is explained 
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by the variation of the independent variables. The remaining 59.76% variations are 
attributed to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. 
We shall begin by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach 
we followed in previous chapters. The coefficient of the combined GDP - nominal is 
insignificant (p-value=0.479). Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to support 
the assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, from and 
to the UAE tend to be higher when the nominal gross domestic product of both the 
UAE and the other European countries is higher.   
When looking at the distance variable, we notice a positive coefficient; however, due 
to the high p-value=0.276, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance explains the variation in the total flows of the foreign direct investments 
between the UAE and Europe. Also, and when examining the population variable, we 
assumed a higher tendency to have more foreign direct investment flows inward and 
outward when the UAE’s and its partner’s population are higher, however, as the p-
value is equal 0.402, we do not have enough evidence to support the former 
assumption. Thus, we also do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total 
foreign direct investment flows between the UAE and European countries are 
explained by the variation in the combined population of both partner nations over the 
18 years from 2009 till 2016. 
Similar to the population variable, we observed that Area in square kilometres does 
not affect the total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE (p-
value=0.188). Therefore, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the 
total flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE and Europe is explained by 
the variation in the Area in square kilometres of the UAE and the European country. 
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The total flow of Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesised to be influenced by the 
existence of foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad. Therefore, in our 
model and given the data we examined, we do have enough evidence to support that 
the existence of foreign missions in the UAE (p-value=0.133), affects the variation in 
the total foreign direct investments outward and inward between the UAE and Europe. 
On the same lines, we observed that the existence of UAE missions in Europe does 
not affect nor explain the variation in the flow of the foreign direct investments 
between the UAE and Europe (p-value=0.523). 
We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. We do not have enough evidence that a 
country is landlocked. The attribute, therefore, does not explain the variation in the 
total foreign direct investments between the UAE and Europe. We observed a p-
value=0.949. The countries attribute of being an island or not is statistically 
insignificant in our model and thus does not have a linear relation with the total foreign 
direct investment flows between the UAE and Europe, i.e. the variation in the total 
foreign direct investment flows is not explained by the variation in the island variable 
(p-value=0.369).  
As shown in the same Table referenced above, we assumed that having a common 
language with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language, is influencing the flows of 
foreign direct investments both ways positively. Therefore, the assumption is that 
having Arabic as an official language in a country tends to increase the total Foreign 
Direct investment flows between the UAE and the other Arabic speaking country. 
However, in the regression model, the variable has been omitted due to collinearity as 
no European country has Arabic as an official first language.  
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Also, as we assumed that the foreign direct investment flows both ways between the 
UAE and other countries is positively influenced by having borders, i.e. neighbouring 
the UAE. The variable has been omitted due to collinearity as not European country 
shares borders with the UAE. In the case of a European country being ever colonized, 
the results obtained from the augmented gravity model show that we do not have 
enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows both 
ways between the UAE and the world is explained by the other European country 
being colonized historically or not as the p-value is equal 0.712. 
On the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between 
FTA’s and bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and outward of the 
UAE (p-value=0.858). Also, bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and 
outward of the UAE is shown to be not related to having an Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) (p-value=0.597). Similarly, the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is shown to be statistically 
insignificant to explain the variation of the total bilateral flows of foreign direct 
investments inward and outward of the UAE (p-value=0.507). We, therefore, do not 
have enough evidence that having the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) is affecting the total bilateral flows of foreign direct investments 
inward and outward between the UAE and Europe. 
3.2.1.7 Investment Analysis of the UAE with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
In this subsection of the results chapter, the regression was performed on the data to 
estimate the results of the augmented gravity model for investment flows. We have 
enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. 
We also have enough evidence that the variation of the independent variables explains 
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48.01% of the variation of total foreign direct investment flows - inward and outward 
- between the UAE and members of the GCC. The remaining 51.99% variations are 
attributed to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. We shall 
begin by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach we 
followed in previous chapters. 
The coefficient of the combined GDP - nominal is positive and highly significant (p-
value=0.001). Therefore we have enough evidence to support the assumption that the 
foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, between the UAE and members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council tend to be higher with countries that have higher 
nominal GDP and also increases as the combined GDP increases.   
When looking at the distance variable, we notice a positive coefficient; however, due 
to the high p-value=0.052, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments between the UAE and 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Also, and when examining the population 
variable, we assumed a higher tendency to have more foreign direct investment flows 
inward and outward when the UAE’s and its partner’s population are higher, however, 
as the (p-value=0.095), we do not have enough evidence to support the former 
assumption. Thus, we also do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total 
foreign direct investment flows between the UAE and members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council is explained by the variation in the combined population of both 
partner nations over the 18 years from 2009 till 2016. 
On the contrary to the population variable, we assume that Area positively affects the 
total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE. In other words, the larger 
the other country is in total area in square kilometres, the less the total flow of foreign 
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direct investments between the UAE and the partner above country. However, the 
variable is insignificant statistically (p-value=0.191). Thus, we also do not have 
enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows between 
the UAE and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council is explained by the variation 
in the Areas in square kilometres of both partner nations. 
The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesized to be influenced by 
the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad, however in our 
model and given the data we examined, we do not have enough evidence to support 
that the existence of foreign missions in the UAE and the existence of UAE missions 
abroad, affect the variation in the total foreign direct investments outward and inward 
into and from the UAE. We observed the p-values of the variable that correspond to 
the existence of GCC missions in the UAE to be 0.567. However, the variable that 
corresponds to the existence of UAE missions in GCC countries has been omitted due 
to collinearity issues. 
We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. The landlocked variable has been omitted 
from the regression model of foreign direct investment flows between the United Arab 
Emirates and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council due to collinearity issues. 
When observing the countries attribute of being an island or not, we observe an 
insignificant (p-value=0.395) which leads us to conclude that the variation in foreign 
direct investment flows between the United Arab Emirates and the members of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council due to collinearity issues is not explained by the variation 
in the Island variable. 
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As shown in previous chapters, we assumed that having a common language with the 
UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language is influencing the flows of foreign direct 
investments both ways positively. Therefore, having Arabic as an official language in 
a country tends to increase the total Foreign Direct investment flows between the UAE 
and the other Arabic speaking country. However, this assumption cannot be examined 
in the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries as the variable have been 
omitted due to collinearity since all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have 
Arabic as their first official language. Also, from the regression output shown in the 
table referenced above, we do not have enough evidence to support that the foreign 
direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council is explained by having shared borders, i.e. neighbouring the 
UAE as the p-value is equal 0.070. In the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
country being ever colonised, the results obtained from the augmented gravity model 
show that the variable has been omitted due to collinearity issues. 
On the legislative front, the model revealed the variables of the Free Trade Agreement, 
the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA), and the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) has been omitted due to 
collinearity. The Gulf Cooperation Council members are already within a Free Trade 
Agreement and have signed and also ratified both the Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA), and the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA). 
3.2.1.8 Investment Analysis of the UAE with North America 
Moving on now to perform the regression on the data to estimate the results of the 
augmented gravity model for investment flows. We have enough evidence to support 
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the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. We also have enough 
evidence that 68.05% of the variation of total foreign direct investment flows – inward 
and outward – between the UAE and the variation of the independent variables 
explains North American countries. The remaining 31.95% variations are attributed to 
other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. We shall begin by 
looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach we followed in 
previous chapters.  
As shown in the regression as mentioned above table, the combined GDP – nominal 
variable is insignificant (p-value=0.198). Therefore, we do not have enough evidence 
to support the assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and outward, 
from and to the UAE tend to be higher with countries that have higher nominal GDP.  
In other terms, the variation in the total flows of foreign direct investments between 
the UAE and North American countries is not explained by the variation of the gross 
domestic product in nominal terms of the UAE and North American countries over the 
18 years from 2009 till 2016. 
When looking at the distance variable, we notice a positive coefficient; however, due 
to the high p-value=0.738, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments between the UAE and 
North America region. Also, and when examining the population variable coefficients, 
we assumed a higher tendency to have more foreign direct investment flows inward 
and outward when the UAE’s or North American countries population are higher, 
however, as the p-value is high and equals 0.465. We conclude that we do not have 
enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investments flows 
between the UAE and North America region is explained by the variation in the 
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populations of the UAE and the North American countries over the 18 years from 2009 
till 2016. 
Similar to the population variable, as an assumption that Area positively affects the 
total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE. The larger the other country 
is in total area in square kilometres, the more the total flow of foreign direct 
investments between the UAE and the partner mentioned above country. However, the 
variable also shows insignificance statistically with a p-value=0.616. 
The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is hypothesized to be influenced by 
the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE missions abroad, however in our 
model and given the data we examined, we do not have enough evidence to support 
that the existence of North American countries missions in the UAE and the existence 
of UAE missions in North America, affect the variation in the total foreign direct 
investments outward and inward into and from the UAE. We observed the p-values of 
both variables that correspond to the existence of UAE missions and North American 
missions to be 0.615 and 0.614 respectively. 
We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. The first variable we observed is the 
landlocked variable. The variable has been omitted from the regression output table 
due to collinearity issues. Similar to the previous variable, the countries attribute of 
being an island or not has also been omitted from the regression output table due to 
collinearity issues.  
Also, and line with the common investment principles, we assumed that the foreign 
direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and other countries are positively 
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influenced by having borders, i.e. neighbouring the UAE. However, in the case of 
North America and since the UAE does not share any borders with the countries in 
this region, we observed that the variable BorderShare had been omitted from the 
regression output table due to collinearity issues. In the case of that North American 
country being ever colonized, the results obtained from the augmented gravity model 
show that being ever colonised is not related to the variation in the total foreign direct 
investment flows between the UAE and North America (p-value=0.695). 
On the legislative front, the model revealed an insignificant relationship between the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) and bilateral flows of 
foreign direct investments inward and outward between the UAE and North America 
region (p-value=0.109). In addition, bilateral flows of foreign direct investments 
inward and outward of the UAE relationship with the signing and ratification of the 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) could not be examined as the both variables have been omitted from 
the regression output table due to collinearity issues. We, therefore, are not able to 
comment on their effects on the flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE 
and North America region. 
3.2.1.9 Investment Analysis of the UAE with Oceania – Pacific Islands 
As we performed the regression analysis of the augmented gravity model for 
investment flows correctly for the Pacific islands, the statistics software returned a 
result stating that the model has insufficient observations on investments between the 
UAE and Oceania – the Pacific Islands over the 18 years from 1999 until 2016. 
Therefore, we could not examine the effects of the explanatory variables nor the 
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dummy variables on the variation of the total foreign direct investment flows between 
the UAE and the Pacific region.  
3.2.1.10 Investment Analysis of the UAE with South America 
In the case of the regression output for the augmented gravity model for investment 
flows between the UAE and South America Region. We have enough evidence to 
support the validity of the model and that the model fits the data. We also have enough 
evidence that 45.51% of the variation of total foreign direct investment flows – inward 
and outward – between the UAE and the variation of the independent variables 
explains the South America Region. The remaining 54.49% variations are attributed 
to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. 
We shall begin by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach 
we followed in previous chapters. The coefficient of the combined GDP - nominal is 
positive and but insignificant (p-value=0.507). Therefore, we do not have enough 
evidence to support the assumption that the foreign direct investment flows inward and 
outward, from and to the UAE tend to be higher with countries that have higher 
nominal GDP. In other terms, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the 
total flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE and South America Region 
is explained by the variation in the combined gross domestic product in nominal terms 
of the countries in both sides over the 18 years from 1999 until 2016.  
When looking at the distance variable, we notice a negative coefficient; however, due 
to the high p-value=0.445, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments between the UAE and 
South America region. Also, and when examining the population variable coefficients, 
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we assumed a higher tendency previously to have more foreign direct investment flows 
inward and outward when the UAE’s and its partner’s population are higher. However, 
when we observed the regression output table of the augmented gravity model for 
investments for testing the hypotheses between the UAE and South America region, 
we conclude that we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total flow 
of foreign direct investments between the UAE and South America region is explained 
by the variation in the population of both sides over the 18 years period from 1999 
until 2016 (p-value=0.157). 
 
On the contrary to the population variable, we observed that Area is not related to the 
total foreign direct investment flows from and to the UAE (p-value=0.157). Therefore, 
we do not have enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct investment 
flows between the UAE and South America Region is explained by the variation of 
the total area in square kilometres. The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is 
hypothesized to be influenced by the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE 
missions abroad, however in our model and given the data we examined, we have 
enough evidence to support that the existence of South American missions in the UAE 
negatively affects the variation in the total foreign direct investments outward and 
inward between the UAE and South America region (p-value=0.05). However, we 
observed the p-value of the variable that corresponds to the existence of UAE missions 
in South American countries to be 0.920. Thus we ruled out that the variable as 
insignificant. 
We now move on to observe the results of the dummy variable in our augmented 
gravity model for the investment flows. The first variable we observed is the 
landlocked variable. We have enough evidence that for a South American country is 
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landlocked, explains the variation in the total foreign direct investments between the 
UAE and South America Region (p-value=0.045). Due to the negative coefficient, we 
conclude that being a landlocked country in South America hinders the flow of foreign 
direct investments between it and the UAE. After that, we examined the South 
American countries attribute of being an island or not. However, the regression model 
output table omitted the variable from the table due to collinearity issues. 
As discussed before, we assume a very high significance of having a common language 
with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language, in influencing the flows of foreign 
direct investments both ways positively. Therefore, having Arabic as an official 
language in a country tends to increase the total Foreign Direct investment flows 
between the UAE and the other Arabic speaking country. However, in the regression 
output table of total foreign direct investments between the UAE and South America 
region, the variable has been omitted from the regression output table due to 
collinearity issues. 
Also, and line with the common investment principles, we assumed that the foreign 
direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and other countries are positively 
influenced by having borders, i.e. neighbouring the UAE. However, in the case of 
South America and since the UAE does not share any borders with the countries in 
this region, we observed that the variable BorderShare had been omitted from the 
regression output table due to collinearity issues. In the case of that South American 
country being ever colonized, the results obtained from the augmented gravity model 
show that the variable does not explain the variation in the total flow of foreign direct 
investments between the region and the UAE (p-value=0.250). 
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On the legislative front, the model revealed that the variables corresponding to the 
signing and ratification of the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement 
(DTA), the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) and the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) could not be examined as these variables have been omitted 
from the regression output table due to collinearity issues. We, therefore, are not able 
to comment on their effects on the flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE 
and South America region. 
3.2.1.11 Investment Analysis of the UAE with West Asia 
Through observing the results of the augmented gravity model for investment flows, 
we have enough evidence to support the validity of the model and that the model fits 
the data. We also have enough evidence that the variation of the independent variables 
explains that 35.06% of the variation of total foreign direct investment flows - inward 
and outward - between the UAE and West Asia. The remaining 64.94% variations are 
attributed to other variables that may not be included in our Gravity Model. 
We shall begin by looking at the explanatory variables results similar to the approach 
we followed in previous chapters. The coefficient of the combined GDP - nominal is 
positive; however, it is insignificant (p-value=0.321). Therefore we do not have 
enough evidence to support the assumption that the foreign direct investment flows 
inward and outward, from and to the UAE tend to be higher with countries that have 
higher nominal GDP.  In other terms, we do not have enough evidence that the 
variation in the total flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE and West 
Asia Region is explained by the variation in the combined gross domestic product in 
nominal terms of the countries in both sides over the 18 years from 1999 until 2016.  
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When looking at the distance variable, we notice a positive coefficient; however, due 
to the high p-value=0.627, we do not have enough evidence that the variation in 
distance affects the total flows of the foreign direct investments between the UAE and 
West Asia. Also, and when examining the population variable coefficients, we 
observed an insignificant relationship between the variation in the size of the 
population and the variation of the total flow of foreign direct investments between the 
UAE and West Asia (p-value=0.125). 
Similar to the population variable, we observed an insignificant attribute to the total 
Area in square meters (p-value=0.931). Therefore, we do not have enough evidence 
that the variation in the total foreign direct investment flows between the UAE and 
West Asia region is explained by the variation in the Area in square meters of both the 
UAE and West Asian countries. The total flow of the Foreign Direct Investments is 
hypothesized to be influenced by the existence of the foreign missions as well as UAE 
missions abroad, however in our model and given the data we examined, we do not 
have enough evidence to support that the existence of UAE missions in West Asian 
countries, affect the variation in the total foreign direct investments outward and 
inward between them (p-value=0.745).  
However, we have enough evidence that the variation in the total foreign direct 
investment flows between the UAE and West Asia region is explained by the variation 
in the number of West Asian Countries mission in the UAE. Interestingly, the 
coefficient is negative which indicates that having West Asian missions in the UAE 
contributes negatively on the total flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE 
and the West Asian Region (p-value=0.039). We now move on to observe the results 
of the dummy variable in our augmented gravity model for the investment flows. We 
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do not have enough evidence that for a country being landlocked does not explain the 
variation in the total foreign direct investments between the UAE and West Asia region 
(p-value=0.600). 
Similar to the previous variable, the countries attribute of being an island or not is 
statistically insignificant in our model, i.e. we do not have enough evidence that the 
variation in the total foreign direct investment flows between the UAE and West Asia 
region is explained by the variation in the island variable (p-value=0.631).  
As discussed before, we assume a very high significance of having a common language 
with the UAE, i.e. Arabic as an official language, in influencing the flows of foreign 
direct investments both ways positively. Therefore, having Arabic as an official 
language in a country is assumed to increase the total Foreign Direct investment flows 
between the UAE and the other Arabic speaking country. However, in the regression 
output table of total foreign direct investments between the UAE and West Asia region, 
the variable has been omitted from the regression output table due to collinearity 
issues. 
Also, and line with the prevailing investment principles, we assumed that the foreign 
direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and other countries are positively 
influenced by having borders, i.e. neighbouring the UAE. However, in the case of West 
Asia region and since the UAE does not share any borders with the countries in this 
region, we observed that the variable BorderShare had been omitted from the 
regression output table due to collinearity issues. 
In the case of that trading country being ever colonized, the results obtained from the 
augmented gravity model show that we do not have enough evidence that the variation 
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in the total foreign direct investment flows both ways between the UAE and West Asia 
Region is explained by the other country being colonized historically or not (p-
value=0.162). 
On the legislative front, the model omitted the variable of the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) due to collinearity and therefore, we are unable to comment on its effect on the 
variation of the total foreign direct investment between the UAE and West Asian 
countries. Also, bilateral flows of foreign direct investments inward and outward 
between the UAE and West Asian Region is shown to be non-linearly related to having 
an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIT/IPPA) as the p-values are 
equal to 0.655.  
However, the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) is shown 
to be statistically significant and negatively affects the total bilateral flows of foreign 
direct investments inward and outward of the UAE (p-value=0.021). Thus, we, 
therefore, have enough evidence that having the Avoidance of Double Taxation on 
Income Agreement (DTA) explains the variation of the total bilateral flows of foreign 
direct investments inward and outward between the UAE and West Asia. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results and findings of this study 
concerning the theoretical body of knowledge of the impact of economic diplomacy 
on the bilateral flows of trade and investment of the UAE and its practical implications. 
The chapter begins by discussing the findings concerning the theoretical framework 
introduced in the literature review. Then the findings are addressed for professionals 
in the diplomatic field being examined. In other words, this chapter addresses the 
dissertation findings practical implications. 
As shown in previous chapters, the economic diplomacy tools, along with the 
determinants of trade and investment flows have been identified to be as follows:  
▪ The Gross Domestic Product 
▪ The Distance in kilometres 
▪ The Population 
▪ The Area of both countries in square kilometres 
▪ The number of foreign missions in the UAE 
▪ The number of UAE missions in other countries 
▪ Being landlocked 
▪ Being an island 
▪ Having a common language 
▪ Having shared borders with the UAE 
▪ Having been ever colonised 
▪ Having a signed and ratified Free Trade Agreement 
▪ Having a signed and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(IPPA/BIT) 
▪ Having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) 
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The above variables have been tested in our regression augmented gravity models for 
both trade and investment and different forms of the variables were used in each 
gravity model as per the academic uses are shown in the references papers we reviewed 
to determine our model.  
In the following section, we discuss in details the implications of each economic tool 
and determinant of trade and investment on the UAE’s economic diplomacy paving 
the way to conclude the following chapter. Moreover, we shed light on some economic 
policy recommendations for each region in the world and identify the attributes, 
determinates of trade and investments, and economic diplomacy tools that boost the 
bilateral flow of non-oil trade and foreign direct investments. 
4.1 Attributes, Trade Determinants, Investments, and Economic Diplomacy 
Tools that Impact the Total Flow of Non-Oil Bilateral Trade and Foreign 
Direct Investments 
4.1.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a Determinate of Trade and Investment 
Flows 
We begin this discussion by looking at the effects of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of trade and investment. 
Therefore, the first part of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how the gross 
domestic product affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the 
other regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous 
chapter, the GDP per capita plays a pivotal role in determining the flows of trade 
between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world. We have enough 
evidence that the total trade is positively related to the magnitude of the GDP per capita 
of both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0).  
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In almost all the regions in the world, we noticed a very high significance of the 
positive coefficient of the GDP per capita variable with the p-value in all the regions 
is less than 5%. Surprisingly, we have enough evidence that the GDP per capita 
negatively impacts the total flow of trade between the UAE and Australasia (p-
value=0.022). Also, we have also concluded that the Gross Domestic Product Per 
Capita has no relation to the flow of trade between the UAE and the Pacific Islands (p-
value=0.607). 
The largest positive coefficient of the GDP per capita in our augmented gravity model 
for trade was 3.389 (p-value=0) observed in the regression output table for the 
augmented gravity trade model for the UAE with South America region. This is 
followed by having a coefficient of 1.79 with p-value=0 observed in the trading 
regression output of the UAE trade flows with the Caribbean. 
Therefore, when it comes to the GDP per capita, we observe that the UAE has more 
prospects to make more trade with countries that have higher GDP per capita only 
because this variable reflects the economic prosperity of nations and the wealth of the 
people of each country and region. This ultimately translates to prospective demand 
on the goods and services that are being traded between both the UAE and the other 
country. Therefore, its positive impact on the flow of trade is commendable and should 
be taken into consideration when we assess the trade potential with any country. That 
being said, we also emphasise on the higher prospects of doing trade with South 
America and the Caribbean regions due to the highly positive relationship that 
eventually is reflected on the magnitude of the trade possibilities and transactions that 
could be executed and ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the 
UAE. 
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Next, we shall discuss the Gross Domestic Product as a determinant of investment 
flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at 
the effects of the Gross Domestic Product across all regions and countries and how it 
affects the flows of investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Gross Domestic Product similar to the case in the Trade Model plays a 
pivotal role in determining the flows of investment between the UAE and the countries 
in various regions in the world. We have enough evidence that the total foreign direct 
investments flow is positively related to the magnitude of the Gross Domestic Product 
of both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0).  
In three regions in the world, we noticed a very high significance of the positive 
coefficient of the Gross Domestic Product variable with the p-value less than 0.05 in 
all of the three regions.  The regions that have a positive and significant coefficient are 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, East Asia, and Arab Countries. We have also concluded 
that the Gross Domestic Product has no relation with the flow of investments between 
the UAE and several regions namely North and South America, Europe, West Asia, 
Australasia, Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean. 
The largest positive coefficient of the Gross Domestic Product in our augmented 
gravity model for investment was 1.72 with a p-value=0.001 observed in the regression 
output table for the augmented gravity investment model for the UAE with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council region. This is followed by having a coefficient of 1.19 with p-
value=0.011 observed in the investment regression output of the UAE investment 
flows with Arab Region, and finally a coefficient of 0.43 observed with a p-value of 
0.017 for the East Asia region. 
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Therefore, when it comes to the Gross Domestic Product we observe that the UAE has 
more prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments with countries that have 
higher Gross Domestic Product in the aforementioned three regions only due to the 
fact that this variable reflects the economic prosperity of the countries of the region 
and the wealth of the people of each country. This ultimately translates to prospective 
partnerships and higher investment appetite as well as other factors that each investor 
should take into consideration during the due diligence process before conducting an 
investment transaction. Therefore, the Gross Domestic Product positive impact on the 
flow of investment is commendable and should be taken into consideration when we 
assess the investment prospects.  
4.1.2 Distance in Kilometres Impact on the Flows of Trade and Investment 
Flows 
 As far as Distance is concerned in all regions and countries regression outputs and 
how it affects the flows of trade and investment, the first part of this subsection 
discusses how the Distance affects the flows of trade between the United Arab 
Emirates and the other regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed 
in the previous chapter, the Distance plays an important role in determining the 
magnitude of the flows of trade between the UAE and the countries in various regions 
in the world; it showed much more significance than the previous factor the Gross 
Domestic Product.  
We have enough evidence that the total trade is mainly negatively related to the 
Distance between both the UAE and the other countries in the world. In almost all the 
regions in the world, we noticed a very high significance of the negative coefficient of 
the Distance variable with the p-value in all the regions is less than 5%. Surprisingly 
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though, we noticed that the Distance was positively related to the total flow of bilateral 
trade with two regions namely the Australasia region which has a high positive 
coefficient equals 29.39 with a significant p-value =0 and the Caribbean region with 
another large positive coefficient of 27.23 and a p-value of 0. We have also concluded 
that the Distance has no relation with the flow of trade between the UAE and the 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (p-value=0.312), Europe (p-value=0.968) 
and Sub Saharan Africa (p-value=0.511). 
The most negative coefficient of the Distance variable in our augmented gravity model 
for trade was -14.96 with a p-value=0 observed in the regression output table for the 
augmented gravity trade model for the UAE with South America region. This is 
followed by having a coefficient of -12.46 with p-value=0 observed in the trading 
regression output of the UAE trade flows with North America. 
Therefore, when it comes to the Distance variable we observe that the UAE has more 
prospects to make more trade with countries that are far from the UAE but in two 
specific regions namely Australasia and the Caribbean, while mainly the distance 
negative affects trade simply due to the fact that this variable reflects the logistics 
burden to transfer goods and services with the costs being higher as the distance grows 
farther. This ultimately translates to exploring markets which are large but in smaller 
distances to the UAE in order to easily exchange the goods and services that are being 
traded between both the UAE and the other country.  
Next, we shall discuss the Distance as a determinant of investment flows between the 
UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at the effects of the 
Distance across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of investment. 
As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, the Distance, on the 
127 
  
 
 
 
contrary to its significance in the Trade Model, has no effects in determining the flows 
of investment between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world. We 
do not have enough evidence that the total investment flows are related to the distance 
in kilometres between both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-
value=0.514).  
In all the regions in the world we noticed insignificance of the coefficients of the 
Distance variable with the p-value always more than 5% while in regions like the 
Pacific and the Caribbean, it was not reported due to a small number of observations. 
Therefore, when it comes to Distance we observe that the UAE investment flows are 
not related to the distance of the countries of the world, this could simply be attributed 
to the advancement in the communication and banking systems which eliminated 
distance to be an obstacle or enabler of investment as nowadays globalisation and 
digital economy have become the norm in the investment world.  
4.1.3 The Population Size of Both Sides as a Determinant of Trade and 
Investment Flows 
The size of the Population of both sides is discussed here as a determinant of trade and 
investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin this 
discussion by looking at the effects of the Population across all regions and countries 
and how it affects the flows of trade and investment. Therefore, the first part of this 
discussion subsection we shall discuss how the population affects the flows of trade 
between the UAE and the other regions and countries.  
As shown in the tables of generated results as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
population plays an essential role in determining the magnitude of flows of trade 
between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world. We have enough 
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evidence that the total trade is positively related to the size of the population of both 
the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0). In all the regions in the 
world, we noticed a very high significance of the positive coefficient of the Population 
variable with the p-value in all the regions being less than 0.05 across all regions. 
The largest positive coefficient of the Population in our augmented gravity model for 
trade was 2.64 with a (p-value=0) observed in the regression output table for the 
augmented gravity trade model for the UAE with Sub Saharan Africa region. This is 
followed by having a coefficient of 2.34 with (p-value=0) observed in the trading 
regression output of the UAE trade flows with Pacific islands. Therefore, when it 
comes to Population variable we observe that the UAE has more prospects to do more 
trade with countries that have higher population simply due to the fact that this variable 
reflects the high quantitative demand by those regions and countries due to a large 
number of people that constitute the destination markets for goods and services as well 
as large population countries also have larger production capacity and thus exports 
capability.  
This ultimately translates to prospective demand on the goods and services that are 
being traded between both the UAE and the other country. Therefore, the Population 
magnitude’s positive impact on the flow of trade is commendable and should be taken 
into consideration when we assess the trade potential with any country. That being 
said, we also emphasise on the higher prospects of doing trade with highly populous 
countries in all over the world due to the highly positive relationship that eventually is 
reflected on the magnitude of the trade possibilities and transactions that could be 
executed and ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE.  
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Next, we shall discuss the Population as a determinant of investment flows between 
the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at the effects of the 
Population across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of investments. 
As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, the Population on the 
contrary to the case in the Trade Model plays a lesser important role in determining 
the flows of investment between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the 
world. We have enough evidence that the total investment is positively related to the 
magnitude of the Population of both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-
value=0).  
When we tested each region separately, we concluded that we do not have enough 
evidence that population is a critical factor in determining the flow of foreign direct 
investments between them and the UAE (p-value>0.05). Therefore, when it comes to 
the size of Population we observe that the UAE has more prospects to grow the 
bilateral flow of investments with populous countries in general due to the fact that 
this variable reflects the size of the market quantitatively, thus the demand as well as 
the availability of labour and expertise for the investments to become viable. This 
ultimately translates to prospective partnerships and higher investment appetite as well 
as other factors that each investor should take into consideration during the due 
diligence process before conducting an investment transaction.  
4.1.4 The Area of Both Countries in Square Kilometres as a Determinant of 
Trade and Investment Flows  
Initially, we commence by observing the effects of the Area in square kilometres 
across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of trade and investments. 
Therefore, the first part of this discussion sub-section we discuss how the Area in 
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square kilometres affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the 
other regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Area in square kilometres plays a pivotal role in determining the flows of 
trade between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world. We have 
enough evidence that the total trade is negatively related to the magnitude of the area 
size in square kilometres of both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-
value=0).  
In almost all the regions in the world, we noticed a very high significance of the 
negative coefficient of the area in square kilometres variable with the p-value in all the 
regions below 5%. Surprisingly though, we noticed that the area per square kilometres 
was positively related to the total flow of bilateral trade with the Australasia with the 
p-value being less than 5% in both. We have also concluded that the area in square 
kilometres has no relation with the flow of trade between the UAE and the South 
American Region with a p-value=0.113. 
The significant negative coefficient of the Area in square meters in our augmented 
gravity model for trade was -27.39 with a p-value=0 observed in the regression output 
table for the augmented gravity trade model for the UAE with the Caribbean region. 
This is followed by having a coefficient of -22.62 with p-value=0 observed in the 
trading regression output of the UAE trade flows with the North American region. 
Therefore, when it comes to the Area in square kilometres we observe that the UAE 
has more prospects to make more trade with countries that have lesser areas in 
kilometre square simply due to the fact that this variable reflects the logistical burden 
carried by exporters and importers to reach markets in larger countries that may lag in 
terms of infrastructure development and thus may have lesser connectivity. This 
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ultimately translates to challenges faced by the suppliers of the goods and services that 
are being traded between both the UAE and the other country. Therefore, its negative 
impact on the flow of trade should be taken into consideration when we assess the 
trade potential with any country. That being said, we also emphasise on the high 
prospects of making a trade with larger countries in Australasia in terms of size in 
kilometre square. 
Subsequently, we shall discuss the area in kilometre square as a determinant of 
investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by 
looking at the effects of the Area per square meter across all regions and countries and 
how it affects the flows of investments. As shown in the results tables discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Area in square meter in contrast with the case in the Trade Model 
plays an antagonising role on the flows of investment between the UAE and the 
countries in various regions in the world. We have enough evidence that the total 
investment is negatively related to the size of each country in square kilometres of both 
the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0.039).  
We had also concluded that the Area in square kilometres has no relation with the flow 
of investments between the UAE and various regions in the world especially when we 
ran the random effect GLS regression for each region alone as the p-value has always 
been above 5%. Therefore, when it comes to the Area per square meters, we observe 
that the UAE has more prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments with 
countries that have the smaller geographical area in square meters in Europe only 
because this variable reflects the lesser logistical burden for investments as well as 
connectivity and manageability. This ultimately translates to the need to study other 
factors that each investor should take into consideration during the due diligence 
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process before conducting an investment transaction. Therefore, the Area size in 
kilometre square’s impact on the flow of investment is a crucial factor which should 
be taken into consideration when potential investors assess the investment prospects 
with Europe.  
4.1.5 The Number of Foreign Missions in the UAE as an Economic Diplomacy 
Tool to Boost Trade and Investment Flows  
We shall begin this sub-section in discussing the economic diplomacy tools used to 
boost trade and investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and 
regions. We used the Foreign missions in the UAE as a variable in the Trade 
Augmented Gravity Model and the Investment Augmented Gravity Model. Therefore, 
the first part of this discussion subsection discusses how having foreign missions in 
the UAE affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other 
regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, 
we do not have enough evidence to support that having foreign missions in the UAE 
plays a role in determining the flows of trade between the UAE and the countries in 
various regions in the world (p-value=0.152).  
However, we have enough evidence with the p-value less than 5% that having foreign 
embassies from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and East Asian countries 
positively affect the total bilateral flow of non-oil trade between the UAE and those 
regions. In contrast, we also have enough evidence with a p-value less than 5% that 
having foreign embassies from the African countries negatively impacts the total 
bilateral flow of non-oil trade between the UAE and those regions. In almost all the 
other regions in the world did not have enough evidence that having a foreign mission 
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in the UAE explains the variation in the total bilateral non-oil trade between the UAE 
and them as the p-value was above 5% in all of these regions. 
The largest positive coefficient of the foreign missions variable in our augmented 
gravity model for trade was 24.49 with a p-value=0 observed in the regression output 
table for the augmented gravity trade model for the UAE with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council region. This is followed by a coefficient of 0.536 with p-value=0.026 observed 
in the trading regression output of the UAE trade flows with the East Asia region. 
Therefore, when it comes to having foreign missions in the UAE we observe that the 
UAE has more prospects to do more trade with countries that have higher missions 
representation in the UAE from the GCC and East Asian countries simply due to the 
fact that this variable reflects the economic diplomacy activities and tools used and 
promoted by those countries missions especially when it comes to trade offices that 
look after all commercial matters and conducts initiatives and programs for trade 
promotion which include trade missions, legislative assistance to traders and many 
other services. This ultimately translates to the prospective exchange of the goods and 
services that are being traded between both the UAE and these regions which also 
comprise a growing demand for goods and services from the Far East and vice versa. 
The UAE, in this case, plays a pivotal role as a bridge for re-export from East Asia to 
the west and vice versa.  
Next, we shall discuss having foreign missions in the UAE as an economic diplomacy 
tool to boost investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. 
We begin by looking at the effects of several foreign missions in the UAE across all 
regions and countries and how it affects the flows of investments. As shown in the 
results tables discussed in the previous chapter, we do not have enough evidence that 
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having foreign missions in the UAE, similar to the case in the Trade Model, plays a 
role in determining the flows of investment between the UAE and the countries in 
various regions in the world (p-value=0.778). Surprisingly, we have enough evidence 
that having foreign missions in the UAE from West Asia, and South America region 
impacts the total flow of foreign direct investments between that UAE and that regions 
with a p-value less than 5% in both negatively. 
We have also concluded that the number of foreign missions in the UAE has no relation 
with the flow of investments between the UAE and the rest of the regions. Therefore, 
and as an implication to the above findings. It was observed that the number of foreign 
missions in the UAE results indicated a minimal relationship with the magnitude of 
trade and investments. This could be the case because historically, the foreign missions 
might not have the relevant economic expertise to carry out economic diplomacy 
initiatives. Another reason is the possibility that the missions were under budgetary 
pressure that resulted in minimal personnel in charge of trade and investment 
promotion.  
Another argument could be that the efficiency of the usage of economic diplomacy 
means was not to the level that promotes trade and investments. Also, there are several 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade that may have hindered the number of missions 
from impacting the flow of trade and investments. Several regions have countries 
which are not open economies and apply those barriers as part of their economic policy 
in order to promote local content and protect the local merchants. 
In some other cases, the coefficient of the Foreign Embassies variable was negative 
which implies a hindering role that these missions impose on the overall trade and 
investment namely in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and West Asia. This could 
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be related to other factors that prevent traders and investors from conducting business 
in the existence of these missions. Some of these missions have historically been 
conducting investigations and submitting court cases against their nationals in the 
UAE on allegations of corruption, although many of these allegations are politicised.  
While that is the case, those embassies have also played an active role in coordination 
with the UAE authorities to fight money laundering, fraud and corruption in various 
legitimate cases. Thus, opening a foreign mission from these regions might send a 
warning signals to financial criminals and eventually divert their operations out of fear 
of being caught and identified by their missions and brought to the UAE justice system. 
Another argument that could also be discussed here is the possibility of the adverse 
and disruptive role of the lobbying activities that may have affected the influence of 
the missions on the overall trade and investments. Towards this end, this discussion 
could be investigated further in future research to understand, explain and explore the 
causes of the zero or adverse effects of the foreign missions in the UAE from several 
regions.  
4.1.6 The Number of UAE Missions in Specific Countries as an Economic 
Diplomacy Tool to Boost Trade and Investment Flows 
Moving on, in this subsection to discuss the effects of having a UAE mission in other 
countries across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of trade and 
investment. Therefore, the first part of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how 
having a UAE mission in other countries affects the flows of trade between the United 
Arab Emirates and the other regions and countries.  
As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, UAE missions abroad 
are mostly insignificant in affecting the flows of trade between the UAE and most of 
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the regions in the world. Despite that, there is enough evidence that the total bilateral 
non-oil trade is negatively related, with a coefficient of -0.242, to having a United Arab 
Emirates missions in other countries around the world (p-value=0.004). Similarly, 
when we zoomed into the various regions of the world, we found enough evidence 
with a very high significance of the negative coefficient of having UAE missions in 
other counties variable in African countries with the (p-value=0). Also, having a UAE 
mission abroad has no relation with, and does not explain the variation of the total flow 
of bilateral non-oil trade between the UAE and all the other regions. 
Therefore, when it comes to having UAE missions abroad, we observe that the UAE 
has more prospects to make more trade with countries regardless of the UAE having 
embassies or consulates in various regions around the world. The general model shows 
a negative relationship overall. The negative impact on the flow of trade should be 
taken into consideration when assessing the trade potential with any country and the 
future expansion plans of our diplomatic representation.  
Next, we shall discuss having UAE missions abroad as an economic diplomacy tool to 
enhance investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We 
begin by looking at the effects of having UAE missions abroad across all regions and 
countries and how it impacts the flows of investments. As shown in the results tables 
discussed in the previous chapter, having UAE missions abroad, on the contrary to the 
case in the Trade Model plays a lesser important role in determining the magnitude of 
the flows of investment between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the 
world. We do not have enough evidence that the total foreign direct investments flow 
is related to the number of UAE mission abroad in almost all the regions (p-
value=0.420).    
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We have also concluded that the number of UAE missions abroad has no relation with 
the flow of investments between the UAE and all the regions around the world as p-
value in the regression output for these region exceeds 5%. Therefore, when it comes 
to having UAE missions abroad and trade and investments promotion. It is observed 
that the UAE prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments with various regions 
around the world is irrelevant to the number of UAE missions and consulates in those 
regions. This is an interesting area to be investigated to understand better the reasons 
for the limited effects of UAE Embassies on the Trade and investment figures and 
whether the reasons are intrinsic or extrinsic to the diplomatic field.  
Therefore, and as an implication to these findings. It was observed that the number of 
UAE mission’s abroad regression results indicated a minimal relationship with the 
magnitude of trade and investments across all the regions except sub-Saharan Africa. 
This could be the case because historically, the UAE missions might not have the 
relevant economic expertise to carry out economic diplomacy initiatives. As of today, 
the UAE has only five government-related Trade Offices across the world in the USA, 
China, India, Switzerland and Egypt while the rest of the trade offices are mainly of 
non-government, private sector entities that only look after those entities interests. 
Another reason is the possibility that the UAE missions were understaffed which 
resulted in the absence of personnel in charge of trade and investment promotion.  
Another argument could be that the efficiency of the usage of economic diplomacy 
tools was not to the level that could influence and promote trade and investments. Also, 
there are several tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade that may have hindered the 
number of UAE missions from impacting the flow of trade and investments. Several 
regions have countries which are not open economies and apply those barriers as part 
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of their economic policy in order to promote local content and protect the local 
merchants. Another Factor that may cause the insignificance of the UAE missions in 
affecting trade and investments is the combined effects of the state-owned enterprises, 
medium and large corporations, multinational companies and other non-government 
economic organisations in facilitating trade and investment flows outside the 
diplomatic field. 
The only case in which the coefficient of the UAE Missions variable was negative was 
witnessed in Sub-Saharan Africa which implies a hindering role that these missions 
impose on the overall trade and investment. This could be related to other factors that 
prevent traders and investors from conducting business in the existence of these 
missions. Similar to the case of the Foreign Missions, Sub-Saharan African countries 
have been suffering from corruption, money laundering and fraud. While that is the 
case, UAE embassies have also played an active role in coordination with the host 
countries authorities to fight money laundering, fraud and corruption in various 
legitimate cases. The UAE has signed and ratified several agreements with Sub-
Saharan Africa on legal assistance and fighting corruption.  
Thus, opening a UAE mission from these regions might send a warning signal to 
financial criminals and eventually divert their operations out of fear of being caught 
and identified and ultimately face justice. Eventually, the negative coefficient may 
correspond to a positive outcome which tackles the global phenomena of corruption 
that is widespread in many sub-Saharan African countries. The UAE today is at the 
forefront of fighting corruption and places high importance to thwart financial crimes 
from being conducted through the UAE’s sophisticated financial markets. Another 
argument that could also be discussed here is the possibility of the adverse and 
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disruptive role of the lobbying activities that may have affected the influence of the 
missions on the overall trade and investments. 
Towards this end, this discussion could be investigated further in future research to 
understand, explain and explore the causes of the zero or adverse effects of the foreign 
missions in the UAE from several regions.  
4.1.7 The Attribute of a Country Being Land Locked as a Determinant of Trade 
and Investment Flows 
In this subsection, we shall discuss being a landlocked attribute of a country as a 
determinant of trade and investment flows between the UAE and the other countries 
and regions. As shown in the results section, we used the landlocked variable for the 
Trade Augmented Gravity Model, and for the Investment Augmented Gravity Model. 
We begin this discussion by looking at the effects of being landlocked across all 
regions and countries and how it affects the flows of trade and investment. Therefore, 
the first part of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how being a landlocked 
country affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and that country. 
As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, being landlocked is 
one of the attributes in determining the flows of trade between the UAE and the 
countries in various regions in the world. 
 However, we do not have enough evidence that the total trade is negatively related to 
being a landlocked country within a region when trading with the UAE (p-
value=0.905). However, when we tested for each region separately, we noticed 
insignificance of the negative coefficient of the landlocked variable with the p-value 
in all the regions is above 5% except for West Asia, which was significant and less 
than 5%. We conclude that being landlocked is positively related to the total flow of 
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bilateral trade with the West Asia region (p-value=0.011). We have also concluded 
that the attribute of being landlocked has no relation to the flow of trade between the 
UAE and all other regions. 
Therefore, when it comes to being a landlocked country, we observe that the UAE has 
more prospects to make a trade with countries that are landlocked in West Asia. That 
being said, we emphasize also on the higher prospects of doing trade with West Asia 
landlocked countries due to the highly positive relationship that eventually is reflected 
on the magnitude of the trade possibilities and transactions that could be executed and 
ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE, especially that many 
of the landlocked countries in West Asia have leapt forward recently in the 
development of connectivity and infrastructure along with logistical services.  
Next, we shall discuss being a landlocked country as a determinant of investment flows 
between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at the 
effects of the landlocked across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows 
of investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, the 
landlocked on the contrary to the case in the Trade Model, is less important and 
insignificant in determining the flows of investment between the UAE and the 
countries in various regions in the world (p-value=0.313).  
When we look at the regional results, we have enough evidence that the total foreign 
direct investments flow is negatively related to being a landlocked country in South 
America (p-value=0.045).  However, in all the other regions of the world, we noticed 
insignificant coefficients of the landlocked variable with the p-value above 5% in all 
regions or the variable had been omitted due to collinearity. Therefore, when it comes 
to being a landlocked country, we observe that the UAE’s prospects to grow the 
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bilateral flow of investments with countries is irrelevant to the fact of that other country 
is landlocked or not except for South America where being landlocked negatively 
impacts the flow of investments between them and the UAE.  
As there might be other factors that affect the investment flows and being landlocked 
is not among them, which is simply because this attribute does not reflect the economic 
prosperity of the countries of the region and the wealth of the people of each country. 
This obligates that investors from both sides have to assess other factors and each 
investor should take into consideration these factors during the due diligence process 
before conducting an investment transaction.  
4.1.8 The Attribute of a Country Being an Island as a Determinant of Trade and 
Investment Flows  
The effects of being an island across all regions and countries and how it affects the 
flows of trade and investment is discussed in this subsection. Therefore, the first part 
of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how being an island affects the flows of 
trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other regions and countries. As shown 
in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, being an island is insignificant 
in determining the flows of trade between the UAE and the countries in various regions 
in the world (p-value=0.893). We do not have enough evidence that the total bilateral 
non-oil trade is related to the fact of being an island.  
When we look at the regions separately, in two regions in the world, we noticed a very 
high significance of the positive coefficient of the being an island variable with the p-
value in all the regions being less than 5%. These regions are the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and Oceania/Pacific islands. We have also concluded that being an island has 
no relation to the flow of trade between the UAE and all the other regions. 
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The largest positive coefficient of being an island in our augmented gravity model for 
trade was 81.156 with a p-value=0.003 observed in the regression output table for the 
augmented gravity trade model for the UAE with the Gulf Cooperation Council region. 
This is followed by having a coefficient of 22.644 with p-value=0.019 observed in the 
trading regression output of the UAE trade flows with the Oceania/Pacific islands 
countries. 
Therefore, when it comes to being an island, we observe that the UAE has tended to 
make more trade with countries that are islands in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and 
the Pacific regions. This positive impact on the flow of trade is commendable, and 
these regions should be taken into consideration when assessing the trade potential 
with any country is an island. That being said, this eventually is reflected in the 
magnitude of the trade possibilities and transactions that could be executed and 
ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE. 
Next, we shall discuss being an island as a determinant of investment flows between 
the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at the effects of the 
island variable across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of 
investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, is an 
island, similar to the case in the Trade Model, is irrelevant when determining the flows 
of investment between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world with 
a p-value = 0.774. Thus, we do not have enough evidence that the total investment 
flows are related to the attribute of being an island of the other countries in the world.  
We have also concluded that being an island has no relation with the flow of 
investments between the UAE and all the regions separately as the p-value exceeded 
5% in all of the regression outputs. Therefore, when it comes to being an island, we 
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observe that none of the regions has shown significance in being an island and 
affecting the trade flows. This ultimately translates to possible other factors that each 
investor should take into consideration during the due diligence process before 
conducting an investment transaction.  
4.1.9 The Attribute of Having a Common Language as a Determinant of Trade 
and Investment Flows  
In this subsection, we discuss having a common language as a determinant of trade 
and investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. First, we 
start by looking at the effects of having a common language across all regions and 
countries and how it affects the flows of trade and investment. Therefore, the first part 
of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how having a common language affects 
the flows of trade between the UAE and the other regions and countries. As shown in 
the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, having a common language plays 
a pivotal role in determining the flows of trade between the UAE and the countries in 
various regions in the world (p-value=0).  
We have enough evidence that the total trade is positively related to having a common 
language between the UAE and the other countries in the world. However, when we 
tested each region separately, noticed that having a common language is irrelevant is 
most of the regions as the p-value was more than 5%. The only regions with significant 
effects of having common languages Sub-Saharan African and G20 countries. 
Therefore, when it comes to having a common language, we observe that the UAE has 
more prospects to make more trade with Sub-Saharan African countries and members 
of the G20 that have Arabic as an official language simply because this eases the 
communication and also means similarities in the culture.  
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This ultimately translates to a prospective boost of exchange of the goods and services 
that are being traded between both the UAE and African countries that speak Arabic. 
Therefore, its positive impact on the flow of trade between the UAE and Africa is 
commendable and should be taken into consideration when we assess the trade 
potential with any African country. That being said, we emphasize also on the higher 
prospects of doing trade with Arabic speaking Sub-Saharan African countries and the 
members of the G20 due to the highly positive relationship that eventually is reflected 
on the magnitude of the trade possibilities and transactions that could be executed and 
ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE. 
Next, we shall discuss having a common language as a determinant of investment 
flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at 
the effects of having a common language across all regions and countries and how it 
affects the flows of investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous 
chapter, having a common language, and similar to the case in the Trade Model, plays 
a significant decisive role in determining the flows of investment between the UAE 
and the countries in various regions in the world. We have enough evidence that the 
total trade is positively related to having a common language between both the UAE 
and the other countries in the world (p-value=0.003).  
However, when we tested each region separately, we noticed an insignificant 
coefficient of the language variable with either the p-value more than 0.05 or mostly 
being omitted due to collinearity issues across all regions.  Therefore, we concluded 
that having a common has no relation with the flow of investments between the UAE 
and specific regions in the world. 
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Therefore, when it comes to having a common language we observe that the UAE has 
more prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments with countries irrelevant of 
having a common language or not merely due to the fact that globalization and ease of 
doing business are predominantly independent of Arabic language and most countries 
today use English documents, which are widely spoken all over the world.  
4.1.10 The Attribute of a Having Shared Borders as a Determinant of Trade and 
Investment Flows  
The variable of having shared borders as a determinant of trade and investment flows 
between the UAE, and the other countries and regions are discussed in this subsection. 
We start this discussion by looking at the effects of having shared borders across all 
regions and countries and how it affects the flows of trade and investment. Therefore, 
the first part of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how having shared borders 
affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other regions and 
countries.  
As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, sharing borders with 
the UAE plays an insignificant role in determining the flows of trade between the UAE 
and the countries in various regions in the world. We do not have enough evidence 
that the total trade is related to having borders shared between both the UAE and the 
other countries in the world (p-value=0.765). However, when we tested for each region 
separately, the only region which showed significant coefficient for having a shared 
border was the Gulf Cooperation Council, this is due to the fact that the UAE does not 
share borders with any country outside the gulf cooperation council and thus for all the 
other regions the coefficient was insignificant and on several outputs it was omitted 
due to collinearity. 
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 The coefficient of sharing borders with the UAE among the Gulf Cooperation Council 
is estimated at 2.63 with (p-value=0.019). We have also concluded that having shared 
borders with the UAE has no relation with the flow of trade between the UAE all the 
other regions as the p-value was higher than 5%. Therefore, when it comes to sharing 
borders with the UAE we observe that the UAE has more prospects to make more trade 
with neighbouring Gulf Cooperation Council members that share land borders with 
the UAE namely Oman and Saudi Arabia simply due to the fact that this variable 
reflects proximity and the ease of moving goods and services to the neighbouring 
markets.  
This ultimately translates to prospective demand on the goods and services that are 
being traded between both the UAE and Saudi Arabia and Oman. Therefore, its 
positive impact on the flow of trade is commendable and should be taken into 
consideration when we assess the trade potential with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries. That being said, we also emphasise on the higher prospects of doing trade 
with Saudi Arabia and Oman due to the highly positive relationship that eventually is 
reflected on the magnitude of the trade possibilities and transactions that could be 
executed and ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE. 
Next, we shall discuss having shared borders with the UAE as a determinant of 
investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by 
looking at the effects of having shared borders across all regions and countries and 
how it affects the flows of investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the 
previous chapter, having borders with the UAE in line with the case in the Trade Model 
plays an insignificant role in determining the flows of investment between the UAE 
and the countries in various regions in the world. We do not have enough evidence 
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that the total foreign direct investments flow is related to having shared borders 
between both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0.347).  However, 
when we test each region separately, the variable has been omitted due to collinearity 
as the UAE only shares a border with two of the Gulf Cooperation Council members 
namely Saudi Arabia and Oman.  
We have also concluded that having shared border with the United Arab Emirates has 
no relation with the flow of investments between the UAE and any region of the world 
including the countries members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Therefore, when it 
comes to having shared borders with the UAE, we observe that the UAE has more 
prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments with countries irrelevant to the fact 
that these countries share borders with the UAE or not. This ultimately translates to 
prospective partnerships and higher investment appetite irrespective of border sharing 
as other factors contribute to the magnitude of foreign direct investments flows that 
each investor should take into consideration during the due diligence process before 
conducting an investment transaction.  
4.1.11 The Attribute of having ever been Colonised as a Determinant of Trade 
and Investment Flows  
Now, we shall discuss the variable of being ever colonised as a determinant of trade 
and investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We 
commence by discussion the effects of being ever colonised across all regions and 
countries and how it affects the flows of trade and investment.  
Therefore, the first part of this discussion subsection we shall discuss how being ever 
colonised affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other 
regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, 
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sharing a colonised history is insignificant in determining the flows of trade between 
the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world. We do not have enough 
evidence that the total trade is related to the fact that both the UAE and its trading 
partner have been colonised before (p-value=0.360).  
In South America, North America, Sub-Saharan African countries, West Asia and the 
G20 countries, we noticed highly significant positive coefficients of the colonised 
variable with the p-value being less than 5%. The largest coefficient was observed in 
North America’s region followed by South America’s Region. In contrast, we noticed 
that being ever colonised was negatively related to the total flow of bilateral trade with 
the Caribbean countries (p-value=0.002). We have also concluded that being ever 
colonised has no relation to the flow of trade between the UAE and the rest of the 
regions in the world. 
Therefore, when it comes to being colonized we observe that the UAE has more 
prospects to do more trade with South American, North American, Sub-Saharan 
African, West Asian and the G20 countries that have been colonized simply due to the 
fact that this variable reflects the willingness of previously colonized countries to catch 
up with the fast moving world and exchange goods and services with partners of 
similar economic and demographic constituents. This ultimately translates to 
prospective demand on the goods and services that are being traded between both the 
UAE and the other previously colonised country.  
Therefore, its positive impact on the flow of trade is commendable and should be taken 
into consideration when we assess the trade potential. That being said, we emphasize 
also on the higher prospects of doing trade with South America, North America, Sub-
Saharan African countries, West Asia and the G20 countries due to the highly positive 
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relationship that eventually is reflected on the magnitude of the trade possibilities and 
transactions that could be executed and ultimately boosting the overall non-oil bilateral 
trade of the UAE. 
Next, we shall discuss having ever been colonised variable as a determinant of 
investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by 
looking at the effects of ever being colonised across all regions and countries and how 
it affects the flows of investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the 
previous chapter, being ever colonized on the contrary to the case in the Trade Model 
is insignificant in determining the flows of investment between the UAE and the 
countries in various regions in the world. Thus, we do not have enough evidence that 
the total flow of foreign direct investments is related to the fact that the other country 
has ever been colonised (p-value=0.504).  
When looking at each region separately, we have also concluded that having been ever 
colonised has no relation with the flow of investments between the UAE and the rest 
of the other regions. Therefore, when it comes to ever being colonised variable, we 
conclude that ever being colonised does not affect the flow of foreign direct 
investments between the United Arab Emirates and various regions of the world. This 
ultimately translates to the effects of the other factors either included in our model or 
not that each investor should take into consideration during the due diligence process 
before conducting an investment transaction.  
4.1.12 Having Signed and Ratified Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as an 
Economic Diplomacy Tool to Boost Trade and Investment Flows  
Moving on to the economic agreements, we shall start discussing the impact of having 
a signed and ratified Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as an economic diplomacy tool to 
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boost trade and investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and 
regions. As shown in the results section, we used the Free Trade Agreement variable 
in both the Trade Augmented Gravity Model and the Investment Augmented Gravity 
Model.  
First and foremost, we shall discuss how having a signed and ratified free trade 
agreement affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other 
regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Free Trade Agreement plays an insignificant role in determining the flows of trade 
between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world. Thus, we do not 
have enough evidence that the total bilateral non-oil trade is related to having a free 
trade agreement signed and ratified between both the UAE and the other countries in 
the world (p-value=0.189).  
However, when we estimated the coefficients of the free trade agreement variable in 
the augmented trade gravity model, we noticed a very high significance of a positive 
coefficient of free trade agreement variable in the European region (p-value=0.007). 
In contrast, we have enough evidence that having a signed and ratified Free Trade 
Agreement negatively affects the flow of the bilateral non-oil trade between the United 
Arab Emirates and East Asia Region (p-value=0). 
All in all, when it comes to having a signed and ratified free trade agreement (FTA) 
we observe that the UAE has more prospects to make more trade with European 
countries that it has a Free Trade Agreement with that is signed and ratified simply 
due to the fact that this agreement has various incentives for traders ranging from 
customs fees elimination. Also, Free trade agreements foster freer trade and investment 
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flows, encourage business productivity and innovation. FTAs can promote regional 
integration, enhance competitiveness and can help developing countries.  
This ultimately translates to prospective boost on the flow of the goods and services 
that are being traded between both the UAE and the European region. Therefore, its 
positive impact on the flow of trade with Europe is commendable and should be taken 
into consideration when we assess the trade potential with any European country. That 
being said, we also emphasise on the higher prospects of doing trade with Europe due 
to the highly positive relationship that eventually is reflected on the magnitude of the 
trade possibilities and transactions that could be executed and ultimately boosting the 
overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE. 
Next, we shall discuss having a signed and ratified free trade agreement as an economic 
diplomacy tool to boost investment flows between the UAE and the other countries 
and regions. We begin by looking at the effects of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of investment. As shown 
in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, the Free Trade Agreement, 
similar to the case in the Trade Model, plays an insignificant role in determining the 
flows of investment between the UAE and the countries in various regions in the world 
(p-value=0.612). Thus, we do not have enough evidence that the total investment flows 
are related to having a ratified and signed free trade agreement between both the UAE 
and the other countries in the world.  
However, and similar to the case of the trade results, we noticed a very high 
significance of the positive coefficient of the free trade agreement variable estimated 
at 1.84 in the East Asia region (p-value=0.027). We have also concluded that the Free 
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Trade Agreement has no relation with the flow of investments between the UAE and 
the rest of the regions in the world as the p-value is above 5% in all regression outputs. 
Therefore, when it comes to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), we observe that the 
UAE has more prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments with East Asian 
countries that it has a signed and ratified free trade agreement. This ultimately 
translates to prospective partnerships and higher investment appetite in East Asian 
countries that the UAE has FTA with namely Singapore, in addition to other need for 
each investor to take into consideration other factors during the due diligence process 
before conducting an investment transaction. Therefore, the Free Trade Agreement 
positive impact on the flow of investment in the East Asia region is commendable and 
should be taken into consideration when we assess the future signing of free trade 
agreements.  
4.1.13 Having Signed and Ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) as an Economic Diplomacy Tool to Boost Trade and 
Investment Flows  
The next economic agreement is having a signed, and ratified Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) as an economic diplomacy tool to boost trade 
and investment flows between the UAE and the other countries and regions. As shown 
in the results section, we used the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) for the Trade Augmented Gravity Model, and the Investment 
Augmented Gravity Model.  
Similar to the previous approaches, the initial part of this subsection discusses how 
having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement 
(DTA) affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other 
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regions and countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, 
having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement 
(DTA) has no noticeable effect in determining the flows of trade between the UAE 
and the countries in various regions in the world.  
Thus, we do not have enough evidence that the total trade is related to having a signed 
and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) between 
both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0.054). However, we 
noticed the significance of the negative coefficient of the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) variable in the Sub-Saharan African Countries 
(p-value=0.028).  We have also concluded that having a signed and ratified Avoidance 
of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) has an insignificant relationship 
with the flow of trade between the UAE and the rest of the specific regions as for each 
region the p-value was more than 5% or in some instances it was omitted due to 
collinearity. Therefore, when it comes to having a signed and ratified Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA), we observe that the UAE has lesser 
prospects to do trade with the Sub Saharan Africa when having a signed and ratified 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA). 
Next, we shall discuss having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on 
Income Agreement (DTA) as an economic diplomacy tool to boost investment flows 
between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin by looking at the 
effects of having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
Agreement (DTA) across all regions and countries and how it affects the flows of 
investment.  
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As shown in the tables of generated results as discussed in the previous chapter, having 
a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) 
plays an insignificant role in determining the flows of investment between the UAE 
and the countries in various regions in the world. We do not have enough evidence 
that the total investments are related to having a signed and ratified Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) between both the UAE and the other 
countries in the world (p-value=0.139).  
However, when we tested each region separately, we noticed an insignificant effect of 
having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement 
(DTA) on the bilateral flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE and most 
of the regions in the world as the p-value was always above 5% and in some cases the 
variable was eliminated from the regression output due to collinearity issues. 
Interestingly, we have enough evidence that the avoidance of double taxation on 
income agreement has an adverse impact on the flow of foreign direct investments 
between the UAE and West Asia (p-value=0.021). Therefore, when it comes to having 
a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) we 
observe that the UAE has more prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments 
with countries irrespective of having a signed and ratified Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA), except in West Asia where the agreement 
negatively impacts the flow of investments.  
4.1.14 Having Signed and Ratified Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (IPPA/BIT) as an Economic Diplomacy Tool to Boost Trade 
and Investment Flows  
Last but not least, we shall discuss having signed, and ratified Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) as an economic diplomacy tool to boost trade 
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and investment flow between the UAE and the other countries and regions. We begin 
this discussion by looking at the effects of having signed and ratified Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) across all regions and countries and 
how it affects the flows of trade and investment.  
Therefore, in the first part of this discussion subsection, we shall discuss how having 
signed, and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) 
affects the flows of trade between the United Arab Emirates and the other regions and 
countries. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous chapter, having 
signed and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) has 
an insignificant role in determining the flows of trade between the UAE and the world. 
Thus, we do not have enough evidence that the total trade is irrelevant to have signed 
and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) between 
both the UAE and the other countries in the world (p-value=0.319).  
However, when we tested each region separately, we arrived at other conclusions. We 
noticed a very high significance of the positive coefficient of the Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) variable in Sub-Saharan Africa (p-
value=0.002) and East Asia (p-value=0). Interestingly though, we noticed that the 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) was negatively related 
to the total flow of bilateral trade with the Arab countries (p-value=0.022). We have 
also concluded that having the IPPA/BIT agreement has no relation with the flow of 
trade between the UAE and the rest of the regions as the p-value was higher than 5%. 
Therefore, when it comes to the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(IPPA/BIT) we observe that the UAE has more prospects to make more trade with 
Sub-Saharan African, and East Asian countries that it has signed and ratified 
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Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) with, simply due to the 
trade facilitation incentives that this agreement brings to traders from both sides. This 
ultimately translates to prospective ease of flow of the goods and services that are 
being traded between both the UAE and the other country.  
Therefore, its positive impact on the flow of trade with Africa, and East Asia is 
commendable and should be taken into consideration when we assess the trade 
potential with any country within those regions. That being said, we emphasize also 
on the higher prospects of having signed and ratified Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) with African countries, and East Asian countries 
due to the highly positive relationship that eventually is reflected on the magnitude of 
the trade possibilities and transactions that could be executed and ultimately boosting 
the overall non-oil bilateral trade of the UAE. Next, we shall discuss having signed, 
and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) as an 
economic diplomacy tool to boost investment flow between the UAE and the other 
countries and regions.  
We begin by looking at the effects of having signed and ratified Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) across all regions and countries and how it 
affects the flows of investment. As shown in the results tables discussed in the previous 
chapter, having signed and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(IPPA/BIT) similar to the case in the Trade Model, plays an insignificant role in 
determining the flows of investment between the UAE and the countries in various 
regions in the world. Thus, we do not have enough evidence that the total flow of 
foreign direct investments is related to having signed and ratified Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) between both the UAE and the other 
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countries in the world (p-value=0.407). However, when we tested each geographical 
region separately, the regression output revealed a significant negative coefficient of 
the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) variable in East Asia 
(p-value=0.040) and West Asia (p-value=0.021). 
We have also concluded that having signed and ratified Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) between the UAE and the rest of the regions in the 
world has no relation with the flow of foreign direct investments between the UAE 
and these regions as the p-value is more than 5%. Therefore, when it comes to having 
signed and ratified Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) we 
observe that the UAE has lesser prospects to grow the bilateral flow of investments 
with East and West Asian countries that it has a signed and ratified Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) despite the fact that this variable 
reflects confidence building for investors to protect their capitals and repatriation of 
their profit proceedings as well as other non-discriminative measures granted to 
foreign investors in both sides.  
4.2 Economic Diplomacy Policy Recommendations 
In this sub-section of the dissertation, we shall shed light on the recommendations for 
policymakers to use the right economic diplomacy tools with each region of the world 
and determine the most suitable way forward that provides the most positive impact 
on the flow of bilateral non-oil trade and foreign direct investments between the UAE 
and countries in these regions. We shall discuss the regions in alphabetical order. 
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4.2.1 Africa  
As a policy recommendation, the African region entails a potential in both bilateral 
non-oil trade as well as the bilateral flow of foreign direct investments. As for the 
recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and Africa, we recommend 
using specific economic diplomacy tools which have been shown to have a significant 
positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade. First, we recommend signing and 
ratifying the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) with 
African countries which have been contributing positively to the bilateral total non-oil 
trade flow between the UAE and Africa. Second, the policymakers should target 
African countries that have higher gross domestic product per capita and are larger in 
terms of the size of a population due to the high significance of these factors in 
boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with Africa. 
In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with African countries to 
boost the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool has been 
used in our augmented gravity model that showed any significance in boosting the 
foreign direct investments between the UAE and African countries. In conclusion, as 
shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools seem to be more effective in 
the boosting the trade only with Africa, and thus the recommendation is to focus on 
Trade with African countries although investments can be boosted and successful with 
African countries through other factors that are not included in this research. 
4.2.2 Arab Countries 
Moving to the Arab countries and as a policy, the region entails a potential in both 
bilateral non-oil trade as well as the bilateral flow of foreign direct investments. As for 
the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and Arab countries, I 
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recommend using specific economic diplomacy tools which have been shown to have 
a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade. First, the Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) should be avoided as it has an 
adverse impact on trade. However, the other economic agreements namely the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income (DTA), and the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) are insignificant for boosting the bilateral trade. 
The policymakers should target Arab countries that have higher gross domestic 
product per capita and are larger in terms of the size of a population due to the high 
significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with Arab countries. 
In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with Arab countries to 
boost the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool has been 
used in our augmented gravity model that showed any significance in boosting the 
foreign direct investments between the UAE and Arab countries. However, Arab 
countries that are higher in nominal GDP tend to have more investment flows with the 
UAE. 
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools in our model 
seem not to be significant in boosting the trade and investments flows with the Arab 
countries and thus the recommendation is to focus on Trade with the Arab countries 
that are high in gross domestic product per capita and are more abundant in population 
size. 
4.2.3 Australasia 
This region entails a potential in both bilateral non-oil trade as well as the bilateral 
flow of foreign direct investments. As for the recommendation to boost bilateral trade 
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between the UAE and Australasia, we recommend using specific economic diplomacy 
tools which have been shown to have a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-
oil trade. I recommend that the policymakers target countries in Australasia that have 
a higher population and large in terms of size in kilometre square as well as those 
countries that are farther from the UAE in the distance in kilometres due to the high 
significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with Australasia. 
However, the economic agreements and diplomatic missions do not have a significant 
effect on the bilateral non-oil trade. 
In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with Australasia countries 
to boost the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool has been 
used in our augmented gravity model that showed any significance in boosting the 
foreign direct investments between the UAE and Australasia countries. In conclusion, 
as shown in our model output, the country attributes of population, area and distance 
seem to be more effective in boosting the trade only with Australasia and thus the 
recommendation is to focus on Trade with Australasia countries although investments 
can be boosted and successful but are may be affected by other factors that are not 
included in this research. 
4.2.4 Caribbean 
As for the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and the 
Caribbean. The policymakers should target Caribbean countries that have higher gross 
domestic product per capita, smaller in geographic size in square kilometres, farther in 
terms of distance and are larger in terms of the size of a population due to the high 
significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with the Caribbean. 
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In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with Caribbean countries 
to boost the overall foreign direct investments, there are no economic diplomacy tool 
that have been used in our augmented gravity model that showed any significance in 
boosting the foreign direct investments between the UAE and the Caribbean region as 
there have not been enough observations over the 18 years period from 1999-2017. In 
conclusion, as shown in our model output, there are no economic diplomacy tools that 
boost the trade and investments with the Caribbean region which may be boosted and 
successful by other factors that are not included in this research. 
4.2.5 East Asia 
As for the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and East Asia, I 
recommend using specific economic diplomacy tools which have been shown to have 
a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade. First, I recommend signing 
and ratifying the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) with 
East Asian countries which have been contributing positively to the bilateral total non-
oil trade flow between the UAE and East Asia. Also, East Asian countries should be 
encouraged and even supported to open missions in the UAE and even increase the 
number of their embassies and consulates as it has been proven that the more missions 
of East Asian countries in the UAE, the higher the bilateral non-oil trade is between 
them and the UAE. Moreover, the policymakers should target East Asian countries 
that have higher gross domestic product per capita and are larger in terms of the size 
of a population due to the high significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral 
non-oil trade with East Asia. 
In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with East Asian countries 
to boost the overall foreign direct investments, there are several economic diplomacy 
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tools that have been used in our augmented gravity model and showed moderate to 
high significance in boosting the foreign direct investments between the UAE and East 
Asian countries. Having a signed and ratified Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with East 
Asian countries have been proven to enhance the flows of bilateral foreign direct 
investments both ways. Moreover, a critical factor that policymakers should take into 
consideration when assessing the potential with East Asian countries is the gross 
domestic product which as it goes higher in both the UAE and East Asian countries, it 
tends to boost the flow of bilateral foreign direct investments both ways. 
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools have been 
shown to be effective in the boosting the trade with East Asia, and thus the 
recommendation is to focus on both Trade and Investment enablers, determinants and 
economic diplomacy tools with East Asian countries, although investments can also 
be boosted and successful by other factors that may not have been included in this 
dissertation. 
4.2.6 Europe 
In terms of the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and Europe, 
I encourage using specific economic diplomacy tools which have been shown to have 
a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade. I also recommend signing 
and ratifying a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with European countries as it has a 
significant positive impact on trade and shall result in enhancing the bilateral non-oil 
trade between the UAE and Europe. Also, policymakers and traders too should 
consider focusing on the European countries which have higher gross domestic 
product per capita and are larger in terms of the size of a population due to the high 
significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with Europe. In 
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terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with Europe countries to 
boost the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool has been 
used in our augmented gravity model that boost the foreign direct investments between 
the UAE and European countries.  
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools have been 
shown to be effective in the boosting the trade with Europe, and thus the 
recommendation is to focus on Trade enablers, determinants and economic diplomacy 
tools with European countries, although investments can also be boosted and 
successful by other factors that may not have been included in this dissertation. 
4.2.7 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
As for the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and the members 
of GCC, I recommend using specific economic diplomacy tools which have been 
shown to have a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade. First, I 
recommend that the policymakers and business people to target GCC states that have 
higher gross domestic product per capita and are larger in terms of the size of 
population, in addition to those countries that have shared borders with the UAE 
namely, Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, due to the high significance of these 
factors in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with the GCC states. Being an Island in 
the GCC states should be a plus when assessing the trade potential between this 
country and the UAE. Second, I recommend increasing the number of Gulf 
Cooperation Council missions in the UAE namely the consulates as it has a highly 
significant positive impact on the overall flow of bilateral non-oil trade. 
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In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries to boost the overall foreign direct investments, there are no 
economic diplomacy tool that have been used in our augmented gravity model that 
showed any significance in boosting the foreign direct investments between the UAE 
and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. However, I recommend that 
policymaker and investors to consider those Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which 
have a higher gross domestic product as this is the only factor has been proven to 
enhance the bilateral flow of foreign direct investments with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. 
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools are proven to 
be effective in boosting the trade and investment with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries and thus the recommendation is to continue focusing on Trade and 
investment with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries although both can be 
boosted and successful more factors that are not included in this research. 
4.2.8 North America 
As a policy recommendation and spawning from the results in chapter 4 and discussion 
in chapter 5, the North American region is shown to entail a potential in both bilateral 
non-oil trade, but a lesser potential in the bilateral flow of foreign direct investments. 
As for the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and North 
America, we recommend using specific economic diplomacy tools which have been 
shown to have a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade.  
As proven empirically, the policymakers should target North American countries that 
have higher gross domestic product per capita and are larger in terms of the size of a 
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population due to the high significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral non-
oil trade with North America. Moreover, being previously colonised is a decisive 
factor that should be considered as it has been proven to boost the bilateral trade 
between the United Arab Emirates and North American Countries. In terms of the 
economic diplomacy tools that are effective with North American countries to boost 
the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool has been used in 
our augmented gravity model which showed any significance in boosting the foreign 
direct investments between the UAE and North American countries.  
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools seem to be 
less effective in boosting the trade with North America, while the attributes of the gross 
domestic product per capita, being colonized, and the size of the population are the 
only factors that when they are higher, they tend to positively boost the bilateral flow 
of non-oil trade between the UAE and North America. Thus the recommendation is to 
focus on Trade with North American countries although investments can be boosted 
and successful, it may be affected by other factors that are not included in this research. 
4.2.9 Pacific 
I recommend looking at specific attributes which have been shown to have a 
significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade. I recommend targeting the 
Pacific Islands that are larger in terms of the size of a population due to the high 
significance of this factor in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with the Pacific. 
However, the more distant the Pacific country, the more negative impact we observed 
in the total flow of trade between both sides, moreover the larger the Pacific country 
in terms of area in square kilometres, also the lesser the total bilateral non-oil trade 
between them and the UAE. 
166 
  
 
 
 
In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with the Pacific countries 
to boost the overall foreign direct investments, there are no economic diplomacy tool 
that have been used in our augmented gravity model that showed any significance in 
boosting the foreign direct investments between the UAE and Pacific countries, mainly 
because there have been insufficient observations of the flow of investment over the 
18 years between 1999 and 2016. 
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools seem to be 
less effective in boosting the trade with the Pacific region and thus the 
recommendation is to still focus on Trade and investments with Pacific countries 
although trade and investments can be boosted and successful but are may be affected 
by other factors that are not included in this research. 
4.2.10 South America 
In this sub-section, as a policy recommendation for South America and building on the 
results in chapter 4 and discussion in chapter 5, the South America region entails a 
potential in both bilateral non-oil trade as well as the bilateral flow of foreign direct 
investments. As for the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and 
South America, I recommend using specific economic attributes which have been 
shown to have a significant positive impact on the bilateral non-oil trade.  
So, I recommend those policymakers and businessmen to consider focusing on the 
South American countries which have higher gross domestic product per capita, 
countries that have been previously colonized, and those that are larger in terms of the 
size of population due to the high significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral 
non-oil trade with South America. However, policymakers and traders should take into 
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consideration that the farther in terms of distance the South American country is from 
the UAE, the more negative impact that has in hindering the flow of the total non-oil 
bilateral trade between both sides. 
In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with South America 
countries to boost the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool 
has been used in our augmented gravity model that boost the foreign direct investments 
between the UAE and South American countries. However, the more embassies and 
consulates in the UAE from South America, the lesser the flow of investments. 
Similarly, being a landlocked country in South America is proven to hinder the flow 
of foreign direct investments between the UAE and this region. 
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools have been 
shown to be lesser effective in boosting the trade and investments with South America, 
and thus the recommendation is to focus on Trade and investment determinants with 
South American countries, although trade and investments can also be boosted and 
successful by other factors that may not have been included in this research. 
4.2.11 West Asia 
Finally, the recommendation to boost bilateral trade between the UAE and West Asia 
is that, first, policymakers and businessmen should consider focusing on the West 
Asian countries which are landlocked geographically, and those that have higher gross 
domestic product per capita and are larger in terms of the size of population due to the 
high significance of these factors in boosting the bilateral non-oil trade with West Asia. 
Being historically colonised is also an essential factor in the trade relations between 
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the UAE and West Asia, as it is evident that being ever colonised affects the bilateral 
flow of non-oil trade between the UAE and West Asia positively.  
However, some attributes affect the bilateral trade negatively with West Asian 
countries. The larger the west Asian country in area in square kilometres, the lesser 
bilateral non-oil trade flows is shown with the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, the 
more distant the West Asian country is the more negative impact that imposes on the 
overall total flow of non-oil bilateral trade between the United Arab Emirates and West 
Asia. In terms of the economic diplomacy tools that are effective with West Asian 
countries to boost the overall foreign direct investments, no economic diplomacy tool 
has been shown in our augmented gravity model to have significance in affecting the 
foreign direct investments between the UAE and West Asian countries.  
As it has been evident in our results, The United Arab Emirates should consider 
limiting the number of West Asian countries missions in the UAE as well as the 
number of representative consulates of the those countries as this has been proven to 
adversely affect the bilateral flow of foreign direct investments between the United 
Arab Emirates and West Asia. Moreover, The Avoidance of Double Taxation on 
Income has been proved to negatively impact the flow of investments between the 
United Arab Emirates and this region. Thus, the recommendation is to hinder the 
efforts to sign this agreement with countries within this region. 
In conclusion, as shown in our model output, economic diplomacy tools are effective 
only in hindering the investments with West Asia. Thus, the recommendation is to 
focus on trade enablers and determinants with West Asian countries. As the economic 
diplomacy tools used in our model, it seemed to negatively affect investments 
especially those related to foreign diplomatic missions of West Asian countries in the 
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UAE and ratifying the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income Agreement (DTA) 
although investments could be boosted and successful by other factors and economic 
diplomacy tools that may not have been included in this research. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
All in All, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of some of the 
Economic Diplomacy tools used in the UAE Foreign Policy on the flow of the bilateral 
foreign investments and non-oil trade.  
The objectives of this dissertation are to assess the effectiveness of the Economic 
Diplomacy tools in delivering the desired outcomes on trade and investment and 
ultimately on the political bilateral and multilateral weight of the UAE, as well as to 
examine the inter-relationship between the desired trade and investment outcomes and 
the agreements either bilateral or Free Trade Agreements signed on a multilateral level 
through the GCC and their impact on the flow of trade and investments.   
Towards this end, the dissertation provides a set of criteria and recommendations to be 
used to successfully evaluate initiatives towards boosting the flow of investments and 
trade, where the foreign policy can contribute further to the economic development 
and prosperity of the UAE, in line with what Young (2017a) has also discussed. The 
dissertation also built on the arguments made by Moons and van Bergeijk (2016) by 
providing the means by which new markets can be opened, identify and remove trade 
and investment impediments, attract new investments and the use of multi-country 
systems such as Free Trade Agreements as also described by Selmier and Oh (2013). 
Meanwhile, in comparison with the argument made by Lee (2010), this dissertation 
affirms that economic diplomacy combines the role of diplomats as international 
relations agents and as international political economists, moreover diplomacy caters 
a holistic set of social, economic, political and cultural factors that also contribute to 
the flow of trade and investments.  
171 
  
 
 
 
Theoretically, and in between the two schools of thought, namely realist theories 
described by Gowa and Mansfield (1993) and liberalism theories discussed by 
Moravcsik (2001), this dissertation leans more towards the realist theories which argue 
that the foreign political agenda drives the international flow of trade. Although, 
eventually the dissertation agrees with Gawarkiewicz and Tang (2017) that the 
relationship between politics and trade is far more complex and involves other factors 
that the dissertation might not have covered. Similarly, the research agrees with 
Gawarkiewicz and Tang (2017) that the quality of the government in the host country 
and the political relations affect the flow of investments too. A key finding affirmed 
by this dissertation is the need to explore further the impact of embassies, consulates 
and trade offices in facilitating and promoting trade and investments, in line with the 
arguments made by Saner and Yiu (2003) while tailored explicitly to the United Arab 
Emirates. 
The study reaffirmed that the use of the gravity model in applied research of bilateral 
trade and investment is theoretically justified. It has citations of a wide range of applied 
research where the gravity model is applied to examine the bilateral trade and 
investment patterns and relationship. The gravity model used, which was developed 
for trade, was developed similar to the model used by Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011) 
while the investment gravity model was based on Gawarkiewicz and Tang (2017) 
model with modified variables taking into consideration the work of Rahman (2003), 
and Batra (2006) in order to compare and contrast those variables effects on both 
investment and trade for the case of the UAE. The data was collected from various 
sources and reflect the amounts of trade and investment over 18 years from 1999 till 
2016. The econometric issues have been checked and found that the generalised 
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gravity model fits the data. Also, the Fixed and Random effects were tested, but due 
to time-invariant variables, the Random Effects Generalized Least Square Regression 
with robust standard errors was conducted in this research.  
The key findings drawn from this dissertation results outline several recommendations 
to boost the bilateral trade and investments with various regions in the world. Each 
economic diplomacy tool, country attributes and trade and investment enablers were 
tested to identify the best tools to be used in which region. Moreover, several 
recommendations were to avoid using specific tools in some regions due to their 
negative impact on either trade or investments. A key argument here is that although 
the econometrics results show that many economic diplomacy tools were statistically 
insignificant, these tools might not have been used effectively nor properly which 
opens a new area of research to test for. Moreover, the negative impact of some tools 
may be explained by other arguments such as other micro- and macroeconomic, socio-
economic and demographic factors beyond this dissertation. 
An important finding is the empirically proven insignificant of having embassies, 
missions, and consulates due to their limited and statistically insignificant role in 
boosting the trade and investments in many regions while having negative and positive 
effects in only five regions namely Africa (Negative), East Asia (Positive), Gulf 
Cooperation Council (Positive), South America (Negative) and West Asia (Negative). 
Therefore, it is an interesting area of research to explore further their impact on the 
bilateral trade and investments and the intrinsic and extrinsic factors affecting their 
effects on trade and investments. 
The results also show that the United Arab Emirates’ significant trade determinants 
are: the Gross Domestic Product per Capita, the size of the population, and having a 
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common language, i.e. Arabic. All three factors affect the United Arab Emirates’ trade 
positively. Meanwhile, the results also show that the major determinants of foreign 
direct investments are: the Nominal Gross Domestic Product and the size of the 
population, and having a common language, these three factors affect the United Arab 
Emirates’ foreign direct investments positively flow both ways. 
Regionally, the estimates of the United Arab Emirates’ global trade potential reveal 
that the potential of the total bilateral non-oil trade is high with the East Asia region, 
followed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, Europe, and African counties. While the 
investment was affected by the economic diplomacy tools mainly in East Asia region 
only.  In addition, and looking at the analysis made by Okano-Heijmans (2010) on 
Japans economic diplomacy tools, this dissertation adds on it that the economic 
agreements, namely the Free Trade Agreements, the Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (IPPA/BIT) and the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income 
(DTA) also have an evident impact on trade and investments of the UAE in different 
magnitudes and ways with every region of the world. However, this dissertation 
showed that in some regions the agreements boost trade and investments, while in 
other regions they negatively impact the trade and investments, while sometimes they 
merely are statistically insignificant.  
The irrelevant and negative results discussed in Chapter 4 – Discussion especially 
those of the UAE Embassies and foreign embassies entails future in-depth studies to 
identify the intrinsic and extrinsic factors that may have caused these effects. In the 
meantime, it would be essential to look at the budgets, several people and the 
qualification of the staff at each embassy or mission to best assign personnel to the 
right missions in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Moreover, the dissertation 
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also suggests providing specialised training programs for diplomats in specific 
technical areas that will enable them to do their jobs effectively and efficiently towards 
the goals and objectives sat to them. 
The dissertation also adds to the emphasis on the importance of investing in logistics 
and transport to overcome the negative effect of distance and large-sized countries in 
square kilometres, as Almezaini (2012) argued that the United Arab Emirates enjoys 
an advantageous geographical location thus acting as a bridge from the west to the east 
and vice versa. The results also offer indirect support for the emerging empirical 
literature on new and intangible barriers or enablers to trade and investments. Indeed, 
in the findings, higher income countries tend to have more flow of trade and 
investment with the UAE, and most of those have shown a positive impact of having 
embassies and trade offices and sign agreements with, this is another corroboration of 
the role economic diplomacy plays. Typically, the low volumes of trade and 
investments with the Caribbean and Pacific islands are mainly linked with the limited 
infrastructure, connectivity and trade facilitation as well as lack of data availability.  
This analysis adds a new element to that discussion namely the need to establish 
foreign embassies from these regions in the United Arab Emirates in order to establish 
a good political relationship that breeds trust as an important trade and investment 
facilitator. Moreover, when it comes to the UAE Vision 2021 (2010) which states that 
knowledgeable and innovative Emiratis will confidently build a competitive and 
resilient economy. Towards this end, several sectors shall benefit from the enhanced 
flow of bilateral non-oil trade as well as foreign direct investments. First of all, job 
creation is a crucial element that shall contribute to the UAE Vision 2021 by 
harnessing the full potential of the UAE Nationals in the economy.  
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It shall also contribute in sustaining the UAE’s drive towards economic diversification 
through expanding to new strategic sectors to channel the UAE national’s energies 
towards industries and services that shall provide a long-term competitive advantage 
to the UAE. As innovation, research, science and technology will build the pillars of 
the UAE knowledge-based economy, the new investments and ventures will provide a 
greater opportunity to create a generation of entrepreneurs that shall excel the 
partnership between the public and private sectors towards the productive and efficient 
economy. The sectors of infrastructure, logistics, fast-moving consumers goods, 
information and communication technologies, FinTech, Block-Chain technologies, 
industries, innovation and services shall include the main drivers and thus recipients 
of the majority of investments in the coming years. 
In conclusion, this research provided new sets of policy recommendations for the 
United Arab Emirates use Economic Diplomacy tools in its foreign policy and its 
effects on the overall trade and investment. In addition to the findings above, this 
dissertation opened up several questions for future investigation and research. One of 
these questions is to examine the reasons why some economic diplomacy tools are 
more important or significant than the others. More arguments can also be examined 
as a continuation from this research such as testing the importance and significance of 
the geopolitical factors that may antagonise and obfuscate the economic diplomacy 
tools impact on the bilateral non-oil trade and flow of foreign direct investments.  
Moreover, it would also be of interest to test the efficiency within the economic 
diplomacy agents namely diplomats, trade consular, officers and others and their role 
in executing the various tools. Their effects should be looked at to determine whether 
the use of these tools have been successful or other ways of implementation could 
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impact the outcomes in more significant ways. These broad prospects of research are 
only a small fraction of the potential possibilities that can be looked at. The growing 
use of economic diplomacy worldwide and the systemizing of its implementation is a 
rich area of research for academics. As the potential is high and the prospects are wide, 
this research is a stepping stone for more research about the United Arab Emirates 
Economic Diplomacy.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Variables Descriptions and Data Sources 
 
Trade Investment
Both D ij
the distance between country i and country j measured between the two latitude-longitude 
combinations
GPS coordinates Distance between 
both capitals
Negative Negative
Trade only Yi*Yj
the GDP per capital PPP – Purchase Power Parity -  in US Dollars for each country i and j 
for a given year, multiplied to avoid collinearity
The Economist Intelligence Unit Positive Positive
Investment Only GDPi*GDPj
the nominaly GDP  in US Dollars for each country i and j for a given year, multiplied to 
avoid collinearity
The Economist Intelligence Unit Positive Positive
Both Pop i * Pop j Denotes the average population of countries I and j for a given year The Economist Intelligence Unit Positive Positive
Both Area i * Area j The area of the country in square kilometers CIA World Fact Book 2018 Negative Negative
Both EmbCon ij Positive Positive
Both EmbCon ji Positive Positive
Both LandLocked The variable is binary in nature and denotes whether country j is landlocked or not CIA World Fact Book 2018 Negative Negative
Both Island The variable is binary in nature and denotes whether country j is an island or not CIA World Fact Book 2018 Negative Negative
Both Language
The variable is binary in nature and denotes whether countries i and j share a common 
language or not
CIA World Fact Book 2018 Positive Positive
Both BorderShare The variable is binary in nature and denotes whether countries i and j share borders together Google Inc Positive Positive
Both Colonized
the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether country i and j have been both 
colonized or not
CIA World Fact Book 2018 Positive Positive
Both FTA ij
the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether a Free Trade Agreement is in place 
between countries i and j. We only included Free Trade Agreements that are signed, ratified 
and are currently in effect
UAE Ministry of Economy Positive Positive
Both BIT ij
the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether a Protection and Promotion of 
Investment Agreement is in place between countries i and j. We only included Protection 
and Promotion of Investment Agreements that are signed, ratified and are currently in effect
UAE Ministry of Finance Positive Positive
Both DTA ij
the variable is binary in nature and denotes whether the Avoidance of Double Taxation on 
Income Agreement is in place between countries i and j. We only included Avoidance of 
Double Taxation on Income Agreements that are signed, ratified and are currently in effect
UAE Ministry of Finance Positive Positive
Both ε ij Error term N/A
Expected Sign
Not Applicable
Denotes the number of embassies and consulates of each country I and j that have been 
established in both countries at any point in time
UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Cooperation
Model Variable Description Source
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Trade Summary Statistics    
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
YjxYi overall 20.11095 1.214096 16.73117 22.94564 N =    3330
between 1.196696 17.50648 22.77359 n =     185
within 0.2219523 17.88109 20.94931 T =      18
PopixPopj overall 3.537511 2.137514 -3.566308 9.449656 N =    3330
between 2.083991 -2.800994 8.94152 n =     185
within 0.4981207 2.10731 4.745625 T =      18
AreaixAreaj overall 3.117195 0.1185967 2.690225 3.330245 N =    3330
between 0.1189006 2.690225 3.330245 n =     185
within 0 3.117195 3.117195 T =      18
Distance overall 8.577107 0.7260946 5.70711 9.656371 N =    3330
between 0.7279557 5.70711 9.656371 n =     185
within 0 8.577107 8.577107 T =      18
Language overall 0.1081081 0.3105635 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.3113596 0 1 n =     185
within 0 0.1081081 0.1081081 T =      18
BorderShare overall 0.0108108 0.103427 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.1036921 0 1 n =     185
within 0 0.0108108 0.0108108 T =      18
Landlocked overall 0.2108108 0.4079456 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.4089912 0 1 n =     185
within 0 0.2108108 0.2108108 T =      18
Island overall 0.2486486 0.4322946 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.4334026 0 1 n =     185
within 0 0.2486486 0.2486486 T =      18
Colonized overall 0.9837838 0.1263251 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.1266489 0 1 n =     185
within 0 0.9837838 0.9837838 T =      18
FTA overall 0.090991 0.2876395 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.2788847 0 1 n =     185
within 0.0731913 -0.409009 0.6465465 T =      18
BIT overall 0.1531532 0.3601892 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.3253898 0 1 n =     185
within 0.1561998 -0.7912913 1.097598 T =      18
DTA overall 0.2258258 0.4181878 0 1 N =    3330
between 0.3426443 0 1 n =     185
within 0.2409886 -0.7186186 1.17027 T =      18
EmbConji overall 0.7105105 0.8439227 0 2 N =    3330
between 0.8155179 0 2 n =     185
within 0.224794 -0.7894895 2.266066 T =      18
EmbConij overall 0.3408408 0.5182595 0 4 N =    3330
between 0.4738821 0 2.444444 n =     185
within 0.212545 -1.103604 1.896396 T =      18
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Continued) 
Investment Summary Statistics 
           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
GDPixGDPj overall 8.446108 2.591017 0.2949476 15.76524 N =    3303
between 2.396202 1.787463 14.91218 n =     184
within 1.00121 5.136541 10.26181 T-bar = 17.9511
POPixPOPj overall 3.533987 2.142548 -3.566308 9.449656 N =    3312
between 2.089124 -2.800994 8.94152 n =     184
within 0.4984755 2.103787 4.742101 T =      18
AREAi x AREAj overall 22.73519 2.553801 14.735 27.94518 N =    3312
between 2.560382 14.735 27.94518 n =     184
within 5.93E-15 22.73519 22.73519 T =      18
Distance overall 6580.25 4064.74 301 15621 N =    3312
between 4075.216 301 15621 n =     184
within 0 6580.25 6580.25 T =      18
Language overall 0.1086957 0.311304 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.3121062 0 1 n =     184
within 0 0.1086957 0.1086957 T =      18
Bordershare overall 0.0108696 0.1037047 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.103972 0 1 n =     184
within 0 0.0108696 0.0108696 T =      18
Landlocked overall 0.2119565 0.4087559 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.4098093 0 1 n =     184
within 0 0.2119565 0.2119565 T =      18
Island overall 0.2445652 0.429894 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.4310019 0 1 n =     184
within 0 0.2445652 0.2445652 T =      18
Colonized overall 0.9836957 0.1266624 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.1269888 0 1 n =     184
within 0 0.9836957 0.9836957 T =      18
FTA overall 0.0914855 0.2883418 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.2795643 0 1 n =     184
within 0.07339 -0.4085145 0.6470411 T =      18
BIT overall 0.1539855 0.3609894 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.3260801 0 1 n =     184
within 0.1566238 -0.7904589 1.09843 T =      18
DTA overall 0.2270531 0.4189905 0 1 N =    3312
between 0.3431712 0 1 n =     184
within 0.2416428 -0.7173913 1.171498 T =      18
EmbConji overall 0.714372 0.8445816 0 2 N =    3312
between 0.8160454 0 2 n =     184
within 0.2254042 -0.785628 2.269928 T =      18
EmbConij overall 0.3420894 0.5188715 0 4 N =    3312
between 0.4748699 0 2.444444 n =     184
within 0.2118586 -1.102355 1.897645 T =      18
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Table 3: Normality Tests- Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data, and 
Skewness/Kurtosis Normality Test 
  
 
 
      is valid for 4<=n<=2000.
Note: The normal approximation to the sampling distribution of W'
    EmbConij        3,330    0.98635     25.697     8.407    0.00000
    EmbConji        3,330    0.99648      6.624     4.896    0.00000
         DTA        3,330    0.99844      2.934     2.788    0.00266
         BIT        3,330    0.99697      5.699     4.507    0.00000
         FTA        3,330    0.99401     11.274     6.273    0.00000
   Colonized        3,330    0.96479     66.269    10.860    0.00000
      Island        3,330    0.99873      2.389     2.255    0.01207
  Landlocked        3,330    0.99822      3.356     3.135    0.00086
 BorderShare        3,330    0.94655    100.613    11.942    0.00000
    Language        3,330    0.99515      9.136     5.729    0.00000
    Distance        3,330    0.92674    137.889    12.758    0.00000
 AreaixAreaj        3,330    0.92218    146.477    12.914    0.00000
   PopixPopj        3,330    0.98494     28.349     8.661    0.00000
       YjxYi        3,330    0.98222     33.474     9.092    0.00000
 _TotalTrade        3,156    0.97723     40.832     9.589    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
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Table 4: Kurtosis and Skewness Data 
stats e Distance Yi * Yj Pop i * Pop j Area i * Area j 
 
Language Island BIT DTA EmbCon ji EmbCon ij 
sd 1.880148 0.726095 1.214096 2.137514 0.118597 
 
0.310564 0.432295 0.360189 0.418188 0.843923 0.51826 
variance 3.534957 0.527213 1.47403 4.568965 0.014065 
 
0.09645 0.186879 0.129736 0.174881 0.712206 0.268593 
se(mean) 0.033468 0.012583 0.021039 0.037041 0.002055 
 
0.005382 0.007491 0.006242 0.007247 0.014625 0.008981 
skewness -0.35739 -0.92169 -0.13709 -0.41163 -1.01413 
 
2.524126 1.163045 1.926204 1.311446 0.587762 1.279564 
kurtosis 4.282153 4.819603 2.171809 3.169402 3.745751 
 
7.371212 2.352674 4.710263 2.71989 1.656348 4.583815 
 
  
   
 
 
 
1
8
9
 
Table 5: Simple Correlation 
 
 
 
 
Total Trade Distance Yi * Yj Pop i * Pop j Area i * Area j Language BorderShare Landlocked Island Colonized FTA BIT DTA EmbCon UAEEmbCon
Total Trade 1
Distance -0.4349 1
Yi * Yj 0.3497 -0.0488 1
Pop i * Pop j 0.7007 -0.1456 -0.0559 1
Area i * Area j 0.4503 -0.0802 -0.1375 0.7753 1
Language 0.2408 -0.5201 0.0649 -0.002 0.0381 1
BorderShare 0.1344 -0.3393 0.1468 0.0104 0.087 0.2994 1
Landlocked -0.1171 -0.1819 -0.2603 0.0046 0.1041 -0.1909 -0.0571 1
Island -0.281 0.2746 0.1395 -0.4214 -0.5472 -0.1059 -0.0575 -0.2848 1
Colonized 0.0502 0.0536 0.0134 0.0145 -0.0161 0.0469 0.014 -0.1386 0.07 1
FTA 0.2741 -0.4995 0.2077 0.0313 0.025 0.7966 0.3296 -0.1526 -0.084 0.0426 1
BIT 0.3392 -0.2007 0.2116 0.2637 0.1481 0.1715 -0.047 0.0025 -0.1492 -0.057 0.2031 1
DTA 0.4057 -0.1741 0.2385 0.3317 0.109 0.0924 -0.06 -0.0815 -0.0502 0.073 0.1364 0.5869 1
EmbCon 0.6552 -0.414 0.3183 0.5439 0.3562 0.3991 0.1584 -0.1955 -0.161 0.0246 0.3832 0.4261 0.4436 1
UAEEmbCon 0.6408 -0.3326 0.3374 0.5311 0.3333 0.3408 0.1316 -0.1707 -0.1389 0.0231 0.3848 0.3732 0.4245 0.7544 1
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Table 6: Variance Inflation Factors 
Trade                          Investment 
 
 
Table 7: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 
    Mean VIF        2.52
                                    
   Colonized        1.10    0.910324
  Landlocked        1.31    0.764983
      Island        1.33    0.749547
         DTA        1.49    0.670937
 BorderShare        1.52    0.659901
         BIT        1.52    0.656156
    EmbConij        1.88    0.533252
    EmbConji        2.48    0.402486
         Dij        2.74    0.365321
   GDPixGDPj        2.82    0.354218
 AREAixAREAj        2.98    0.335381
   POPixPOPj        3.84    0.260289
         FTA        4.63    0.215813
    Language        5.68    0.176090
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
Table 3: Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Pop i * Pop j 4.14 0.241359 
Language 3.51 0.28458 
Area i * Area j 3.34 0.299563 
EmbCon ji 3.27 0.305693 
FTA 3.12 0.320794 
EmbCon ij 2.76 0.361681 
Distance 2.03 0.493702 
DTA 1.82 0.54867 
BIT 1.7 0.586876 
Island 1.7 0.589891 
Yi * Yj 1.52 0.658251 
Landlocked 1.43 0.69787 
BorderShare 1.28 0.783078 
Colonized 1.05 0.956629 
Mean VIF 2.33   
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   453.73
         Variables: fitted values of _TotalTrade
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table 8: F-Test for Fixed Effects for both Trade and Investment Models 
Trade Model: 
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Table 8: F-Test for Fixed Effects for both Trade and Investment Models (Continued) 
Investment Model:  
 
  
F test that all u_i=0: F(125, 774) = 4.06                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .61483133   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4078807
     sigma_u    1.7787641
                                                                              
       _cons    -.4907977   .9808287    -0.50   0.617    -2.416197    1.434602
    EmbConij    -.0016075   .2195141    -0.01   0.994     -.432521     .429306
    EmbConji    -.2052249   .3100476    -0.66   0.508    -.8138587    .4034089
         DTA    -.1976996   .2223005    -0.89   0.374    -.6340829    .2386838
         BIT    -.5089888   .2785606    -1.83   0.068    -1.055813     .037835
         FTA    -.0814176   .4485356    -0.18   0.856    -.9619081    .7990728
   Colonized            0  (omitted)
      Island            0  (omitted)
  Landlocked            0  (omitted)
 BorderShare            0  (omitted)
    Language            0  (omitted)
         Dij            0  (omitted)
 AREAixAREAj            0  (omitted)
   POPixPOPj    -.7675498   .3769947    -2.04   0.042    -1.507603   -.0274964
   GDPixGDPj     .8727518   .2127788     4.10   0.000     .4550598    1.290444
                                                                              
      FDIjit        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6491                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,774)          =       5.05
     overall = 0.0045                                         max =         14
     between = 0.0008                                         avg =        7.2
     within  = 0.0437                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: CountryCode                     Number of groups  =        126
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        907
note: Colonized omitted because of collinearity
note: Island omitted because of collinearity
note: Landlocked omitted because of collinearity
note: BorderShare omitted because of collinearity
note: Language omitted because of collinearity
note: Dij omitted because of collinearity
note: AREAixAREAj omitted because of collinearity
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Table 9: Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects in the Trade 
Model and the Investment Model 
Trade Model: 
 
 
 
Investment Model 
 
  
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  9031.33
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     1.765309       1.328649
                       e     .8130016        .901666
               _TotalT~e     11.04103       3.322804
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        _TotalTrade[CountryCode,t] = Xb + u[CountryCode] + e[CountryCode,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   190.58
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .7259852       .8520476
                       e     1.982128       1.407881
                  FDIjit     3.541628       1.881921
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        FDIjit[CountryCode,t] = Xb + u[CountryCode] + e[CountryCode,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
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Table 10: Hausman Test for the Trade Model and the Investment Model 
Trade Model:  
 
 
Investment Model:  
 
 
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =  -196.16    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    EmbConij     -.2423501    -.2715868        .0292368               .
    EmbConji     -.1101366    -.0647174       -.0454192               .
         DTA     -.1481029    -.1897876        .0416847               .
         BIT     -.1135125    -.1346037        .0210912               .
         FTA     -.2743938    -.2650316       -.0093622               .
   PopixPopj      2.092929     2.229011       -.1360819               .
       YjxYi      1.076847     .9905648        .0862825               .
                                                                              
                random_group fixed_group     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =   -14.99    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    EmbConij      .1429624    -.0016075        .1445698               .
    EmbConji     -.0475161    -.2052249        .1577088               .
         DTA     -.2547306    -.1976996        -.057031               .
         BIT     -.1660512    -.5089888        .3429376               .
         FTA     -.1817276    -.0814176         -.10031               .
   POPixPOPj      .2359239    -.7675498        1.003474               .
   GDPixGDPj      .2608224     .8727518       -.6119294               .
                                                                              
                random_group fixed_group     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Table 11: Empirical Results of the Random Effects GLS Regression of the Gravity 
Model of Bilateral non-Oil Trade Flow per Region (1999-2016)  
 
 
 
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 1.79 *** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) 1.13 *** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 2.15 *** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 *** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) - 27.39 *** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 *** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 *** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 12.46 *** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 0.95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) 0 (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 0.48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) 0.002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 0.99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) 0.09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) - 0.31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) 0.44 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
Overall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
South America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
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Table 11: Empirical Results of the Random Effects GLS Regression of the Gravity 
Model of Bilateral non-Oil Trade Flow per Region (1999-2016) (Continued) 
 
 
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 1.79 *** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) 1.13 *** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 2.15 *** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 *** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) - 27.39 *** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 *** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 *** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 12.46 *** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 0.95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) 0 (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 0.48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) 0.002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 0.99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) 0.09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) - 0.31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) 0.44 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
Overall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
South America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 79 ** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) 1.13 *** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 15 ** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 *** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) 27 39 ** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 *** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 ** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 12.46 *** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) 0 (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) 0.002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) 0.09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) 31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) 0.44 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
Overall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
South America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Ca ribean E st Asia Eu ope GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 1.79 *** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) 1.13 *** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 2.15 *** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 *** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) - 27.39 *** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 *** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 *** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 12.46 *** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 0.95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) 0 (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 0.48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) 0.002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 0.99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) 0.09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) - 0.31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) 0.44 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
Overall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
South America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
ote: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
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Table 11: Empirical Results of the Random Effects GLS Regression of the Gravity 
Model of Bilateral non-Oil Trade Flow per Region (1999-2016) (Continued) 
 
  
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 1.79 *** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) 1.13 *** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 2.15 *** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 *** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) - 27.39 *** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 *** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 *** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 12.46 *** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 0.95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) 0 (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 0.48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) 0.002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 0.99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) 0.09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) - 0.31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) 0.44 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
Overall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
South America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 1.79 *** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) .13 ** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 2.15 *** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 ** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) - 27.39 *** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 ** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 *** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 2.46 ** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 0.95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 0.48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) .002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 0.99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) .09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) - 0.31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) .4 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
Overall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
S th America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
Region
GDP Per Capita 1.07 *** (0.06) 1.51 *** (0.13) 0.93 *** (0.15) - 1.29 ** (0.56) 1.79 *** (0.40) 1.32 *** (0.14) 1.52 *** (0.11) 0.80 ** (0.33) 1.13 *** (0.15) 0.22 (0..44) 3.38 *** (0.47) 1.04 *** (0.19) 0.86 *** (0.11)
Population 2.09 *** (0.03) 2.64 *** (0.66) 1.79 *** (0.07) 2.06 *** (0.21) 2.15 *** (0.20) 1.63 *** (0.10) 1.46 *** (0.07) 1.35 *** (0.05) 1.96 *** (0.11) 2.34 *** (0.39) 1.27 *** (0.18) 1.70 *** (0.11) 1.55 *** (0.05)
Area - 13.53 *** (1.18) - 22.12 *** (2.67) - 10.95 *** (3.88) 63.12 *** (14.61) - 27.39 *** (7.08) - 11.83 *** (2.45) - 8.76 *** (2.41) - 20.0 *** (5.07) - 22.62 *** (2.86) - 15.20 *** (4.58) - 7.20 (4.53) - 10.43 ** (4.20) - 11.60 *** (1.69)
Distance - 1.07 *** (0.18) - 0.47   (0.72) - 0.78 (0.49) 29.39 *** (5.18) 42.62 *** (14.20) - 2.65 ** (1.10) 0.03 (0.77) - 0.33 (0.31) - 12.46 *** (2.08) - 4.53 ** (1.88) - 14.96 *** (3.53) - 2.55 *** (0.98) - 0.06 (0.33)
Language 1.72 *** (0.43) 3.79 *** (1.24) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.21 ** (1.00)
Border Sharing - 0.31 (1.06) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 2.63 ** (1.12) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked 0.03 (0.28) - 0.69   (0.42) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.63 (0.61) - 0.23 (0.34) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.90 (0.60) 1.39 ** (0.62) 0 (omitted)
Island 0.04 (0.31) - 0.91   (0.767) 21.76 * (12.2) 0 (omitted) 0.95 (1.25) - 0.27 (0.48) 0.48 (0.47) 22.64 *** (4.29) 0 (omitted) 81.15 *** (27.19) 0 (omitted) 1.56 (1.28) 0.13 (0.34)
Colonized 0.73 (0.80) 38.82 *** (11.74) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 361.19 *** (119.03) 0 (omitted) - 1.01 (0.91) 0 (omitted) 161.80 *** (27.37) 0 (omitted) 93.50 ** (43.82) 2.42 ** (0.95) 16.72 *** (5.87)
FTA - 0.27 (0.20) 0 (omitted) - 0.94 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 1.64 *** (0.41) 0.46 *** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - 0.11 (0.11) 1.99 *** (0.64) - 0.38 ** (0.16) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.15 *** (0.23) 0.21 (0.14) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.16 (0.18) - 0.02 (0.12)
DTA - 0.14 * (0.07) - 0.55 ** (0.25) - 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.41) 0.48 (1.47) - 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.07) 0 (omitted) 0.002 (0.22) 0.11 (2.01) 0.09 (0.61) - 0.25 (0.16) - 0.05 (0.09)
Foreign Missions - 0.11 (0.07) - 0.64 *** (0.15) 0.11 (0.29) 0.34 (0.38) 0.99 (0.78) 0.53 ** (0.24) 0.02 (0.11) 24.49 *** (4.82) 0.09 (0.12) 0.81 (1.87) - 0.12 (0.31) - 0.17 (0.14) 0.60 *** (0.11)
UAE Missions - 0.24 *** (0.08) - 0.73 *** (0.18) 21.12 (13.3) - 0.10 (0.37) - 0.31 (1.09) - 0.17 (0.19) - 0.03 (0.09) 0 (omitted) 0.44 (0.34) 0 (omitted) - 0.24 (0.38) - 0.27 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)
Constant 25.16 *** (4.40) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 454.96 *** (82.33) 0 29.81 ** (14.53) - 5.05 (8.57) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 26.96 (17.57) 0 (omitted)
verall R2
Overall
0.94 0.38 0.54 0.86
South America West Asia
0.95 0.47 0.94 0.85 0.91
G20
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.61 0.63
Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania
0.780.72
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Table 12: Empirical Results of the Random Effects GLS Regression of the Gravity 
Model of Foreign Direct Investments Flow per Region (1999-2016) 
 
 
 
Region
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 0.63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1.61 (1.14) 0.72 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) 0.31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - 1.02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3.56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159.21) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1.74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) 0 (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - 0.39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0.64) - 1.61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0.74) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania South America West Asia
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Table 12: Empirical Results of the Random Effects GLS Regression of the Gravity 
Model of Foreign Direct Investments Flow per Region (1999-2016) (Continued) 
 
 
Region
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 0.63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1.61 (1.14) 0.72 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) 0.31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - 1.02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3.56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159.21) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1.74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) 0 (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - 0.39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0.64) - 1.61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0.74) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania South America West AsiaRegion
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 0.63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1.61 (1.14) 0. 2 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) .31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - .02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3.56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159. 1) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1 74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) 0 (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - .39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0.64) - 1.61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0.7 ) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Eu ope GCC North America Oceania South America West AsiaRegion
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 0.63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1.61 (1.14) 0.72 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) 0.31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - 1.02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3.56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159.21) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1.74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) 0 (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - 0.39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0.64) - 1.61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0.74) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania South America West Asia
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Table 12: Empirical Results of the Random Effects GLS Regression of the Gravity 
Model of Foreign Direct Investments Flow per Region (1999-2016) (Continued) 
 
 
 
Region
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 0.63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1.61 (1.14) 0.72 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) 0.31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - 1.02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3.56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159.21) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1.74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) 0 (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - 0.39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0.64) - 1.61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0.74) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania South America West AsiaRegion
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1 61 (1.14) 0.72 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) 0.31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - 1 02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3 56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159.21) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1.74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - 0.39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0. 4) - 61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0. 4) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania South America West AsiaRegion
GDP Per Capita 0.26 *** (0.07) - 0.38 (0.26) 1.19 ** (0.47) - 1.77 (1.67) 0.43 ** (0.18) 0.14 (0.21) 1.72 *** (0.51) 1.45 (1.12) - 0.63 (0.95) 0.29 (0.30)
Population 0.23 ** (0.10) 0.45 (0.30) - 1.22 (0.87) 3.85 (3.11) - 0.61 * (0.36) 0.26 (0.31) - 1.29 * (0.77) - 1.36 (1.87) 1.61 (1.14) 0.72 (0.47)
Area - 0.14 ** (0.06) - 0.06 (0.20) 0.16 (0.38) 0.67 (0.62) 0.31 (0.20) - 0.23 (0.17) - 0.62 (0.47) 0.37 (0.74) - 1.02 (0.68) 0.03 (0.35)
Distance - 0.12 (0.19) 0.46 (0.76) - 0.37 (0.85) - 1.05 (1.92) 1.11 (1.31) 1.24 (1.13) 1.55 * (0.80) 4.97 (14.84) - 3.56 (4.67) 0.59 (1.22)
Language 1.34 *** (0.46) 2.02 (1.48) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Border Sharing 0.74 (0.78) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 4.00 * (2.21) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Landlocked - 0.29 (0.29) - 0.95 * (0.52) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 1.09 (2.29) - 0.03 (0.56) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 3.08 ** (1.54) 0.55 (1.05)
Island 0.08 (0.30) 0.38 (1.85) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.45 (0.58) 0.57 (0.63) - 2.88 (3.39) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0.80 (1.68)
Colonized 0.50 (0.76) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 13.29 (12.11) 0.43 (1.17) 0 (omitted) - 62.47 (159.21) 63.97 (55.56) 2.43 (1.74)
FTA - 0.18 (0.35) 0 (omitted) 0.08 (1.28) 0 (omitted) 1.84 ** (0.83) - 0.07 (0.43) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
BIT - .016 (0.20) - 1.40 (1.79) - 0.73 (0.76) 0 (omitted) - 1.08 ** (0.52) 0.17 (0.33) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 0.22 (0.49)
DTA - 0.25 (0.17) - 0.56 (0.72) 0.67 (0.96) 1.86 (1.56) 0.40 (0.54) - 0.15 (0.23) 0 (omitted) - 1.32 (0.82) 0 (omitted) - 1.20 ** (0.51)
Foreign Missions - 0.04 (0.16) - 0.04 (0.37) 2.58 (1.75) 0.21 (1.00) - 0.39 (0.46) 0.47 (0.31) - 2.48 (4.34) 0.32 (0.64) - 1.61 ** (0.82) - 1.86 ** (0.90)
UAE Missions 0.14 (0.17) 0.38 (0.45) - 6.71 (13.17) - 0.48 (0.84) 0.45 (0.38) 0.17 (0.27) 0 (omitted) 0.37 (0.74) - 0.06 (0.69) 0.30 (0.92)
Constant 4.38 ** (1.91) 2.67 (8.35) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 5.04 (8.50) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) - 6.97 (13.63)
Overall R2
Not reported due to 
insufficient observations
Note: ***,**,* implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
0.40 0.48 0.68 0.45 0.350.24 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.19
Not reported due to 
insufficient 
observations
Overall Africa Arab Countries Australasia Carribean East Asia Europe GCC North America Oceania South America West Asia
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 1: P-P Plot of the Variables (Continued) 
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Figure 2: Plot of the Fitted Values against the Residuals 
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Figure 3: P-P Plot of the Error term 
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Figure 4: Economic Diplomacy Tools and Demographics that Boost the Bilateral Flow of Non-Oil Trade per Geographic Region 
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Figure 5: Economic Diplomacy Tools and Determinants that Reduce the Bilateral Flow of Non-Oil Trade 
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Figure 6: Economic Diplomacy Tools and Determinants that Boost the Bilateral Flow of Foreign Direct Investments 
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Figure 7: Economic Diplomacy Tools and Determinants that Reduce the Bilateral Flow of Foreign Direct Investments 
